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El gobierno ha de nacer del país. El espíritu del gobierno 
ha de ser el del país. La forma de gobierno ha de avenirse 
a la constitución propia del país. El gobierno no es más 
que el equilibrio de los elementos naturales del país. 
 
 
 
                                                                     José Martí, Nuestra América (1891) 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
There was no more exciting place to be on January 1 1959 than Havana, Cuba. 
It was the defining moment in the life of a nation, when all that came before it 
seemed to be a prelude. Fidel Castro led a revolution which had captivated an 
entire population and had swept a brutal tyrant from power. In the emotive 
moment of revolution, and, the significance of what happened next, an 
objective portrayal of Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar has somehow been lost to 
the annals of history. 
 
Batista is second only to Castro when it comes to being the Cuban leader who 
possessed all-encompassing and complete political dominance on the island. 
Despite his relevance, he remains a one-dimensional caricature. Popular 
culture perpetuates the impression that Batista was no more than a uniformed 
puppet of imperialism, friend to the American mafia, and brutal exploiter of 
WKH&XEDQSHRSOH ,Q0DULR3X]R¶V *RGIDWKHU 3DUW,,%DWLVWD ZKRKDG
promised that he would not tolerate guerrillas in the casinos or swimming 
pools) is portrayed as the archetypal dictator who permitted organised crime to 
control Cuba's lucrative hotel and gambling concessions. This portrayal of pre-
revolutionary Cuba (with its misrepresentations and simplifications) is too 
often blindly accepted as fact.      
 
The iniquities of pre-1959 Cuba are too often simplistically blamed on the 
vague notion of the tiranía. This is an opaque explanation which does nothing 
to accou4QW IRU WKHFRPSOH[LWLHV RI WKHSHULRG7KH H[KLELWV RI&XED¶V0XVHR
de la Revolución focus almost entirely on the insurgency of the 1950s and post 
1959 hiVWRU\ 9LVLWRUV DUHLQYLWHG WRHQWHU µ%DWLVWD¶V RIILFH¶ SRUWUD\HG DVD
kind of den of iniquity or lair of a tyrant). The office had been used by many 
presidents, including Gerardo Machado (who was possibly the most tyrannical 
Cuban leader). It was also used by presidents who been democratically elected 
in the most honest elections in Cuban history. Yet the museum places Batista 
on its Muro de los Cretinos and thanks him for making the revolution possible.  
 
Batista, the great usurper of Cuban history seized power in an almost bloodless 
golpe de estado in March 1952. He had toppled a discredited political system 
which he had initiated himself twelve years earlier. Despite the opposition that 
developed later on, in March 1952, most Cubans met the madrugón with 
apathy and relief , rather than outrage and resistance. This thesis is not an 
attempt to rehabilitate Batista, however, the one-dimensional caricature that we 
have inherited is superficial and discourages an accurate explanation of what 
bought him to power for the second time in 1952. As   inconvenient as it is to 
the revolutionary narrative, it is time to question why it was that almost 
nobody resisted.    
 
  
 
There is no vast body of literature on the subject of Batista. However Frank 
Argote-)UH\UH¶V 6) relatively recent biographical study does examine his 
personal and political life until his election as president in 1940. Otherwise, 
there are also some earlier biographical studies:  Edmund Chester (1954), Raúl 
Acosta Rubio (1943) and Ulpiano Vega Cobiellas (1955), but these are little 
more than pro-batistiano propaganda pieces, written by his friends. The rest of 
the literature overwhelmingly ignores his first tenure in power between 1933 
and 1944 (when he claimed to be a revolutionary and enjoyed his greatest 
popularity). His second tenure between 1952 and 1958 is uniformly referred to 
in terms of the repression and opposition to the Castro led rebellion. The 
EDWLVWLDQRV DUHDOZD\V µWKHRWKHU¶ DQGQHYHU µWKH VXEMHFW¶ RIKLVWRULFDO VWXG\  
 
Whilst Batista may have become the ostentatious protector of the wealthy later 
on, he   had been born into abject poverty and his story is the personification of 
WKH WHUP µUDJV WRULFKHV¶ 6RQRID&XEDQ:DURI,QGHSHQGHQFH YHWHUDQ KHZDV
born and raised in a bohío in the small eastern town of Banes, Holguín on 
January 16 1901 . His humble background and physical features played a 
constant role in his life and political career at a time when issues of race and 
class were so contentious.   His opponents exaggerated his African features and 
disparagingly referred to him as El Negro. He had spent his youth cutting sugar 
cane, picking oranges, and working on the railroads before joining the army as 
an enlisted soldier at the age of 20. Within three years he had learned the art of 
stenography, and had become a stenographer to President Alfredo Zayas. He 
subsequently rose through the ranks methodically;to be sure, the first half of 
his life gave no indication whatsoever as to what the second half would bring.                   
 
The historical context of his first tenure in power (the first Batistato) is 
investigated in the second chapter of this thesis, and, consists of three primary 
FRPSRQHQWV )LUVWO\ LW H[DPLQHV %DWLVWD¶V UHPDUNDEOH ULVH WRDSRVLWLRQ RI
power in 1933. He had come to power by leading a rebellion of enlisted men 
who toppled an elitist and corrupt officer corp. This study will examine the 
extent to which he really was a revolutionary in the 1930s as he claimed to be. 
Secondly, this research considers the extent that was a genuinely popular 
µSRSXOLVW¶ OHDGHU GXULQJ WKLV ILUVW SHULRG7KLUGO\ LW ORRNV DWKRZDQGZK\
sought to engineer a transition to genuine democracy in the late 1930s. It 
examines how he was democratically elected to the presidency in 1940, and, 
whether he left power in 1944 as a relatively popular president. Clifford (2005) 
DUJXHV WKDW E\WKHWLPH KHOHIW RIILFH KHKDG ³ZRQ WKHFRQILGHQFH RIWKH
ZHDOWK\ pOLWH ODERU DQGPDQ\ RWKHU JURXSV ´ &OLIIRUG $UJRWH-Freyre 
concurs that BaWLVWD KDG³JDLQHG HQRUPRXV QDWLRQDO DQGLQWHUQDWLRQDO
FUHGLELOLW\ ´ $UJRWH-Freyre, 2006:286) for his acceptance of the presidential 
election result of 1944 (in which his candidate Carlos Saladrigas lost), and his 
conduct as an international statesman during the Second World War.  
 
The military undoubtedly facilitated the coup and were (and always had been) 
%DWLVWD¶V SULPDU\ VSRQVRUV7KLV VWXG\ SUREHVWKHRULJLQV RIWKLV VXSSRUW DQG
specifically considers the significance of the revolución de los sargentos which 
first brought him to power in 1933. The marginalisation of officers during the 
eight years of Auténtico government between 1944 and 1952 is further 
investigated in chapter four. The Auténtico presidents who had succeeded 
  
 
Batista were products of the middle-class student struggle against Machado; 
whereas Batista had been a humble soldier, born into poverty, and had risen to 
become Jefe del Ejército and president. Most studies focus on the military 
(rather than civilian) support for the golpe de estado: Mills (1960), Perez 
(1976), Pérez-Stable (1999), García-Pérez (1999) and Skierka (2004). These 
studies argue that officers supported the coup as they sought to renew the pre-
eminence of the military in Cuban political life (which had been diminished 
undHU FRQVHFXWLYH $XWpQWLFR DGPLQLVWUDWLRQV /RXLV $3HUH]¶V VWXG\ LV
perhaps the most exhaustive investigation of the Batistiano army. His research 
examines the effects of pistolerismo (political violence) on the increasing 
discontent amongst officers in 1952, and, explores the notion that Batista relied 
on the support of the army rather than any civilian support (Perez, 1976:132).  
 
This thesis examines the rise of autenticismo, which became the dominant 
political doctrine in Cuba during the 1940s. This is investigated in chapter 
three, which focuses on the two Auténtico Party  governments of Ramón Grau 
San Martín (1944 until 1948) and Carlos Prío Socarrás (1948 until 1952). 
Much of the literature compartmentalises twentieth century Cuban history into 
three parts: the Plattist Republic (1902-33), the Batista era (1933-58), and the 
revolutionary post-1959 period. But this actually fails to account sufficiently 
for the almost eight years that Batista was not leader (between 1944 and 1952). 
This period saw two non-batistiano presidencies and should be treated as a 
distinctive era in itself. Whilst this period is generally under-researched in the 
historiography, a few studies do address the Auténticos in some depth. The 
PRVW FRPSOHWH DFFRXQW LV$PHULQJHU¶V study, The Cuban Democratic 
Experience. Jorge Domínguez (1978) and Samuel Farber (1976) also offer 
valuable analysis of the loss of legitimacy and discrediting of the political 
system during these years.  
 
Studies tend to offer broad, cryptic generalisatiRQV RI WKHµWKH&XEDQSHRSOH¶V¶
UHDFWLRQ 5XE\+DUW3KLOOLSV WDONV RID³PL[WXUH RIFRQIXVLRQ
UHVHQWPHQW DQGKRSH ´ +DUW3KLOOLSV  RWKHUV UHIHU WR³SDVVLYLW\ DQG
FRQIXVLRQ ´ $PHULQJHU  ³FRPSODFHQF\ ´ )DOFRII  DQG
³VWXQQHG DFTXLHVFHQFH ´ (QJOLVK 'DPLiQ )HUQiQGH] 
FRQFOXGHV WKDW ³WKH FRXSJHQHUDWHG PRUH DSDWK\ DQGF\QLFLVP WKDQ SRSXODU
RSSRVLWLRQ ´ )HUQiQGH] 7KHUHVHDUFK LQ WKLV WKHVLV FKDOOHQJHV WKHVH
vague explanations.   
 
Any support that Batista may have had outside of the military is explored in 
WKH IRXUWK FKDSWHU RIWKLV WKHVLV 7KLV VWXG\ FKDUWV%DWLVWD¶V MRXUQH\ IURP KLV
return to politics in 1948 until his discarding of the constitutional process in 
1952. It explores the response of Prío and the deposed politicos. Pérez-6WDEOH¶V
DUJXPHQW WKDW ³WKH $XWpQWLFRV ZHUHVSLQHOHVV LQ GHIHQGLQJ WKHLU
constitutional claim to power. They had breached their legitimacy while in 
office, and because of it, representative democracy passed away LQJORULRXVO\ ´
is explored (Pérez-Stable, 1999:52). This thesis equally considers the reactions 
of groups such as the students, Communists and trade unions.  
 
Batista was a fascinating and complex figure who was pivotal in shaping 
Cuban history. He was the orchestrator of massacres of army officers, he was a 
  
 
social reformer, he was a friend to the United States whilst simultaneously 
allying with the Communist Party, and he led a transition to genuine 
democracy and presided over one of the most progressive constitutions in the 
world at the time, before dismantling these achievements a decade later. There 
are many faces of Batista, he a complex and multi- layered historical character 
ZKLFK FDQQRW EHVLPSOLVWLFDOO\ GLVPLVVHG DVMXVW µWKH W\UDQW ZKRSUHOXGHG WKH
&XEDQ UHYROXWLRQ¶ LW LV WLPH WRFKDOOHQJH WKHRQH-dimensional assumptions of 
the historical narrative that we have inherited.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER TWO   
THE FIRST BATISTATO 
 THE KING IS DEAD, LONG LIVE THE KING 
 
Between 1933 and 1940 Fulgencio Batista used the iron fist of the armed 
IRUFHV DQGWKHYHOYHW JORYH RI SRSXOLVP WRVXFFHVVIXOO\ ³UHSUHVV FR-opt, 
balance and neutralize such disparate groups as traditional politicians, sugar 
interests, organized labor, communists, radical nationalists, and the United 
6WDWHV ´ :KLWQH\  Batista had dramatically come to a position of 
power in 1933 as a result of the revolución de los sargentos which 
significantly altered the status quo in Cuba. The clases populares (the masses) 
would now have to be courted rather than ignored by those in power.   
Between 1933 and 1940, Batista held power (but not political office) in Cuba 
as Jefe del Ejército (Army Chief). This chapter will explore the first Batistato   
and how it came to result in two significant achievements: (a) the formulation 
of implementation of the progressive Cuban Constitution of 1940, and (b) the 
transition to a relatively representative democracy.  
This chapter investigates the extent to which Batista was a populist leader, who 
utilized populist policies (particularly) between 1937 and 1940 to ultimately 
triumph in the presidential election of 1940. Whilst it was not a completely 
free and fair election, it was, up until that point, one of the fairest presidential 
elections in Cuban history. It was followed four years later by a presidential 
election which ranks amongst the most transparent in Cuban history.    
Background to revolution: Sergeant Batista and September 1933  
Batista had enlisted in an elitist Cuban army in 1921. Twelve years after 
HQOLVWLQJ VHUJHDQW%DWLVWDOHGWKHDUP\¶VHQOLVWHG PHQLQDUHYROWDJDLQVWDQHOitist and 
corrupt officer corps. The officers had historically discriminated against enlisted 
soldiers. Enlisted men were obliged ³WROHDYHDSXEOLF SODFHZKHQDVHQLRURIILcer 
DUULYHG´$UJRWH-Freyre, 2005: 41). Enlisted men would travel third class whilst 
officers travelled first class. It was not unusual for the Cuban treasury to fund more 
army positions than actually existed, with the extra funds siphoned off by high 
ranking officers such as generals and colonels (Ibid). The officers had succeeded only 
in ingraining frustration and animosity amongst the enlisted men by 1933. Argote-
Freyre argues that this hostility directly resulted in the revolt of the Sergeants, and was 
not a product of any desire amongst the enlisted men for political change.  
  
 
Batista had not actively fought against the Machadato (as the leaders of the 
students Antonio Guiteras or Ramón Grau San Martín) had done1. It is known, 
however, that Batista had been passing information to the secret underground 
organization known as the ABC2. He had joined the group in August 1931, the 
group was an anti-Machado revolutionary organisation which operated 
clandestinely as a secret society. The group was organized into cells which 
operated independently of each other; cell leaders could only communicate 
with a limited number of other cell leaders; its members were therefore largely 
unknown to each other. This strategy insulated the individual cells and guarded 
against the possibility of widespread government infiltration (Argote-Freyre, 
2006:53).  
Batista probably joined the ABC: ³PRWLYDWHG DVPXFK E\DGHVLUH WRVXUYLYH
WKH FKDRVRIWKH0DFKDGR\HDUV DVE\DQ\GULYLQJ UHYROXWLRQDU\ VSLULW ´
(Argote-Freyre, 2006: 40). He was a member of a cell composed of military 
men which provided intelligence to an underground anti-Machado radio station 
and opposition newspapers (Ibid). The ABCs principal membership was 
affluent, conservative and middle class. The poorly educated young sergeant 
must have felt somewhat out of place. However, %DWLVWD¶V SRVLWLRQ DVFRXUW
stenographer at Campamento Columbia meant that he had access to sensitive 
information and intelligence relating to the highest levels of the military3. 
Batista would frequently be present at the trials of anti-Machado men, which 
would have made the young Batista a valuable asset to the ABC (Ibid).   
%\$XJXVW 0DFKDGR¶V SRVLWLRQ DVSUHVLGHQW KDGEHFRPHXQWHQDEOH
Former Cuban President and anti-Machado figure Mario García Menocal wrote 
in The New York Times RI WKH³YLROHQFH DQGLQVHFXULW\ WROLIH DQGSURSHUW\ ´
(The New York Times, February 7 1933) under Machado, arguing that ³Rne 
ZRXOG KDYH WRJREDFNWRWKH9HQHWLDQ UXOH RIWKH'RJHVIRU VXFKEDUEDULVP ´
(Ibid). MachadR¶V UHSXJQDQW UHJLPH HQGHGZLWK KLV UHVLJQDWLRQ IURP Whe 
presidency on August 12 1933. His resignation followed an intense two-year 
period of protest and armed struggle against his regime as a result of his 
decision to unconstitutionally prolong his presidency into a second term. The 
complete withdrawal of support of the regime by the United States and its 
ambassador (Sumner Welles) signalled the demise of the brutal and chaotic 
Machado government (Argote-Freyre, 2006:45).  
Carlos Manuel de Céspedes was subsequently installed as president by 
elements of the Cuban elite (with the support of United States) (Argote-Freyre, 
2006:53). Céspedes lacked popular support in the country and presided over a 
weak government riddled with indecision (Diario de la Marina, August 13, 1).  
+XJK 7KRPDV FRQFOXGHV WKDW WKHJRYHUQPHQW ZDV³ZLWKRXW VXEVWDQFH ´
(Thomas 2001:421). Even &pVSHGHV¶supporters at the conservative newspaper 
                                                 
1
 Refers to the Presidency of Gerardo Machado (May 20 1925 until August 12 1933)  
2
 ABC refers to a call sign rather than an acronym.  
3
 The Camp Columbia barracks in Havana was the seat of the military high command and until 
1959 the nations most important military base.  
  
 
Diario de la Marina gently mocked the new President. Its daily cartoon 
portrayed a theatre goer asking Céspedes: ³GLJDPH VHQRU DFRPRGDGRU KD\SRU
DKL DOJXQ SURJUDPD" ´ Diario de la Marina, August 24:3). The cartoon implied 
that Céspedes had no plan or programme of government and lacked direction.   
Since before the fall of the Machadato, Batista had begun to forge alliances 
within the ranks of increasingly disgruntled NCOs (Non Commissioned 
Officers). He forged alliances with leaders such as Pablo Rodríguez, who had 
EHHQSUHVLGHQW RIWKH HQOLVWHG PHQ¶V FOXE VLQFH $UJRWH-Freyre, 2006:57).   
A funeral held on August 19 1933 proved to be the decisive moment in 
%DWLVWD¶V ULVH DVOHDGHU RIWKH1&2V4. The funeral was held for three soldiers, 
whose bodies had been discovered in the torture chambers of the Atarés 
fortress, following the collapse of the Machadato (Argote-Freyre, 2006:58). 
Many Cuban people looked towards the Cuban military (which had been 
riddled with porrista elements5) with great hostility following the demise of 
Machado. The reputation and prestige of the armed forces was at an all-time 
low. Angry mobs began lynching suspected porristas, fearful soldiers and 
SROLFH RIILFHUV VWRRGE\D%ULWLVK RIILFLDO REVHUYHG WKDW ³WKH ERGLHVRI WKHPRVW
famous porristas ZHUHHYHQGUDJJHG LQ WULXPSK WKURXJK WKHVWUHHWV ´ 7KRPDV
1971:384). The discovery of the tortured bodies of the three soldiers in the 
Atarés fortress strikingly demonstrated to the nation that not all soldiers had 
supported the Machadato.  
The officers exacerbated the tense situation by omitting to send a 
representative to the funeral of the three soldiers. Batista delivered a fiery 
speech which denounced porrista elements of the military and rallied against 
the attitude of the officers (Ibid). Batista had impeccably vocalized the feelings 
of the majority of enlisted soldiers (who had not supported Machado and did 
not wish to be associated with his crimes). %DWLVWD¶V SRSXODULW\ VRDUHG+e had 
succeeded in positioning himself as the leader of the enlisted men, by 
deflecting WKH&XEDQSHRSOH¶V DQJHU DZD\ IURP WKH HQOisted soldiers and 
towards the officers.   
At the same funeral, Batista met and befriended the influential editor of the La 
Semana newspaper, Sergio Carbó. This friendship in the weeks leading up to 
the events of September 4 proved to be the invaluable link in what became the 
unlikely alliance between BDWLVWD¶V 1&2VDQGGrau¶V students (Argote-Freyre, 
2006:59). In the days following the funeral, the number of conspirators grew 
and multiplied several times over. The years of frustration and hostility on the 
part of the enlisted men towards the officers had culminated in a fever of 
mutinous sentiment. Batista and his allies worked quickly to ensure the loyalty 
                                                 
4
 Non-Commissioned Officers 
5
 0DFKDGR¶VVHFUHWVHUYLFHZKRPXUGHURXVO\HQIRUFHGKLVUXOH  
  
 
of enlisted men in as many military installations as possible throughout the 
country (but particularly in Havana). Batista later wrote that:  
³(VFRJL XQKRPEUH GHFDGDSXHVWRRFRPSDxtD \OXHJR RWURHQTXLHQ SXGLHUD
confiar y así sucesivamente hasta que solo fuera menester dar la señal de que 
KRUDGHWHUPLQDGD KDEtD OOHJDGR ´ 9HJD &RELHOODV  
On the evening of September 4, Batista and hundreds of enlisted men met at 
Campamento Columbia under the pretence of drafting a letter of complaint to 
the officers (Argote-Freyre, 2006:67). But the real purpose of the meeting was 
for Batista to order his NCOs to seize command from their Officers (Argote-
Freyre, 2006:68).  
Within hours, Carbó had arrived at the meeting alongside Grau and the DEU 
(Directorio Estudantil Universitario) leadersip. Batista was soon persuaded to 
adopt their programme of government, and make permanent the revolt. 
Sergeants, corporals and privates subsequently seized control of almost the 
entirety of the armed forces within hours (Argote-Freyre, 2006:70). This 
sustained revolt is unique in military history anywhere in the world.   
The following day, as Batista consolidated his command of the armed forces, 
Grau and the DEU marched on the Presidential Palace and peacefully relieved 
Céspedes of the Presidency (Argote-Freyre, 2006:65). The revolución de 
los Sargentos bought Batista to a position of power and influence just twenty 
three days following the fall of Machado. Batista triumphantly declared that: 
³6HWUDWD GHXQPRYLPLHQWR H[FOXVLYR GHVDUJHQWRV FDERV\VROGDGRV DYLGRV
de limpiar el uniforme que vestimos de las manchas que pensan sobre el´ 
(Diario de la Marina, September 5 1933, p.1). 
Charles Ameringer (2000) argues that the revolución de los Sargentos was not 
UHYROXWLRQDU\ DWDOO DQGKDGVLPSO\ UHSODFHG WKHRIILFHUV ZLWK %DWLVWD¶V 1&2
IULHQGV LQ WKHSURFHVV³WUDQVIRUPLQJ WKH DUP\ LQWR DPHUFHQDU\ RUJDQL]DWLRQ  ´
(Ameringer, 2000:22), loyal to Batista. The army had been politicized to the 
extent that Grau was doomed as president before he even took office  
7KH UDGLFDO µGD\JRYHUQPHQW¶ ZDVZHDNDQGVRRQ IRXQG LWVHOI LVRODWHG                          
The United States HQYR\ 6XPQHU :HOOHV EHOLHYHG WKDWPDQ\ PHPEHUV RI*UDX¶V                
student group (the DEU) were Communists (Ameringer, 2000:10). To further                       
complicate the situation, several hundred officers  had spent weeks holed up in                 
the United States owned Hotel Nacional under the command of Dr Horacio                         
Ferrer6 (Kapcia, 2002:287-%DWLVWD¶V VROGLHUV KDGDWWDFNHGWKHKRWHO RQ              
October 2, and despite surrendering after hours of bombardment, scores of                    
unarmed officers had been murdered in cold blood and the United States held                        
the Grau government responsible (Los Angeles Times, October 3 1933).                           
Rumours persist that Batista ordered his men to open fire on the officers, but                 
                                                 
6
 Ferrer had been the Secretary of the Army and Navy prior to the revolt of September 4 
  
 
there is no compelling evidence to confirm this. It has also been said that                          
soldiers killed the unarmed officers in confusion after believing they were being                    
fired on. Whatever the case, this episode demonstrated to Sumner Welles it was               
Batista and not Grau whom commanded the authority and strength necessary to                
ensure stability in Cuba, and the protection of US interests (Kapcia, 2002:289).                       
,QDPHHWLQJ ZLWK %DWLVWD RQ2FWREHU:HOOHV VWDWHGWKDW WKH ³*UDX JRYHUQPHQW               
did not meet any of the conditions necessary for recognition by the United                         
StaWHV ´ DQGWKDW KH %DWLVWD ZDVWKH³RQO\ LQGLYLGXDO LQ&XEDWRGD\ZKR                   
UHSUHVHQWHG DXWKRULW\ ´ $PHULQJHU  ,Q2FWREHUThe New York Times                     
reported that Cuba was so volatile that Grau was living virtually as a prisoner                      
(New York Times, October 3 1944). By January 1934, protests had become                  
widespread; students who had previously supported the Batista-Grau alliance                           
QRZFKDQWHG ³£0XHUD %DWLVWD ´ DQG ³.LQg-.RQJ TXHVHYD\D5DPyQ ´                          
(Bohemia, January 14 1934:20). On January 18 Batista pushed Grau and his                     
JRYHUQPHQW DVLGHZLWK WKHVXSSRUW RI:HOOHV¶ PRVW DFFRPPRGDWLQJ UHSODFHPHQW            
Jefferson Caffery (Ameringer, 2000:11). 6XPPLQJ XS*UDX¶V-1934                          
Presidency, Bohemia wrote that:    
³/DSHUPDQHQFLD GHO'U*UDX6DQ0DUWtQ HQHOSRGHUVLJQLILFDED OD DQDUTXtD
y disolucíon de la República. El gobierno no estaba haciendo revolución, sino 
SHUWXUEDFLyQ ´ Bohemia, 1934, January 21:37). 
Batista was able to push Grau aside with ease*UDX¶V government had been the 
³self-proclaimed YDQJXDUGV RI SRSXODU VWUXJJOH ´ ZKRKDG³IRXQG WKHPVHOYHV
holding state power but did not have the means either to lead or to control the 
YHU\SHRSOH WKH\ FODLPHG WRUHSUHVHQW ´ :KLWQH\  Grau was 
replaced by El Presidente Relámpago Carlos Hevia7 (Bohemia, January 21, 
1934:22), who was the first of a long succession of puppet presidents installed 
by the Jefe del Ejercito. The following exchange appeared in the magazine 
Bohemia, which depicted one such president, Carlos Mendieta8, being quizzed 
by a citizen:  
³'H VXJRELHUQR ORTXHPiVTXHKDJXVWDGR HVHOSURJUDPD  ´    
-6L\DFRPSUHQGR VREUHWRGRHQ ORTXHUHILHUH DODFRQVWLWX\HQWH  ´
-1R&RURQHOPH UHILHUR DOSURJUDPD GHORVFDUQDYDOHV ´ 
(Bohemia, February 4 1934:25) 
7KH VXJJHVWLRQ EHLQJ WKDW0HQGLHWD OLNH %DWLVWD¶V other puppet Presidents) 
was only good for organising the carnival as opposed to any serious 
programme of government. 
Preparing for Office: Batista the Populist 
Robert Whitney (2001) argues that in the 1930s Batista was a populist in the 
purest Latin American tradition. In order to interrogate this argument it is 
                                                 
7
 1LFNQDPHG µ7KH/LJKWLQJ3UHVLGHQW¶E\WKH&XEDQSUHVVDVDUHVXOWRIWKHEUHYLW\RIKLV
Presidency which lasted 48 hours 
8
 Served as President between January 18 1934 and December 11 1935 
  
 
important to consider the definition of populism, as the concept is contested in 
academic debate.  
Antoni Kapcia (1986) defines populism as a political response to emerging 
crises in Latin America in the 1930s and 1940s, a response conceived to 
resolve as many immediate needs as possible by the greatest number of 
SDUWLFLSDQW¶V SRVVLEOH .DSFLD  
Torcuato Di Tella (1965) considers populism to have been an anti-status quo 
ideology which attracted the support of anti-establishment middle classes as 
well as urban and/or rural working classes. Alan Knight (1998) argues that 
populism was more a political strategy than an ideology. Knight argues that 
populist leaders aimed to build rapport with the masses by giving a voice to the 
powerless against the powerful. Knight sees populism as having been an 
alternative political strategy to the traditional democratic political parties. 
Ernesto Laclau (2005) questions if populism is definable at all, by arguing that 
definitions of populism are no more than lists of potential characteristics. 
Laclau argues that in some cases characteristics will exist that will be missing 
completely from other cases. Laclau argues that the academic debate does not 
currently possess the ontological tools to offer anything more than vague and 
generalist descriptions of populist case studies.  
It is clear that characteristics of populist movements and/or governments are 
not static and are dependent upon historical and geographical realities. Other 
than Batista, there are other (perhaps more genuinely) populist models in Latin 
America, such as Getulio Vargas in Brazil (1930-45, 1950-54), Lázaro 
Cárdenas in Mexico (1934-1940) and Juan Perón in Argentina (1946±52, 
1952±55, 1973±74). The concept of populism in Latin America is closely 
associated with ideas of nationalism, mass participation, the forging of 
alliances across class divides, social reform and strong charismatic (often 
militaristic) leadership. According to Paul Cammack (2000),  
³3RSXOLVP¶V NH\SRLQW RI UHIHUHQFH ZDVWKHGHYHORSPHQWDOLVW DOOLDQFH EHWZHHQ
the state, the working class and the industrial bourgeoisie which promoted 
import-substituting industrialization in the wake of the depression. At the 
institutional level, it placed emphasis upon the prominence of the leader, the 
relative weakness of parties and the legislature, and the use of corporatist 
LQVWLWXWLRQV WRRUJDQL]H EXVLQHVV DQGWRPRELOL]H DQGFRQWURO ODERXU ´
(Cammack, 2000: 151) 
Kapcia argues that populism in Cuba was different to elsewhere in Latin 
America. In Cuba the bourgeois lacked genuine economic (and thus political) 
power. This pattern had been established by the 1903 Reciprocity Treaty with 
the United States (Kapcia, 1986:33). The treaty had restricted &XED¶VIRUHLJQ
  
 
trade and economic structure domestically. It had equally resulted in relative 
economic prosperity and security (especially in the sugar industry). The treaty 
restricted diversification of the economy and the development of 
industrialization. By the late 1930s Cuba was heavily dependent on the zafra 
and on foreign capital, whereas in other Latin American countries (such as in 
Mexico, Argentina and Brazil), populist leaders could call upon a means of 
production owning bourgeois who possessed genuine economic power. 
7KHUHIRUH ZKLOVW %DWLVWD VXFFHHGHGLQ LQLWLDWLQJ ³WKHPHFKDQLVP RI SRSXOLVW
PRELOL]DWLRQ ´ .DSFLD KH FRXOGQRW WUDQVFHQG WKHPRELOL]DWLRQ
phase and push for industrialization, diversification of the economy and 
ultimately genuine economic independence.  
Populism has been widely accepted as possessing anti status-quo, anti-elitist 
attributes. Latin American populists were known for encouraging mass 
participation, advancing social reform and promoting nationalist sentiment. 
These leaders were often charismatic and possessed strong oratory ability. 
Five-WLPH SRSXOLVW (FXDGRULDQ 3UHVLGHQW -RVp0DULD9HODVFR VDLG³*LYH me a 
balcony and I will become pUHVLGHQW ´ The Economist, April 15 2006). Populist 
leaders sought to capture the support of clases populares, often across social, 
economic and political divides. Supporters often come from largely 
unorganized groups amongst the masses.  
Kurt Weyland (2001) helps us to clarify the common characteristics found in 
populist movements. He focuses on populist movements and their charismatic 
OHDGHUV LQ ZKLFK ³WKH FRQQHFWLRQ EHWZHHQ OHDGHU DQGIROORZHUV LVEDVHGPRVWO\
on direct, quasi-SHUVRQDO FRQWDFW QRWRQRUJDQL]DWLRQDO LQWHUPHGLDWLRQ´
:H\ODQG  :H\ODQG DUJXHV WKDW WKH ³UHODtionship between populist 
leaders and their mass constituency is un-LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HG DQGIOXLG ´ DQGWKDW
WKHSHRSOH¶V ³OR\DOW\ FDQ HYDSRUDWH TXLFNO\ LI WKHOHDGHU IDLOV WRIXOILOO SRSXODU
H[SHFWDWLRQV ´ ,ELG :H\ODQG DUJXHV WKDW WKHVH OHDGHUV¶ VXSSRUW LV often fragile 
and that populists often seek to create a close and intense relationship with 
their supporters using great personal charisma. He iGHQWLILHV WZRµYHUVLRQV¶ RI
populist movements: those which are well organized structurally and those 
which are pragmatic and constantly changing. His study makes a further 
distinction: 
³3RSXOLVW OHDGHUV DSSHDO HLWKHU WRWKHSHRSOH DQLPDJLQHG VLQJXODU DFWRUZKRP
they convoke to collective manifestations in public, or to the common man and 
woman, a plurality of aFWRUV ´ :H\ODQG  
Economically, populists in Latin America have generally pursued 
industrialization and substitution of foreign imports by domestic produce. They 
have sought to increase state control or influence over vital sectors of their 
national economies, for example in the case of Cárdenas` nationalization of the 
Mexican oil industry in 1939. Similar action would have been impossible in 
  
 
Cuba in the 1930s considering its economic dependence on the zafra (annual 
sugar crop) and the United States as a customer and trading partner. It was 
unthinkable that Cuba could prosper or even exist without United States trade 
DQGSROLWLFDO VXSSRUW(YHQ LI %DWLVWD KDGZDQWHG WRFRS\&DUGHQDV¶ H[DPSOH
unlike Cárdenas, who initiated a thriving industrialized and diversified 
economy, Batista had many more limitations as a result of the pattern set by 
the 1903 Reciprocity Treaty.   
Far from wishing to antagonize the United States, Batista cultivated excellent 
relationships with successive US Ambassadors (Sumner Welles, Jefferson 
Caffery and Butler Wright), which demonstrated his wish to seek the support 
of Washington.   
Populists often aimed to introduce generous social welfare policies (such as 
%DWLVWD¶V plan trienal which is examined later in the chapter). They often 
encouraged their supporters to unionize, as Batista did by permitting his 
Communist allies to establish the CTC (Confederación de Trabajadores 
de Cuba) in 1939. Unions under populist leaders were frequently influenced or 
guided by the state and were often used as a tool for mass mobilizations (such 
as political rallies). Like Batista, other populist leaders (such as Cárdenas, 
Vargas and Perón) often emerged from and had the support of the military.   
Whilst Grant Watson, of the British embassy, marveled at Batista as an 
³DGYDQFHG VRFLDO UHIRUPHU ´ :KLWQH\  LWZDVQRWXQWLO WKDW
Batista really made the transition to populist. The coronel (colonel) spent the 
majority of 1934-1936 violently oppressing opposition. 
Batista relied on his second-in-command, Lieutenant Colonel José Eleuterio 
Pedraza, to lead the pacification of opposition to his rule. Pedraza had been one 
of %DWLVWD¶V FORVHVW FRQVSLUDWRUV and was feared for his brutality (Argote-
Freyre, 2006:148). Argote-Freyre notes that the first and second Batistato 
frequently relied on military men, feared for their brutality, to enforce the 
regimes rule. Batista preferred to maintain a distance from the violence that 
occurred under his command, and Pedraza was the first of his enforcers (Ibid). 
Opposition journalists were often seized in the dead of night and tortured, 
using what became known as the palmacristi treatment9 (Argote-Freyre, 
2006:156). To break strikes, military governors were assigned to each 
province, curfews were enacted and the right to congregate in groups of more 
than three people suspended. 7KHGHDWKSHQDOW\ ZDVHQDFWHG DQG³EXOOHW-
riddled bodies of political opponents began to appear in empty lots in and 
DURXQG+DYDQD ´ (Argote-Freyre, 2006:173). This manner of public terror 
would also become a common trait of the second Batistato in the 1950s  
Between 1934 and 1936 Batista consolidated his position by murderously 
oppressing opposition, and it was only after 1937, when this process had been 
successfully completed, that he began to turn his attention towards enacting 
                                                 
9
 Forced to consume large quantities of Castor oil, this would result in several days of 
debilitating stomach cramps, dehydration and diarrhoea   
  
 
populist social policies, which would ultimately lead him to the Presidential 
palace as a democratically elected President.                
%DWLVWD¶V SRSXOLVW DJHQGDEHJDQ LQ HDUQHVW LQ ,Q -DQXDU\ LQ DQDttempt to 
attract the support of the rural working classes, Batista orchestrated the mass 
deportations of illegal foreign (Caribbean) workers (mostly rural workers of 
British West Indian, Jamaican and Haitian descent); the rural guard was called 
upon, particularly in sugar growing regions, to expel the illegal workers. 
Deportations continued into the following year: 
³6HFUHWDU\ RI/DERU3RUWXRQGR 'RPHQHFK \HVWHUGD\ VDLG DSSURS[LPDWHO\
50,000 Haitian cane-field laborers would be repatriated during the remainder 
of this year. Repatriations will begin April 15, he said. Appropimately 25,000 
+DLWLDQV ZHUHUHWXUQHG WRWKHLU FRXQWU\ ODVW \HDU ´                                              
(Diario de la Marina, April 6 1938:1) 
Simultaneously sugar mills were encouraged to replace deported workers with 
workers of Cuban descent. Whilst it was true that of a general population of 
4,000,000 there were 300,000 unemployed Cubans (Whitney, 2001:155), the 
vast majority of the unemployed resided in cities. The policy resulted in an 
exacerbation of an existing labour shortage in the campo (countryside). Whilst 
sugar mills requested hundreds of workers from government labour exchanges 
in Camagüey and Oriente, the foreign workers who would have previously 
filled the quotas no longer resided in Cuba (Whitney; 2001:155). A campaign 
against voluntary idleness was initiated in the east of Cuba; for example, on 
February 10 1937, police in Santiago rounded up 100 men from various bars 
and brothels, before dispatching them to the nearby mills to work (Whitney, 
2001:156). Even so, this campaign could not round up enough workers to meet 
increasing labour demands. Many sugar mills decided to ignore the policy, and 
so illegal workers did continue to work in Cuba after 1937, albeit in much 
fewer numbers. Whilst the deportations did stoke nationalist fervor and 
increased support for Batista in the cities, in the campo the practicalities of his 
policies were highly questionable and hardly popular.  
In the same year, the colonel presented his populist agenda in a paper entitled 
Líneas Básicas del Programa del Plan Trienal; this plan trienal (three year 
plan) outlined his social and economic programme. Diario de la Marina refers 
to ³(O PDJQR SODQ GHOFRURQHO %DWLVWD ,´ adding that³(VH HVHOPRWLYR TXe 
obliga a pensar en las condiciones económicas ambientes y en el que podemos 
llamar el orden moral-VRFLDO ´ Diario de la Marina, July 2 1938, 1). The plan 
SURPLVHG WRVHFXUH ³OD SURWHFFLyQ IUDQFD DO SHTXHxR FRORQR ´ ,ELG LW
addressed the tobacco and coffee industries and promised to search for quick 
solutions to problems affecting campesinos (rural Cubans) in particular. The 
plan promised to address the issue of a new Cuban constitution, as well as the 
organisation of the national bank, a bank which promised not to rely on 
³FDSLWDOHV QDFLRQHV QL H[WUDQMHURV ´ ,ELG7KH FRQVHUYDWLYH QHZVSDSHU Diario 
de la Marina DSSODXGHG WKHSODQ FRQFOXGLQJ WKDW ³(O LOXVWUH DXWRU HLPSXOVRU
de esas propincuas reformas sociales y económicas, acogidas con general 
aplauso SRUOD RSLQLyQ S~EOLFD ´ Diario de la Marina, July 2 1938:6). 
  
 
The plan trienal promised to address issues of land redistribution and radical 
VRFLDO UHIRUP DWHYHU\ OHYHO DQGZDVVDLG WRKDYH EHHQ³VRH[WHQVLYH LQ
ambition as to be nicknamed the 300 year pODQ ´ 7KRPDV *UDX¶V
nationalisation of labour decree from 1933 (known as the 80% law) was 
reinstated and claimed by Batista as his own; this law required 80% of any 
FRPSDQ\¶V HPSOR\HHV WREH&XEDQ WKHOHJLVODWLRQ GHPDQGHG WKDW DQ\
industrial enterprise with more than 90 employees must fill their executive 
positions with Cubans. The plan demanded the return of the eight hour 
working day, the minimum wage, social security, pensions, worker 
compensation, maternity leave and paid vacations. These reforms were 
extremely progressive for 1937.  
But the plan was not universally welcome, and foreign business interests in 
Cuba became nervous. A British government report on labour conditions noted 
WKDW ³IRUHLJQ FDSLWDO DQGIRUHLJQ ODERU DUHWKXVXQLWHG LQ their condemnation of 
WKHSUHVHQW&XEDQSROLF\ ´ :KLWQH\  -RXUQDOLVW 5XE\ +DUW3KLOOLSV
observed that: ³%DWLVWD GHVLULQJ WKH VXSSRUW RI&XEDQ ODERUZDWFKHGSDVVLYHO\
as labor laws were tightened until it became impossible for an American to 
obWDLQ HPSOR\PHQW ´ :KLWQH\  
In order to pay for the implementation of his social programmes, Batista 
increased taxation on foreign companies (both the Cuban and American 
chambers of commerce condemned the increases) (Ibid). In a memorandum the 
CXED&DQH6XJDU&RPSDQ\ FRPSODLQHG WKDW WKHELOO ZDV³LOO-suited to meet 
specific needs of the varying cane zones; as (the legislation) was conceived in 
KDVWH WKURXJK SROLWLFDO SUHVVXUH ´ :KLWQH\  7KH VXJDU LQGXVWU\ ZDV
overwhelmingly dominated by foreign interests; 69 sugar mills were US 
owned and produced 56% of all Cuban sugar, 36 were Spanish owned and 
accounted for 17%, and the rest were British, Dutch and French owned 
(Thomas, 2001: 440). The reforms were met with hostility by the sugar 
industry, which convinced Batista to decree that the sugar industry would only 
be required to ensure that 50% of its employees were Cuban, as opposed to the 
80% in alternative sectors.  
In September the Sugar Coordination Bill was passed. The law concerned              
smallholding colonos (sugar-cane growers) ³ZKR QRUPDOO\ SURGXFHG OHVV WKDQ
30,000 arrobas WRQV RIVXJDU ´ 7KRPDV  7KHVH colonos 
would be able to retain 52% of their crop and sell it for profit on the open 
market. They would be obliged to set aside a section of their land to grow 
alternative crops; this was an early, albeit modest and half-hearted, attempt at 
crop diversification. The ultimate objective was to initiate a model of profit 
sharing between sugar producers and workers. Whilst the law was difficult to 
implement, the rhetoric alone was sure to deliver the support of these 
smallholding farmers. The term colono does not, however, necessarily refer to 
only smallholding cane farmers:  
³$ ODUJH IDUPHU RSHUDWLQJ WKRXVDQGV RIDcres of land with wage labor and a 
small farmer working his cane lands only with family labor were both called 
colonos ´ $\DOD  
  
 
Colonos played a central role in the Cuban economy and were truly 
representative of the essence of Cubanidad. Batista must have believed that, by 
championing their cause, he would be able to ensure popularity and a 
reputation as a man of the people.  
In December 1937 the bill for the colonization, reclamation and distribution of 
state lands was passed. This legislation allowed unused or unregistered land to 
be turned into smallholdings and given to agricultural workers. At least 50,000 
of the poorest workers would benefit, and, true to his word, by early 1938 
more than 33,000 acres of land had been redistributed (Whitney, 2001:158).  
³,Q OLQH ZLWK &RORQHO %DWLVWD
V 'LVWULEXWLRQ RI/DQG%LOO WKH7UHDVXU\
Department yesterday announced more than 330,000 acres in Santa Clara 
province would be claimed by the government. A large part of the land, it was 
revealed, has been deveORSHG IRUDQXPEHU RI \HDUVE\VTXDWWHUV ´                   
(Diario de la Marina April 10 1938:21) 
Other than these reforms, an amnesty of all Cuban exiles was decreed, which 
LQFOXGHG ³PHPEHUV RIWKH0DFKDGRUHJLPH HYHQ0DFKDGRKLPVHOI ´ 7KRPDV
2001: 440). The debts of the Machado years were finally recognized; this was 
significant as it had been an issue of contention and had complicated 
international trade since 1933. Batista founded the Comisión Nacional de 
Transporte, which proved to be highly popular. He also supported mortgage 
credits for los humildes (the poor) for the first time. Batista was a classic 
example of a Latin American populist after 1937. In 1933 he had given a voice 
to oppressed soldiers, after 1937, he had also sought to speak for colonos, 
clases populares and los humildes.   
Transition to Democracy and the Search for Allies  
A series of elections in 1936, 1938 and in 1939 had preceded the presidential 
election of 1940, which ushered Batista in as an elected President. There had 
been a presidential election in January 1936 (which had been the first national 
HOHFWLRQ VLQFH 0DFKDGR¶V YLFWRU\ LQZKLFK VDZ the Batista-backed 
Miguel Mariano Gómez run for office representing a coalición tripartite 
comprised of the Partido Liberal, Unión Nacionalista and Accíon Republicana 
parties (López Civeira, 1990:44). This coalition triumphed over the former 
president Mario García Menocal, who represented the Conjunto Nacional 
Democrático opposition group (Ibid). The election was deeply flawed and was 
QRWIUHH DQGIDLU DWDOO 7KH OHDGLQJ RSSRVLWLRQ JURXSV*UDX¶V $XWpQWLFRV
Joven Cuba and the ABC, all refused to participate (Thomas, 1971:434). 
'HVSLWH WKH6HFUHWDU\ RIWKH ,QWHULRU¶V DVVHUWLRQ WKDW ³WKH HOHFWLRQV KDYHEHHQ
the most honest ever held in &XED ´ The Washington Post, January 13 1936), 
they were actually characterised by fraud, violence and bloodshed (The Sun, 
January 11 1936). Perhaps the most progressive aspect of the election had been 
that women were allowed to vote for the first time (Ibid). Gómez was 
impeached by December of the same year, after clashing with Batista on 
several issues and not fully appreciating the role of the President, and not fully 
understanding who was really in control of Cuba (Argote-Freyre, 2006:223-
229). The Vice-President Federico Laredo Brú inherited the Presidency and 
  
 
continued the tradition of deferring entirely to the will of the Jefe del Ejército 
(Thomas, 1971:437).  
Congressional elections two years later passed without igniting much 
excitement at all in Cuba. All 450 candidates supported Batista and his puppet 
government (The New York Times, March 5 1938), and no more than 40 per 
cent of the electorate voted (The New York Times, March 6 1938). In the 
magazine Carteles, a cartoon depicted a campesino asking DFRPSDQLRQ ³SRU
TXLHQ YRWR
8' HQHVWDHOHFFLRQHV" WKHUHVSRQVHZDV³£DK SHURKXER
HOHFFWLRQHV´ Cartles, March 13, 1938:20). The following week, the magazine 
published a cartoon which depicted a suspicious wife sarcastically accusing her 
husband RIEHLQJ DV³SXUD\KRQUDGD FRPRODV ~OWLPDV HOHFFLRQH V ´Carteles, 
March 20 1938, 20). The New York Times concluded that the ³WKH PDQ RQWKH
VWUHHW H[SUHVVHGQRFXULRVLW\ DVWRWKHZLQQLQJ FDQGLGDWHV ´ The New York 
Times, March 6 1938). 
Whilst the elections of 1936 and 1938 had been as corrupt as any in Cuban 
history, elections held for a Constituent Assembly in November 1939 were 
surprisingly honest, and up until that point were the single most honest 
national elections in Cuban history; these elections were a dress rehearsal for 
the subsequent 1940 Presidential election. The winning candidates would be 
responsible for preparing and delivering a new Cuban constitution in 1940. 
Batista apparently presumed that the support of the Communist-controlled 
CTC, as well his own support following  two years of progressive social 
reform would be enough to guarantee his candidates electoral victories in free 
HOHFWLRQV 7KRPDV  ,QWKH HYHQW*UDX¶V FRDOLWLRQ RI$XWpQWLFRV
ABC, Demócratico Republicano and Acción Republicana triumphed by 
winning 41 seats; the Batista-backed candidates won 35 seats (Ibid). Despite 
this set-back, Batista was determined to run for the Presidency and win in 
1940. On December 6 1939 the colonel formally resigned as Jefe del Ejército, 
becoming a civilian presidential candidate (Argote-Freyre, 2006:267).   
Batista knew that his ambitious social reforms would not be enough to ensure 
success at the ballot box. He realised the necessity of building a popular front, 
as Cárdenas had done with the labour movement in Mexico. The colonel   
proved that he was the ultimate pragmatist with an entirely flexible political 
ideology, when he engineered an alliance with the communists in 1938.   
The Communists had been outlawed and persecuted by Batista since 1933; 
they had been refused entry into Campamento Columbia to participate in the 
events of September 4 1933 and had been brutally oppressed ever since 
(Argote-Freyre, 2006:72). From mid-1937 they had operated by proxy (via a 
front party called the  Partido Unión Revolucionaria). This group was led by 
the poet Juan Marinello, and other leaGHUV VXFK DVWKHZULWHU 6DOYDGRU *DUF'?D
$JĦHUR DQGWKH OHDGLQJ LQWHOOHFWXDO $QWRQLR 0DF'?DV7KRPDV 
Student Communists joined the Ala Izquierda Estudantil. Whilst retaining 
admirable discipline and support of many workers, los rojos (the communists) 
had been a fairly benign threat to Batista, since their failed participation in the 
general strike of 1935. The strike, which was due to discontent about 
  
 
educational conditions, initially captured the support of many, and in March 
1935 had effectively paralyzed the country: 
³7KH QDWLRQDO ORWWHU\ ZDVVXVSHQGHG IRU ODFNRI DZRUNIRUFH7UROOH\ FDUDQG
bus services in Havana were interrupted, as was truck traffic throughout Cuba. 
The few truckers who took to the roads found them laced with large quantities 
of nails. The lack of available transportation limited food and gasoline 
GHOLYHULHV *UDSKLF DUWLVWV ZHQW RQVWULNH FORVLQJ PRVW RIWKHQDWLRQ¶V
newspapers. Doctors, tobacco workers, barbers, soap and shoe factory workers, 
all refused to work. From March 7 to March 11, when the strike reached its 
maximum effectiveness, virtually no one worked at his or her job. If the 
PLOLWDU\ GLGQRW UXQ LW LW GLGQRW UXQ  ´ (Argote-Freyre, 2006:172-173). 
7KH VWULNHZDVFRQYLQFLQJO\ DQGYLROHQWO\ EURNHQE\%DWLVWD¶V PLOitary who 
declared war against the strikers by orchestrating a murderous campaign of 
terror, attacking strike leaders and publicly deposing of their bodies to send a 
message of fear. Argote-Freyre observed that violence was a common Batista 
tactic when under pressure:  
³WKLV VRUWRI GHVHFUDWLRQ EHFDPHDWUDGHPDUN RI%DWLVWD UHJLPHV XQGHU H[WUHPH
pressure, and the tactic was employed with great frequency in the late 1950s as 
a the revolutionary movement against the Batista government gained 
PRPHQWXP ´ $UJRWH-Freyre, 2006: 174). 
Communists had placed much faith in the success of the strike, and its failure 
damaged their credibility greatly. In order to find an explanation for their 
surprising willingness to enter into an alliance with Batista we must consider 
the international context of the Communist movement by the late 1930s. 
Following the Seventh Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) 
in 1935, Communist groups around the world were directed to seek alliances 
with social democratic anti-fascist parties. The emergence of global fascism 
had resulted in communist groups seeking to form the broadest possible anti-
fascist alliances which were deemed necessary. In Chile the Socialist, 
Communist and Radical Parties formed a successful Popular Front; similar 
alliances occurred in Peru, Chile and Mexico (Whitney, 2001:166). The 
Comintern believed that conditions in Latin America were not yet conducive 
for revolution. According to Marxist doctrine, socialism can only come after 
capitalism, and, as the Latin American economies were seen to be feudal in 
character in the 1930s, it was thought that the best way to strive for eventual 
communism was to encourage the development of liberal capitalism.  
It would be fair to say that the Communists had much more in common with 
Grau and the Auténticos than with Batista. However, at the time of the 1933 
revolution, Juan Marinello had ODEHOHG *UDX ³DVRFLDO IDVFLVW  ´ (Whitney, 2001: 
167), which had resulted in personal animosity between Grau and the 
Communist Party leadership. In 1938, Marinello did meet with Grau in Miami 
to explore the potential for a political alliance but the animosity could not be 
overcome (Ibid).                               
  
 
By mid-1938, both the Communists and Batista desperately needed allies. The 
Communists sought to leave the political wilderness in which they found 
themselves following the failure of the 1935 general strike. In the context of 
the ongoing Spanish Civil War and rise of global fascism, the Communists 
were concerned that fascist elements could gain a foothold in Cuba; this 
anxiety prompted many in the party to push for the formation of an anti-fascist 
front as a matter of urgency. Batista meanwhile needed political allies in his 
quest to become President in 1940. By May 1938 the publication of the 
Communist daily Hoy was permitted under the stewardship of Aníbal 
Escalante. On September 13 the PCC (Partido Comunista de Cuba) was 
legalised and thereafter a marriage of convenience was sealed.  
In January 1939 Communist leaders succeeded in establishing the CTC 
(Confederacíon de Trabajadores de Cuba), with the support of Batista and his 
puppet government (led by Federico Laredo Brú). A gathering of one thousand 
DQGILYH KXQGUHG GHOHJDWHV LQ+DYDQD HOHFWHG &RPPXQLVW OHDGHU/i]DUR 3HĔD
as CTC General Secretary (Whitney, 2001:169). Robert Alexander (2002) said 
WKDW3HĔDZDV ³WRWDOO\ LPEXHG ZLWK 0DU[LVW GRFWULQH DQGNQHZZHOO LWV
objectives, but knew how to pursue them with tact and suaveness which 
provided a great advantage for Communist contrRO RIWKH&7& ´$OH[DQGHU
2002: 83). 
The guest of honour at the CTC inaugural meeting was Labour minister 
Portuondo Domenech, as well as influential Mexican union leaders, Vicente 
Lombardo Toledano and Fidel Velázquez. Joseph Kowner represented the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations of the United States (Ibid). The inaugural 
meeting called for a number of reforms:   
³DGDLO\ PLQLPXP ZDJHRI IRULQGXVWULDO ZRUNHUVDQGIRU WKRVH LQ
agriculture; the policy that parts of the Ley de Coordinacíon Azucarera 
favoring the sugar workers but put finally into practice; the establishment of 
social security funds for workers in all branches of the economy; the 
elimination of decreed and laws of the 1934-1936 period that limited the free 
functioning of unions, collective bargaining, and the right to strike. There was 
DOVR DUHVROXWLRQ FDOOLQJ HOHFWLRQ RIDFRQVWLWXWLRQDO DVVHPEO\ ³ZLWK IUHH DQG
VRYHUHLJQ FKDUDFWHU ´ ,ELG 
The Communist-FRQWUROOHG &7&EHFDPH WKHGDUOLQJ RI%DWLVWD¶V 0LQLVWU\ RI
Labour, which was a remarkable turnaround, especially considering the 
LQWHQVLW\ RI%DWLVWD¶V UHSUHVVLRQ LQ WKHSUHFHGLQJ \HDUV&RPPXQLVW FRQWURO RI
the CTC would endure until Grau wrestled control from the Communists in 
1947.   
Thomas DUJXHV WKDW%DWLVWD¶V DOOLDQFH ZLWh the Communists was not unique to 
&XEDEXWZDVSDUWRIDZLGHU ³FRQWLQHQW ZLGH VZLQJ ´ 7KRPDV 
His study points out that whilst Batista was making peace with the PCC in 
Cuba, the Peruvian strongman Manuel Prado was granting Communists a 
strong LQIOXHQFH RYHUKLV FRXQWU\¶V ODERXU PRYHPHQW ,Q&KLOH $JXLUUH &HUGD
worked closely with Communists and even offered them a seat in his cabinet. 
In Mexico, Cárdenas worked closely Lombardo Toledano and Mexican 
  
 
Communists (Ibid). It is clear that, whilst the alliance was remarkable, it was 
hardly unique in the context of international events. This political maneuvering 
ZDVDWHVWDPHQW WR%DWLVWD¶V ideological flexibility in the pursuit of electoral 
victory. Batista later argued that the alliance was a result of his desire to build 
an anti-Nazi coalition in Cuba (Batista, 1964: 15).  
In the years prior to the 1940 Presidential election, the worst kept secret in 
Cuba was that Batista was firmly in charge and not the puppet civilian 
presidents. Diario de la Marina applauded his pet projects on a daily basis, 
ZKHWKHU FRQFHUQLQJ WKHRSHQLQJ RIDQHZER\¶VUHIRUPDWRU\ RUWKHKROGLQJ RI
a cocktail party in his honour by industrialists or army officers (Diario de la 
Marina April 10 1938:1). %DWLVWD¶V GHFODUDWLRQV Rn everything from problems 
of water supply and sanitation to budgets, poverty, the economy and the price 
of sugar was constantly applauded by his supporters in the press (Diario de la 
Marina, April 22 1938, 1). On the same day as attending his induction to the 
Association of Spanish-American War Veterans as an honorary member, 
alongside the US ambassador, the colonel declared that:     
³&RQVLGHUR GHXQD LPSHULRVD QHFHVLGDG KXPDQD \QDFLRQDO HO TXHORV              
SRGHUHVSǌEOLFRV LQWHUYHQJDQ HQODFXHVWLyQ \FRQMXUHQ SRUPHGLR GHXQD
actuacíon rápida y eficaz la situación de centenares de indigentes, cuyo 
HVSHFWiFXOR GHPLVHULD UHVXOWD KDUWRGRORURVR\HVFDORIULDQWH ´                                                 
(Batista, Diario de la Marina, April 22 1938:1).  
Batista frequently declared his intention to uphold justice, humanity, liberty 
and democracy (Diario de la Marina, April 25 1938:1), he spoke of leading a 
revolución sin agresiones and a revolución de ideas. In 1938 Batista spoke 
with the same revolutionary zeal as in 1933, he spoke about defending 
³SURSLHGDG FRQWUD ODVPRQRSROLRV \ DFDSDUDGRUHV\FRQWUD ODV HPERVFDGDVGHO
UDGLFDOLVPR TXHRVOD TXLHUH DUUHWEDWDU HVWDPRVQRVRWURV ´ ,ELG His 
revolutionary rKHWRULF FRXOG KDYHEHORQJHG WR&DVWUR¶VUHYROXWLRQDU\
government after 1959. 
Batista sought to enhance his popularity by projecting an image as an 
international statesman. In November 1938 he took Mexican president 
Cárdenas up on an invitation to visit him in Mexico City. The trip came at a 
tense time in Mexican-8QLWHG 6WDWHVUHODWLRQV DVDUHVXOW RI0H[LFR¶V
nationalization of its petroleum industry. Whilst in Mexico City, Batista talked 
openly about nationalizing the sugar industry and proclaimed his support for 
Republican Spain in front of a crowd of 100,000. The warming relations 
EHWZHHQ%DWLVWD DQG&iUGHQDVZHUH ³ZDWFKHG ZLWK LQWHUHVW DQGVRPH
XQHDVLQHVV E\$PHULFDQ EXVLQHVVPHQ´ 5+DUW3KLOOLSV The New York Times, 
May 8 1938). But it was clear that CXEDGHSHQGHG³FRPSOHWHO\ RQKHU ODUJHVW
customer, the United States, and that the prosperity or depression of the island 
GHSHQGVGLUHFWO\ RQWKH UHFLSURFLW\ WUHDW\ DQGVXJDU TXRWD ´ ,ELG  
Batista had visited the US President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the White House 
RQWKH VDPHWULS %DWLVWD GHFODUHG WKDW KHZRXOG KHOS5RRVHYHOW ³PDNH WKH
ZRUOG VDIH IRU GHPRFUDF\ ´ The Washington Post, November 11 1938). 
Despite his fiery rhetoric in Mexico, it was clear that Batista had firmly placed 
  
 
Cuba behind thH8QLWHG 6WDWHV DQGDJDLQVW WKH IDVFLVW FRXQWULHV %DWLVWD ³VWDWHG
that he and Cuban officials would heartily cooperate with President Roosevelt 
LQ KLV SODQ WRUHOLHYH WKHWHUULEOH VLWXDWLRQ DEURDG ´The New York Times, 
November 19 1938). Roosevelt and BatLVWD DQQRXQFHG WKDW&XED¶VUHFLSURFDO
treaty with the United States would be revised to allow $50,000,000 to become 
immediately available for public works projects. Despite his talk of 
nationalizations, it is clear that the United States firmly backed the Batistato. 
But his mixed messages in Mexico and the United States led the British 
(PEDVV\ WRZULWH WKDW ³LW LV LPSRVVLEOH WRIRUHWHOO ZKHWKHU DVD3UHVLGHQWLDO
candidate he (Batista) will seek to lead the forces of the centre or those of the 
OHIW ´ :KLWQH\, 2001: 172). The foreign trips in 1938 succeeded in enhancing 
%DWLVWD¶V UHSXWDWLRQ DQGSUHVWLJH DWKRPH  
The Constituent Assembly which had been elected to prepare the new 
constitution were meanwhile hard at work. The Cuban Constitution of 1940 
was one of the most significant achievements of the Cuban Republic. It was 
the result of the admirable cooperation of disparate and opposing political 
groups. Signatories included communists Blas Roca and Juan Marinello, and 
Auténticos such as Ramon Grau San Martín and Carlos Prío Socarrás (The 
Political Database of the Americas, 2006). Whilst it was heavily influenced by 
%DWLVWD¶V SURJUHVVLYH UHIRUPV WKHcolonel was strangely not a signatory of the 
constitution. However, the final document did include many aspects which 
Batista had championed in his three year plan of 1937: social insurance, a 
minimum wage, pensions, accident compensation, an eight hour working day, 
a forty-four hour week and paid vacations (Thomas, 2001:449).  
The constitution for the first time designated voting as a fundamental right. It 
protected private property and substantiated the independence of the judiciary. 
Constitutional protection was enacted protecting social and labour rights, 
culture and family. The Constituent Assembly sought the assistance and 
guidance of those who had helped to draft the Weimar Republics constitution 
LQ DQG WKH6SDQLVK 5HSXEOLF¶V &RQVWLWXWLRQ RI The Political 
Database of the Americas, 2006).   
The realisation of a progressive constitution was the first remarkable 
achievement of 1940. The second was the presidential election held in July of 
WKDW \HDU%DWLVWD VRXJKW RIILFH LQ RQ³XQ SURJUDPD GHJRELHUQR
progresista pero moderado, que ofrece proteccíon al capital y al trabajo 
estímulo al inversionista \OLEHUWDG GHHQVHxDQ]D ´ Carteles, April 7 1940:33).  
Argote-Freyre points out that, whilst the Communists were more ideologically 
suited to an alliance with Grau. Mario Menocal (the conservative former 
President who had allied with the radical Grau in 1939) was actually more 
suited to an alliance with Batista (Argote-)UH\UH 0HQRFDO¶V
Demócrata Republicano party had assured Auténtico success in the Constituent 
Assembly elections in 1939 and Menocal would be kingmaker in 1940 (Ibid). 
Both Grau and Batista sought the support of the former President, but it was 
%DWLVWD WKDW ILQDOO\ VHFXUHG0HQRFDO¶V VXSSRUW LQ0DUFKE\RIIHULQJ
more concessions (namely cabinet positions and congressional seats) than his 
rival (Argote-Freyre, 2006:270). Menocal must have also felt more 
  
 
ideologically and personally close to the practical military man Batista, than to 
the radical Profesor Grau. By March Batista had put together a remarkable 
coalition of the PCC on the radical left, and the Demócrata Republicano party 
on the conservative right; this alliance became known as the Coalición 
Socialista Democrática.      
The coalition won Batista the Presidency in July 1940; Batista polled 805,125 
YRWHV WR*UDX¶V 1RKOHQ  LQ WKHPRVW KRQHVW 3UHVLGHQWLal 
election since Menocal had won the Presidency in 1912 (Thomas, 2001:451).  
³$ IHZHOHFWLRQV ERRWKVZHUHEXUQHG VRPH WHOHSKRQH ZLUHV ZHUHFXWDEULGJH
RUWZREORZQ XSDQGDIHZ WUHHVIHOOHG DFURVVKLJKZD\V ´ Daily Boston Globe, 
July 16 1940:16), but, by Cuban standards the election had been fairly 
peaceful. Reports of army intimidation were rife (Argote-Freyre, 2006:273), 
but it could be argued that, whilst Batista was unable or unwilling to control 
his loyal soldiers, he would have won the vote anyway, considering the 
overwhelming electoral support he received. Batista and his remarkable 
coalition of CRPPXQLVWV RQWKH OHIW DQG0HQRFDO¶V FRQVHUYDWLYHV RQWKH ULJKW
KDGEHDWHQ*UDX¶VPRGHUDWH DOOLDQFH E\DPRUH WKDQYRWHV 1RKOHQ
2005:203) . The Washington Post insightfully observed that: ³7KH 0DQZKR
for seven years has been the power behind the throne in Cuba has now openly 
and with the full weight of constitutional sanction come forward to wield the 
VFHSWUH ´ The Washington Post, July 16 1940:10). 
Batista the President  
Batista was sworn in as president on October 10 1940, a symbolic day chosen 
to coincide with the national holiday of the grito de yara10 (The New York 
Times, October 11 1940:6)7KH FKDUDFWHU RI%DWLVWD¶V 3UHVLGHQF\ EHWZHHQ
1940 and 1944 was largely dictated by the Second World War. The decimation 
of the war-torn sugar producing countries in the far-east gave Cuba an 
unprecedented economic boost not seen since the danza de los millones (dance 
of the millions)11. Cuba achieved the highest standard of living per capita in 
Latin America during the first Batista Presidency (Farber, 1976:102).  
As in 1952, Batista ensured that his government was filled with obedient and 
tame men, such as the Vice-President Gustavo Cuervo Rubio, and Prime 
Minister Carlos Saladrigas Zayas. Since 1933, Batista had politicized the army 
and under his stewardship had placed them at the centre of national politics. He 
had ensured that the military enjoyed the fruits of power, and by 1940 the 
leadership was accustomed to these privileges and expected power, influence 
and riches. In the first months of his presidency, Batista confined himself to 
civilian matters (Thomas, 2001:453). When, in January 1941 he replaced the 
police chief with Colonel Manuel Benítez, this set the former army chief on a 
collision course with his replacement and former right-hand-man Pedraza, as 
                                                 
10
 The Declaration of Yara signifies the start of the first war of Cuban independence on 
October 10 1868  
11
 This refers to the economic prosperity of the early 1920s in Cuba, which was a result of the 
GHFLPDWLRQ RI(XURSH¶VEHHW-sugar industry following the first world war.   
 
  
 
well as the chief of the Navy and fellow septembrista Angel Anselmo 
González12 (Ibid).  
Pedraza and González led a large group of disgruntled officers against Batista 
and had even confronted their former friend in the presidential palace whilst 
accompanied by dozens of heavily armed bodyguards (Thomas, 2001:454). 
When Pedraza demanded full control of the armed forces, Batista asked for 24 
hours to think about it. The President immediately fortified the palace and 
personally seized control of Campamento Columbia, by appealing directly to 
the loyalty of the soldiers literally on the parade ground. Within hours, Pedraza 
and González had been arrested and subsequently sent into exile in Miami 
(Ibid). These events were the first test of the new constitution and indicate the 
continued volatility of Cuba by the 1940s. Events equally indicate the 
undiminished strength, resolve and to some extent popularity of Batista as an 
elected leader.   
By December 11 1941, Cuba had declared war on Japan, Germany and Italy 
(The Hartford Courant, December 12 1941:1). This declaration assured the 
rapid agreement of a second trade agreement with the United States (Thomas, 
2001:456), which authorised the sale of almost the entire 1942 zafra to the US 
(The New York Times, January 29 1942:8). Batista also agreed to the massive 
deployment of United States personnel and equipment on Cuban soil in 
VXSSRUW RIµKHPLVSKHULF GHIHQFH¶ %\ Oate 1942 there were nine military 
agreements between the United States and Cuba, which involved the use of 
Cuban territory (Thomas, 2001:457). Several hundred Cubans volunteered to 
fight in the United States military, just as many had done on the side of 
Republican Spain in the 1930s.  
As former Jefe del Ejército, Batista remained technically an army reservist, 
and in February 1942 he took advantage of his new wartime law which 
reorganized the Cuban armed forces to promote himself to the rank of Major 
General (Chicago Daily Tribune, February 6 1942). This rank had ceased to 
exist since the fall of Machado, and it is possible that Batista decided to 
promote himself to this rank (which would be the most senior military rank) in 
anticipation of a potential return as chief of the army under a future President 
of his choosing. The colonel was now a General.   
The Communists remained firm allies of the President, and the US-Soviet 
alliance against the Axis powers only increased their support of the 
government. Soon Cuba and the USSR entered into alliance (Ibid), and in 
February 1942 Juan Marinello became the first ever Communist to enter a 
government in Latin America13 (Thomas, 2001:458).  
When Batista left office in 1944 he left behind a buoyant economy. In his fina l 
year in office, Cuba had produced an unprecedented Zafra which had yielded 
profits not seen since 1924 (Thomas, 2001:459). Subsequently, sugar mill 
workers received a 10 per cent salary increase (The New York Times, February 
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 The name given to those in the military who participated in the events of September 4 1933. 
13
 0DULQHOOR HQWHUHG%DWLVWD¶VFDELQHWDVPLQLVWHU ZLWKRXWSRUWIROLR $IHZPRQWKVODWHU&DUORV
Rafael Rodríguez became the second Communist government minister.     
  
 
23 1944:6). A 10 per cent salary increase for low-bracket salaried public 
employees as well as for soldiers followed in June of that year. Batista could 
not have hoped for a more positive outlook economically as he prepared to 
leave office.  
Batista and his handpicked presidential candidate Carlos Saladrigas must have 
understandably approached the 1944 Presidential election with enormous 
confidence. Batista and his Coalición Socialista Democrática14 backed their 
FDQGLGDWH DJDLQVW *UDX¶V$XWpQWLFR-Republicana alliance (López Civeira, 
1990:45).  Batista must have felt confident enough to decide to prevent the 
armed forces from interfering in the election. Saladrigas¶ FDPSDLJQ ZDVwell 
funded and well organized, but Grau waged an equally relentless and 
determined campaign which gripped the nation. The charismatic former 
university professor SURPLVHG WKDW ³7KH ZRUNHUVZRXOG KDYH DIDLU GHDO
Corruption would end. Cuba would be for the Cubans. The Auténticos would 
make Cuba HFRQRPLFDOO\ LQGHSHQGHQW ´ (Thomas, 2001:460). 
In what the magazine Bohemia UHIHUUHG WRDV³OD VRUSUHVD HOHFWRUDO´  Bohemia, 
June 18:24) Grau secured more than 200,000 votes than Saladrigas (Nohlen, 
2005:203).  Despite this, Grau was not the only hero of the hour in June 1944:   
³(Q ODV FDOOHV GHOD+DEDQD HOPLODJUR VHUHYHló sobre el pueblo. Por la tarde se 
arremolinaban en los parques y plazas, sonando fotutos, agitando banderas, 
golpeando bongoes, bailando la conga a lo largo del magnifico paseo El Prado. 
Ovacionaron estruendosamente a Grau San Martin. Todavía más 
estruendosamente ovacionaron a Fulgencio Batiststa, el hombre fuerte que 
KDEUD LPSXHVWR OD GHPRFUDFLD HQ&XED ´ Bohemia, June 18:27) 
Whilst Grau was the man of the moment, Cubans also applauded General 
Batista for finally bringing a free and fair democracy to Cuba. The New York 
Times UHSRUWHG WKDW%DWLVWD KDG³UHFHLYHG WKHJUHDWHVW RYDWLRQ IURP WKHSHRSOH
LQ KLV GHFDGHLQSRZHU ´ The New York Times, June 4 1944:11). It reported 
thousands upon thousands of people congregating at the Presidential Palace 
shouting cries of ³9LYD%DWLVWD´ (Ibid).    
Batista left the Presidential Palace for the last time on October 10 1944 to the 
cheers of 35,000 Cubans (The Hartford Courant, October 11 1944:4). Batista 
was the hero of 1933, he was a strongman who had championed democracy 
and had left office presiding over a strong, stable and prosperous Cuban nation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 In 1944 this alliance consisted of the Communists who had since renamed themselves the 
Partido Socialista Popular, the ABC as well as the Partido Demócrata and Partido Liberal 
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
THE AUTÉNTICO ERA (1944-52)         
A POT OF GOLD AND AN EASY CHAIR 
 
The literature frequently treats the years 1933-58 as a sustained period of 
Batista rule, but this is to neglect the eight years of Auténtico government 
between 1944 and 1952. The Auténtico era culminated in a discredited 
SROLWLFDO V\VWHP ZKLFK ZDVXQDEOH WRZLWKVWDQG %DWLVWD¶V golpe de estado in 
March 1952.  
The Auténticos had won one of CuED¶V IDLUHVW DQGPRVW KRQHVW SUHVLGHQWLDO
elections ever in 1944. Autenticismo came to power on a wave of optimism and 
great expectations15. The era was one of economic prosperity, unprecedented 
civil liberties, and the most democratic political process in Cuban history. The 
era is also remembered as one of the most corrupt, violent and chaotic periods 
LQ&XEDQKLVWRU\ 7KH&XEDQSHRSOH¶V IHHOLQJV RI KRSHDQGRSWLPLVP LQ 
became feelings of betrayal and disillusionment by March 1952.  
 The Glorious Journey 
The nucleus of the group which would become the Auténtico party, originated 
from the fraternization of imprisoned DEU (Directorio Estudiantil 
Universitario) VWXGHQW OHDGHUV DQGXQLYHUVLW\ SURIHVVRUV LQ 0DFKDGR¶V Presidio 
Modelo (model prison), on the Isle de Pines. The prison became more of a 
revolutionary training school than a prison. Disparate elements of the anti-
Machado struggle (which included imprisoned soldiers) conspired together for 
the first time (Ameringer, 2000:4).  
The collapse of the Machadato and subsequent revolución de los sargentos 
(revolution of the sergeants) in 1933 resulted in a five day provisional 
executive of five leaders (which included Carbó and Grau), and subsequently 
the µGD\JRYHUQPHQW¶16. This government engineered radical social 
change, and issued a number of progressive decrees in its short existence 
(Farber, 1976:43). Batista pushed aside Grau and the civilian leaders of the 
revolution in January 1934; within weeks the deposed leaders had regrouped 
under Grau to establish the Auténtico party (officially called the Partido 
Revolucionario Cubano-Auténtico) (Ameringer, 2000:12).  
The party was heavily influenced by Aprista doctrine. This ideology was 
pioneered by the Peruvian political party APRA (Alianza Popular 
Revolucionaria Americana) led by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre in the early 
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 The political doctrine of the Auténtico party 
16
 The government, led by Ramón Grau San Martín, actually lasted 127 days, between 
September 10 1933 and January 15 1934  
  
 
1920s (Kantor, 1952:578). It called for continent-wide political unity in Latin 
America, anti-imperialism, economic nationalism, democracy and the use of 
WKH VWDWHSRZHUWRLPSURYH ³education, agriculture, industry, transportation, 
DQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQ ´ .DQWRU -584). Political movements in Peru, 
Mexico, Costa Rica, Bolivia and Venezuela (as well as in Cuba) were 
influenced by Aprista doctrine (Alexander, 1949:236).  
The Auténtico party DGRSWHGWKHVORJDQ ³&XEDSDUDORV&XEDQRV ´ Bohemia, 
0D\ DQGIURP LWV LQFHSWLRQ KDG³PRQRSROL]HG WKHV\PERO RI
³UHYROXWLRQ ´ LQ&XEDQSROLWLFV ´ 6WRNHV   
%DWLVWD¶V YLROHQW RSSUHVVLRQ RIRSSRVLWLRQ EHWZHHQDQGIRUFHG WKH
Auténtico leadership into exile.Whilst Grau campaigned against the Batistato 
from Mexico, many Auténticos fought the regime (literally) from within Cuba. 
Other non-$XWpQWLFR JURXSV VXFK DV$QWRQLR *XLWHUDV¶ -RYHQ &XEDVLPLODUO\
fought against Batista. These armed-JURXSV ZRQ*UDX¶V UHVSHFWDQGVRPHRI
these fighters subsequently established the grupos de accíon (action groups) of 
the 1940s (Farber, 1976:62).   
A more accommodating Batista permitted the party leaders to return to Cuba, 
to participate in the constituent assembly elections of November 1939 
$PHULQJHU 7KH$XWpQWLFRV VWRRGDVSDUWRIDQµRSSRVLWLRQ IURQW¶
DOOLDQFH ZKLFK GHIHDWHG%DWLVWD¶V µJRYHUQPHQW IURQW¶ E\ZLQQLQJ IRUW\ RQHRI
the seventy six seats in the assembly (Nohlen, 2005:197). Grau had ridden a 
³ZDYH RISRSXODU HPRWLRQ DQGPHVVLDQLF fervour ´ LQ autenticismo (Ehrlich, 
2012:296). Auténtico assembly members subsequently played a pivotal role in 
the drafting the Cuban Constitution of 1940, which ultimately contained much 
of the Auténtico social-democratic philosophy (Ameringer, 2000:14). Grau 
however lost to Batista in the 1940 presidential election heavily tainted by 
reports of army meddling (Argote-Freyre, 2006:273). The 1944 election was, 
by comparison, free and fair and without military interference (Thomas, 
7KHYLFWRU\ UHSUHVHQWHG DFXOPLQDWLRQ RIZKDW(GXDUGR µ(GG\¶
&KLEiVGHVFULEHG DV³OD MRUQDGDJORULRVD ´ WKHJORULRXV MRXUQH\ $PHULQJHU
2000:16).  
Great Expectations and Wasted Opportunities  
By 1944 autenticismo ³had replaced Liberalism as the collective state of mind 
RI&XEDQV  ´ (Ameringer, 2000:143). The magazine Bohemia wrote that Cuba 
had waited a long time for democracy, and declared that Cubans vested great 
hopes for change in Grau (Bohemia, June 18 1944:27). The Auténticos 
promised tax reform, the elimination of corruption in public office, the creation 
of a national bank and currency system, as well as improvements to public 
sanitation, healthcare and education. They had promised to expand public 
works projects, do more to assist campesinos, and secure the economic 
independence of the island (The New York Times, October 11 1944:13). It 
VHHPHG WKDW DQHZGD\KDGFRPH IRU&XEDDV*UDXSURPLVHG HYHU\ERG\ ³a pot 
RIJROG DQGDQHDV\FKDLU  ´ (Staten, 2005:66).  
  
 
Grau VWDUWHGGHFLVLYHO\ KH³XVHGKLV SRSXODU PDQGDWH OLNH DPDFKHWH ´ (Time, 
November 20 1944), retiring ³PDQ\ RI&XED
VVZDJJHULQJ $UP\ RIILFHUV ´
(Ibid) DQG DQQRXQFHG WKDW KHZRXOG ³HOLPLQDWH &XED
VFKHULVKHG botellas 
(literally, bottles²soft government jobs  ´ (Ibid). The British embassy 
anticipated a positive improvement in Cuba; they commented that Grau was an 
³KRQHVW PDQ DQG DQLGHDOLVW ZKRKDGEHHQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\ HOHFWHG 3UHVLGHQW
DIWHU \HDUV RISROLWLFDO VWUXJJOH´ British Embassy, Dispatch No. 192, 
December 30 1948). 
The promotion of Grauist officers, such as the unpopular Major Pérez Dámara 
(who was promoted to General and Jefe del Ejército) resulted in seething 
discontent amongst the pro-batistiano military (Thomas, 2001:469). Grau 
retired more than two hundred septembrista officers17, replacing them with 
Grauist officers (Staten, 2005:79). The president was shaken when a group of 
septembrista officers (led by the ex-colonel Pedraza) were detained for 
apparently plotting a golpe de estado in February 1945 (Embassy of the United 
States, March 22 1945); it must have seemed like déjà vu. Grau remembered 
WKH VDFULILFHV RIKLV µER\V¶ LQ WKH grupos de accíon, and would come to rely on 
them more than the army.    
 
Cuba was enjoying enormous prosperity as a result of post-war demand for 
sugar; prices had not been as high since the danza de los millones18. Record-
breaking flows of capital entered the Cuban economy; the national income was 
double that of 1939 and by 1947 real incomes had increased some 40% on 
average: 
  
³7KLV SKHQRPHQDO ULVH VWHPPHG IURP WKHFRPELQDWLRQ RI WKHOLIWLQJ RIZDUWLPH
price controls and the fact that European sugar beet production had not yet 
UHFRYHUHG IURP WKHZDU¶VGHYDVWDWLRQ  ´ (Ameringer, 2000:122). 
Grau increased taxes on sugar to finance public works programmes. The first 
Auténtico government spent some $80,000,000 each year on constructing 
roads, schools, parks, houses and hospitals. These projects provided jobs for 
many sugar workers during the off-season. The government also encouraged 
union participation, and by 1948 as many as 50 per cent of the work-force were 
part of one union or another (Staten, 2005:79).   
Nevertheless, endemic corruption overshadowed the positive work of the Grau 
administration. Charles Ameringer (2000) described the presidency as ³RQHRI
WKHPRVW FRUUXSW SHULRGV LQ WKHKLVWRU\ RIWKH5HSXEOLF´ (Ameringer, 2000:60). 
Whilst the Auténticos did not invent political corruption in Cuba, they did 
master it. The culture of corruption in Cuba can be traced back to Spanish 
colonial rule when civil servants were paid so little by the Spanish crown, that 
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 7KRVHRIILFHUVZKRKDGWDNHQSDUWLQWKHµUHYROWRIWKHVHUJHDQWV¶RI6HSWHPEHU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who, owed their positions to Batista 
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 7KHµGDQFHRIWKHPLOOLRQV¶ UHIers to the skyrocketing sugar prices of the early 1920s, this 
was as a result of increased post-war demand   
  
 
theft was the only method of attaining reasonable remuneration. Corruption 
most often involved the allocation of public works contracts, pardons, non-
existent government or military positions, the sale of government property and 
the misappropriation of national lottery funds (Thomas, 2001:463). Just a year 
LQWR *UDX¶V SUHVLGHQF\ WKH%ULWLVK HPEDVV\ IRXQG ³OLWWOH MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU
RSWLPLVP´ British Embassy, Dispatch No. 192, December 30 1948), and 
accused the Cuban government of graft on a grand scale.  
The British later explored the issue of corruption further by highlighting the 
FDVHRI*UDX¶V0LQLVWHU IRU(GXFDWLRQ -RVp0DQXHO $OHPiQ British Embassy, 
Dispatch No. 50, 12 April 1950). Alemán had been a bureaucrat who had 
³ULVHQ WRSRZHUDVDUHVXOW RIKLV ³VNLOO LQ WKHPDOYHUVDWLRQ RISXEOLF IXQGV ´
,ELG7KH UHSRUW GHVFULEHVKRZ WKHµ,QFLVR.¶tax, which levied nine cents on 
a bag of sugar to supposedly support the maintenance and development of rural 
schools, actually allowed the minister to plunder millions of dollars from the 
treasury without having to account for it. From the time that Alemán took up 
his post at the Ministry of Education, funding for rural schools almost ceased 
WRH[LVW :KLOVW ³$OHPiQ GLGQRWLQYHQW WKLHYHU\ LQ WKH0LQLVWU\ RI(GXFDWLRQ 
KHZRXOG UDLVH LW WRXQSUHFHGHQWHG OHYHOV ´ $PHULQJHU :KHQ
asked how he managed to extract so much money from the treasury in the last 
days of the GrDX UHJLPH KLV UHSO\ ZDV³LQ VXLWFDVHV ´ British Embassy, 
Dispatch No. 50, 12 April 1950).  
*UDX VSHQW KLV ILQDO GD\VLQ RIILFH ³EXVLO\ HQJDJHG LQ ILOFKLQJ ZKDWZDVOeft in 
the tUHDVXU\ ´ British Embassy'LVSDWFK 1R'HFHPEHU*UDX¶V
presideQF\ GUHZWRDFORVH ³IRXU \HDUVRI GHFHSWLRQ DQGGLVDSSRLQWPHQW 
trampling on the expectations of the many people who had faith in his 
SURPLVHV ´ 7KRPDV -478). Grau had done nothing to strengthen the 
democratic process in Cuba, he had actually achieved quite the opposite.   
7KHµ&RUGLDO¶ 3UHVLGHQW  
Whilst many Cubans had been hopeful in 1944, many had become pessimistic 
by 1948. The *UDXJRYHUQPHQW KDG³SURYHG WKHPVHOYHV RQHPRUHSKDODQ[ RI
JUHHG\ RIILFH KROGHUV¶ (Schwartz, 1997:112). Nevertheless, the Auténticos 
remained the largest and best organised political party in Cuba, the party was 
still the flag-EHDUHU RIWKH µJHQHUDWLRQ RIµ¶19, and was by far the best funded 
party (as a result of their pilfering of the Cuban treasury).  
The former DEU leader, Carlos Prío Socarrás, was selected as the Auténtico 
presidential candidate in 1948. Prío had the support of Alemán and his political 
slush fund, BAGA (Bloque Aléman-Grau Alsina). BAGA was a limitless 
political fund (plundered from the treasury) FRQWUROOHG E\$OHPiQ DQG*UDX¶V
QHSKHZ )UDQFLVFR *UDX$OVLQD %$*$ZDV³WKH PRVW SRZHUIXO SROLWLFDO
PDFKLQH LQ &XED¶VKLVWRU\ ´ (KUOLFK $FFRUGLQJ WRWKH%ULWLVK LW
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ZDV$OHPiQ¶V ILQDQFLDO VXSSRUW WKDW ³ZHLJKHd the scales in favour of Prío as 
FDQGLGDWH RI WKH$XWpQWLFR SDUW\ LQ  ´British Embassy, Dispatch No. 50, 
12 April 1950). BAGA supplied Prío with as much as thirty million pesos in 
1948 (Ehrlich, 2012:295).  
The Auténtico candidate had outstanding revolutionary credentials: he had 
been a founding party member, and had served as a competent Minister for 
Labour and Prime Minister under Grau. His outgoing demeanour and friendly 
smile would result in him becoming known as the presidente cordial (cordial 
president). But behind the persona of cordialidad, it was known that power had 
corrupted Prío, E\KHZDV³DOUHDG\ NQRZQ WREHH[WUDRUGLQDU\ DWWUDFWHG
E\WKH LGHDRIPRQH\ ´ 7KRPDV   
7KH$XWpQWLFRV DOOLHG ZLWK $ORQVR 3XMRO¶V 3DUWLGR5HSXEOLFDQR LQwhich 
established the Alianza Auténtico-Republicana) (López Civeira, 1990:54). The 
largest opposition was the Liberal-Democrata coalition of traditional parties 
led by Ricardo Núñez Portuondo. The Communists participated, but struggled 
to garner support without allies. More importantly, the popular Auténtico 
OHDGHU µ(GG\¶ &KLEiV¶ KDGEURNHQ DZD\ IURP WKHSDUW\ LQ 0D\DQG had 
formed a new anti-corruption party called the Ortodoxos (officially called the 
Partido del Pueblo Cubano-Ortodoxo). For the first time in a generation, no 
batistiano candidate campaigned for the presidency. The Alianza Auténtico-
Republicana conducted a well-organised, well-funded and meticulous 
campaign. Organisations such as the Comité Femenino endorsed Prío with 
VORJDQV VXFK DV³PHYR\ FRQ&DUORV3UtR SRUTXHHVFRUGLDO \DPLVWRVR ´ DQG
³&XEDQDV GHPRVWUDUHPRV XQDYH]PDVTXHVDEHPRV HVFRJHU ´ Diario de la 
Marina, June 16, 1948).  
7KH HOHFWLRQ ZDVUHODWLYHO\ SHDFHIXO ZLWK RQO\ µVRPH¶ UHSRUWHGYLROHQFH ZKLFK
was an achievement by Cuban electoral standards. On the day, 78.7 per cent of 
the electorate turned out to convincingly elect Prío to the presidency (with 46 
per cent) of the vote. The government coalition returned thirty six senators and 
forty congressmen (Nohlen 2005:203). Whilst the victory was not a landslide, 
the fragmented (or inexperienced, in the case of the Ortodoxos) opposition 
ensured that the Auténticos secured a convincing second mandate.  
Despite the victory, enthusiasm for the Auténticos had greatly diminished 
since 1944 (Stokes, 1951:77). The influential political analyst Raoul Alfonso 
Gonse (sic) wrote in Alerta, WKDW WKHPRUDOO\ ³EDQNUXSW OHDGHUVKLS FRPSHOOHG
WKHPDVVHV WRVHHNHOVHZKHUH IRUUHOLHI IRU WKHLU GLVLOOXVLRQPHQW ´ 6WRNHV, 
1951:77). The British embassy concurred, predicting that Prío and Pujol would 
EHFRQIURQWHG ³ZLWK RQHFULVLV RUDQRWKHU ILQDQFLDO RUUHYROXWLRQDU\ RUERWK
DQGQHLWKHU LQP\YLHZ LVRI WKHVWXII WRPDVWHUV UHYROXWLRQV ´ British 
Embassy, Dispatch No. 192, December 30 1948) 
  
 
7KH µFRUGLDO¶ SUHVLGHQW started decisively by establishing a Banco Nacional, 
Tribunal de Cuentas and Banco de Fomento Agrícola e Industrial 
de Cuba (BANFAIC). The Banco Nacional is considered the greatest 
achievement of the Prío presidency. It was designed to independently 
administer credit, centralise national finances and reduce government 
corruption. The Tribunal de Cuentas was (ironic considering the Auténticos 
record in office) designed to administer the use, and reduce the misuse of 
public funds. BANFAIC was intended to be an independent organisation 
which would provide credit to struggling farmers to whom private banks 
would not lend to. BANFAIC was designed with economic diversification in 
mind (Ameringer, 2000:107-108). These were apparently well-intentioned   
achievements which finally went to some way to fulfilling the original 1944 
Auténtico programme, at least in theory.   
Changes in personnel occurred in most government departments, but the most 
FRPSOHWH RYHUKDXO ZDVDWWKH0LQLVWU\ RI(GXFDWLRQ $OHPiQ¶V IRUPHU
ministry). Aureliano Sánchez Arango replaced Alemán, and was probably one 
of the most honest ministers of the entire Auténtico era. Sánchez Arango 
dismissed over a thousand personnel (real or imagined) (British Embassy, 
Dispatch No. 20, February 16 1949). The new education minister declared that 
WKH ³DSSRLQWPHQWV KDGEHHQVROG DQGLVVXHG ZKROHVDOH LQ DQLOOHJDO PDQQHU DQG
WKHUHIRUH QRZKDGWREHUHYRNHG ´ 6WRNHV-78). 
Just three months after taking office, the president claimed to have succeeded 
in lowering the cost of living and basic foodstuffs. According to the British 
embassy, Cubans were not convinced. Many Cubans actually felt that the cost 
RIOLYLQJ KDGLQFUHDVHG VLQFH 3UtR¶V LQDXJXUDWLRQ British Embassy, Dispatch 
No. 14, January 27 1949). As a result of poor planning and the reduced 
demand for sugar internationally, Prío ultimately presided over a declining 
economy.   
In 1951, the IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) 
published an extensive report on the Cuban economy. The report presented an 
all-encompassing analysis of the economy, its public administration and 
policy. TKH UHSRUW¶V ILQGLQJV ZHUHQRW XQH[SHFWHG WKH HFRQRP\ ZDVRYHU-
reliant on sugar and the United States; 83 per cent of all Cuban imports 
originated from the United States (IBRD, 1951:739) and sugar was responsible 
for 90 per cent of its exports (IBRD, 1951:194). Everybody knew that Cuba 
ZDV³LQIDWXDWHG ZLWK WKHRXWSXW DQGSULFHRIVXJDU ´ *XWLpUUH] 6iQFKH] 
EXWWKH UHSRUWRIIHUHG ³VXEVWDQFH WRWKHQRWLRQ SURviding statistics, tables and 
FKDUWV ´ $PHULQJHU  The British concurred with the IBRD 
DVVHVVPHQW WKDW WKH$XWpQWLFRV ³ZRXOG KDYHSDUDO\]HG &XEDLI LWZHUHQRW IRU
the strong demand for sugar in the world market (British Embassy, Dispatch 
No. 58, April 25 1950). The report concluded that the Auténtico policy of 
µHFRQRPLF QDWLRQDOLVP¶ KDGHQFRXUDJHG DVXJDU LQGXVWU\ ZKLFK ZDVRYHU-
regulated and lacked productivity, dynamism and innovation. The report also 
concluded that US sugar interests (which produced 55 per cent of raw sugar) 
EHOLHYHG WKDW ³&XEDQ VXJDU ZDVLQ LWV GHFOLQLQJ VWDJH $PHULQJHU   
  
 
7KH$XWpQWLFRV¶ PDQDJHPHQW RI WKHHGXFDWLRQ V\VWHP ZDVFULWLFLVHG LQ WKH
study. It   concluded that educational standards, literacy rates and attendance 
had deteriorated as a result of over-centralisation, corruption and incompetence 
(Ameringer, 2000:130-7KH%DQN IXUWKHU FULWLFLVHG WKH$XWpQWLFRV¶ SXEOLF
administration, arguing that political appointments in public administration 
encouraged corruption which had diminished the authority of the government. 
By the time that Prío received the report in July 1951, he could not act upon its 
recommendations, as he was struggling for political survival by this time 
(Ameringer, 2000:142).    
The Cuban economy was increasingly stagnant by the late 1940s. The 
HFRQRP\ UHOLHG RQWKH H[SRUW RIDSURGXFW IRUZKLFK ³PDUNHW FRQGLWLRQV ZHUH
XQFHUWDLQ DQGFRPSHWLWLRQ ZDVLQWHQVH ´ 3pUH]7KHGHYHORSPHQW RI
the sugar industry had peaked by 1925 and had developed little since. The 
Auténticos did little to diversify a boom and bust economy, which was hostage 
to the uncertainty of international demand.   
The one sector of the economy that defied the sugar industry stagnation, and 
contradicted the Auténtico FRQFHSW RIµHFRQRPLF QDWLRQDOLVP¶ ZDVWKH
increase in   (non-sugar related) commercial ties between Cuba and the United 
States (Ibid). Air travel expanded immeasurably, there were as many as twenty 
eight scheduled flights a day to and from the United States by 1949 (Ibid). The 
permanent Cuban communities in the United States grew exponentially 
(primarily in New York City and Miami) (Ibid). A Cuban Chamber of 
Commerce was established in New York City which resulted in greater bi-
lateral commercial ties and familial remittances (Pérez 2003:207). The number 
RIWUDYHOHUV EHWZHHQ WZRFRXQWULHV LQFUHDVHG PDVVLYHO\ LQ WKH ODWH V ³,Q
one four-month period between May and August 1948, an estimated forty 
thousand travelers from Cuba arrived in Miami. By the earl\ ¶VWKLV
number had increased to fifty thousand. During these years Cubans visiting 
)ORULGD ZHUHVSHQGLQJ PRUH WKDQ PLOOLRQ DQQXDOO\ ´ 3pUH]7KH
UHDOLVDWLRQ WKDW WKHRQHDVSHFWRI WKHHFRQRP\ WKDW µEXFNHGWKH WUHQG¶ RI
stagnation under Prío, was an aspect of the economy not under government 
direction, must have undermined the prestige of the Auténtico concept of 
µHFRQRPLF QDWLRQDOLVP¶  
Arguably the most surprisingly development of the Prío presidency was the 
fragmentation of the party in 1950; between the president and his supporters 
and Grau and his allies. Prío permitted the criminal prosecution of his former 
IULHQG FKDUJLQJ ³WKDW KHIRXQG *RYHUQPHQW GHSDUWPHQWV ZLWKRXW IXQGV DQG
KHDYLO\ LQ GHEW ´KHDQQRXQFHG WKDW ³PLOOLRQV RI GROOars had disappeared in the 
ODVW GD\VRIWKH*UDXJRYHUQPHQW ´ The New York Times, July 5 1950). It is 
difficult to believe that Prío had been ignorant of the thievery of the Grau 
government; Prío indeed had very much been a member of the government and 
must have been aware of the outrageous plundering of the treasury. The likely 
motivation of the charges therefore was the desire to reduce the influence of 
Grau and Grauist elements within the party. The charges could also have been 
an attempt to divert public attention away from economic stagnation, 
corruption and pistolerismo (political violence) (Staten 2005:81).  
  
 
The indictments were handed down by Judge Federico Justiniani on charges of 
the misappropriation of $174,000,000. Even though Alemán had passed away 
in April 1950, the bulk of the evidence in the case originated from his 
outrageous activities at the Ministry of Education. Before the trial began, six 
PDVNHGJXQPHQ EURNHLQWR WKHFRXUWURRP DQG³VWROH HYHU\ VFUDSRISDSHU
related to the case. This consisted of thirty five folders, each containing 200 
SDJHV ´ The New York Times, July 5 1950). The Prío government was infact 
engaged in exactly the same practices as its predecessors. It has been claimed 
that Prío may have himself stolen as much as $90,000,000. What is sure, is 
that, despite his relatively modest presidential salary, Prío and his brothers had 
become millionaires and had invested heavily in everything from agriculture to 
Havana nightspots (such as the Sans Souci Casino) to Miami real estate. In 
&KLEiV DVNHG³7HOO PH&DUORV3UtR KRZ\RX FDQEX\ VRPDQ\ IDUPV
and build them in so many and various things while at the same time you say 
WKHUH LV QRPRQH\ ´ +LUFKIHOG   
As a result of the Prío-Grau hostilities, the party underwent a second split in 
1950. The party split between the libres who supported Grau, and the 
gubernamentales who supported Prío (British Embassy, Dispatch No. 86, June 
12 1950). Factionalism threatened to irrevocably divide the party. Perhaps the 
most notable example of the hostilities was the disagreement over the 
Auténtico candidature for the Mayor of Havana race (Ibid). Prío supported his 
EURWKHU$QWRQLR¶V QRPLQDWLRQ ZKLOVW *UDXSUHIHUUHG 1LFRODV &DVWHOODQRV
Despite the backing of his brother and BAGA funds, a superior war chest 
FRXOG QRWQHXWUDOL]H $QWRQLR 3UtR¶V ³PHDJHU OLNDELOLW\ ´ (Ihrlich, 2012:297) and 
Castellanos won by a mile By 1950 autenticismo had suffered two damaging 
splits and found itself severely fragmented and diminished.  
Prío therefore entered the final period of his presidency in a climate of 
contradictions, poor administration and a decline in the prestige of the 
Auténticos. The Auténtico party had squandered opportunities, abused public 
trust and succeeded in fracturing the legitimacy of the system; by 1951 
³GHPRFUDF\ ZDVSURJUHVVLQJ ´ EXW³LQ SHULO´  $PHULQJHU  
                                       Organised Labour and Los Rojos  
Farber argues that by the Auténtico era, the PSP was perceived by a majority 
of Cubans as opportunistic, undemocratic, and (most damningly) un-patriotic. 
This was in large part a result of their perceived ties to the Soviet Union, and 
alliance with Batista between 1938 and 1944. Ironically, the PSP was one of 
WKHPRVW µLQGHSHQGHQW¶ FRPPXQLVW SDUWLHV LQ the world during this time. In 
WKH6RYLHWV HYHQ FULWLFL]HG WKH363IRUWKHLU µULJKW-ZLQJ¶ VXSSRUW RIWKH
United States communist leader Earl Browder (Farber, 1976:89).   
µ%URZGHULVP
 KDGEHFRPHDSRSXODU LGHD DPRQJVW &RPPXQLVWV LQ WKHZHVWHUQ
hemisphere; it promoted collaboration over confrontation in capitalist 
FRXQWULHV 5RRVHYHOW¶V SURJUHVVLYH SROLWLFV DQGVXSSRUW IRU RUJDQLVHG ODERXU LQ
the United States, coupled with the US-Soviet wartime alliance, had created 
conditions in which it seemed that Communist participation within mainstream 
politics could flourish (Johanningsmeier, 1994:293). Browder envisaged a 
  
 
µSRSXODU IURQW
 QRW DVDWHPSRUDU\ H[LJHQF\ RUDPDQRHXYUH EXWDVDPRUHRU
less permanent state" (Ibid). In a pamphlet entitled Victory and After, Browder 
predicted a lasting peace between the Soviets and the United States. In 
December 1943, Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt affirmed their intention to 
work together as allies during and after the war. Browder then sought 
acceptance and mainstream legitimacy for the United States Communists by 
seeking to distance Communism from the conspiratorial nature of its past 
(Ibid). When Stalin dissolved the COMINTERN (Communist International) in 
1943 to obtain increased allied assistance in the war, Browder (naïvely) took 
this as a sign that national Communist Parties would be free to act more or less 
autonomously. Browder went as far as to dissolve the United States 
Communist Party as a political party, and redefined the group as a communist 
political association. He sought alliances with mainstream politicians, just as 
the PSP had done in Cuba (with Batista between 1938 and 1944, and with 
Grau between 1944 and 1946) (Ibid).  
The death of Roosevelt in 1945 and the subsequent beginning of the Cold War 
resulWHG LQ WKHGHFOLQH RIµ%URZGHULVP¶ 7KH OHDGHU RIWKH)UHQFK&RPPXQLVW
Party, Jacques Duclos, attacked the idea in the French Communist journal 
Cahiers du Communisme:  
"despite declarations regarding recognition of the principles of Marxism, one is 
witnessing a notorious revision of Marxism on the part of Browder and his 
supporters, a revision which is expressed in the concept of a long-term class 
peace in the United States, of the possibility of the suppression of the class 
struggle in the post-war periodand of the establishment of harmony between 
capital and labor" (Johanningsmeier, 1994:305) 
Browderism had been discredited and its decline resulted in a strategic shift in 
Communist strategy throughout the western hemisphere from 1946 
(Alexander, 1957:39). As a dual result of the decline of the legitimacy of 
Browderism, and the Auténticos no longer requiring their support in the 
legislature after the 1946 elections, the PSP found themselves politically 
LVRODWHG DQGSHUFHLYHG E\PDQ\ DV0RVFRZ¶VSXSSHWV7KHPSP performed 
dismally during the Auténtico era: 
"They reached ten per cent of the vote in the congressional elections of 1946. 
In the Presidential elections of 1948 their candidate received seven and a half 
per cent of the poll. In 1950 they elected 8 out of 136 members of congress" 
(Goldenberg, 1965:119). 
The Batista-PSP pact of 1938 had resulted in the establishment of the 
(communist controlled and government-backed) CTC in 1939 (Alexander, 
7KH$XWpQWLFRV¶ WHQXRXV SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH OHJLVODWXUH LQ 1944 (Thomas, 
2001:468) had resulted in Grau continuing the tradition of government support 
for the confederation, at least for the first two years of his presidency. The 
agreement permitted the Communist leader Lázaro Peña to remain as CTC 
General Secretary in return for greater Auténtico representation on the 
executive committee; the collaboration was a marriage of convenience. The 
1946 mid-term parliamentary elections resulted in the Auténticos emerging as 
  
 
the largest parliamentary party, which no longer required PSP support (Nohlen, 
2005:203). The Communists had lost their political leverage and were 
vulnerable from this point on.                                                                                                                           
WLWK $OpPDQ¶V ILQDQFLDO EDFNLQJ DFWLRQ JURXS µPXVFOH¶ DQG WKHSROLWLFDO
support of (Auténtico) labour leader Eusebio Mujal and Minister for Labour 
Carlos Prío, the government was able to seize control of the CTC. Batista 
claimed that Prío needed to control the CTC to consolidate his political power 
and provide jobs for his supporters (Batista, 1964:29). The government 
ZLWKGUHZ LWV µRIILFLDO UHFRJQLWLRQ¶ RI WKH&RPPXQLVW GHOHJDWHV DQG
subsequently held a new congress to elect their own (Auténtico) 
representatives. The new Auténtico delegates were not as experienced as trade 
unionists as the Communists had been, and were perceived to be political 
rather than labour leaders (Farber, 1976:130). Lázaro Peña presided over his 
RZQ µLOOHJDO¶ YHUVLRQ RI WKH&7&EXt struggled without government monetary 
and political support (Alexander, 2002:118-119). Farber argues that workers 
GLGQRW KDYH WKH ³GHVLUH WUDLQLQJ RUHQGXUDQFH ´ )DUEHU WRIROORZ
WKHLU IRUPHU XQLRQ OHDGHUV WR3HxD¶V&7&0DQ\ZRUNHUV HTXDOO\ viewed the 
new (Auténtico) leaders with cynicism (Ibid). The upheaval resulted in 
militancy and labour conflicts, which alongside decreasing sugar demand, 
resulted in encouraging a stagnant economy by the late 1940s (Farber, 
1976:131).  
The CTC takeover had been a throwback to the most brutal days of Machado 
or Batista in the early and mid-1930s. Communists found themselves 
imprisoned; their newspaper Hoy and radio station Mil Diez (1010) were 
ransacked and closed (Ameringer, 2000:49). Much of the legitimacy of the 
$XWpQWLFRV¶ KDGUHVLGHG LQ WKHLU FRPPLWPHQW WRGHPRFUDWLF IUHHGRPV EXWWKH
takeover demonstrated to some Cubans an abandonment of these values.  
The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 initiated a second wave of 
repression against the PSP. Prío even contemplated establishing mass detention 
camps in the event of a crisis. The government issued Decree 2273, which 
GHPDQGHG ³IUHH HTXDO UDGLR WLPH IRUDQ\ JRYHUQPHQW RIILFLDO WRDQVZHU
µVODQGHUV¶ E\FRPPHQWDWRUV $PHULQJHU 7KHGHFUHHSrovoked 
outrage and even the government   minister, Ramón Vasconcelos (Minister 
without Portfolio and editor of Alerta) denounced the decree as outrageous. 
Opposition was so great that the decree was rescinded after only being used 
once (against Chibás) (Ameringer, 2000:165). Nevertheless, the damage had 
EHHQGRQHWRWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V SHUFHLYHG FRPPLWPHQW WRGHPRFUDWLF SURFHVV
There had been one hundred and twenty strikes and one hundred and fifty one 
demands for wage increases during the final year of the Prío presidency, a 
record in Cuban history; discontent amongst organised labour had   never been 
greater (Farber, 1976:130).  
Increasing working class disillusionment with autenticismo, and the failure of 
the government to manage industrial relations, resulted in a weakening of 
legitimacy in the political system. Auténtico failings in labour relations had 
resulted in an organisational vacuum by 1952. Many workers found 
themselves unwilling to defend a government which had provided them with 
  
 
turmoil and political appointees rather than genuinely effective labour leaders. 
Mujal and the CTC executive lacked loyalty to the morally bankrupt concept 
of autenticismo by 1952, and were prepared to work with anybody, as long as 
they continued to receive funds from the presidential palace.   
Pistolero Politics 
In March 1952, Batista had justified the coup by citing his desire to restore 
public order and peace (Batista, 1964:36), following years of pistolerismo 
under the Auténticos. The term pistolero refers to the political violence of the 
Auténtico era which bought murderous brutality to Cuban streets. This 
violence was committed by groups claiming to be revolutionary student 
organisations (but almost all were simply opportunistic gangsters). The chaos 
of pistolero politics played perhaps the greatest role in the breakdown in the 
legitimacy of the political system, and was perhaps most directly responsible 
IRU%DWLVWD¶V LQWHUYHQWLRQ Many of these groups were supported financially by 
the Auténticos, and were essentially WKHJRYHUQPHQWV µPXVFOH¶ Many in the 
country (and pertinently in the armed forces) were disgusted by the Auténtico 
complicity in the pistolero carnage.       
Whilst the Auténtico participation in the revolution of 1933 had not resulted in 
an army loyal to autenticismo, it had resulted in the formation of a number of 
so-called grupos de acción. These groups had originated as university-
orientated organizations that violently opposed the Machadato, and later 
Batistato. Upon coming to power in 1944, Grau giftHG KLV OR\DO µER\V¶ VDODULHG
SRVLWLRQV LQ WKHJRYHUQPHQW DQGSROLFH IRUFHDVD³FRXQWHUZHLJKW WRWKH
SHUFHLYHG WKUHDW RI%DWLVWD¶V DUP\ ´ EHOLHYLQJ WKDW ³WKH\ FRXOG EHUHKDELOLWDWHG
E\EHLQJ JLYHQ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ ´ $PHULQJHU  7KHUHZHUHDQXPEHU of 
such groups, each claiming to be revolutionary, but in reality most lacked any 
ideology whatsoever and were basically comprised of opportunistic thugs 
(Ibid). Rolando µ(O7LJUH¶ 0DVIHUUHU¶V 06520 (Movimiento Socialista 
Revolucionario), was amongst the most lethal of the groups. This group was 
rivalled in its infamy by the UIR (Unión Insurreccional Revolucionaria) led by 
Emilio Tró21 (Skierka, 2004:21). These groups bought assassinations and 
disorder to Cuba on an unprecedented level (Farber, 1976:121). In an attempt 
to counter hostility in the pro-Batista military and in the Communist-controlled 
                                                 
20
 Masferrer (1918-1975) was a Communist who had participated in the Spanish Civil War as 
an enforcer for the International Brigades. Upon returning to Cuba, he renounced Communism 
and founded the MSR (an anti-Communist group) which supported the Auténtico 
governments. Masferrer was subsequentO\HOHFWHGWR&XED¶V+RXVHRI5HSUHVHQWDWLYHVLQ
as an Auténtico congressman from Holgúin. Following the 1952 coup he switched sides again 
and founded a pro-%DWLVWDSDUDPLOLWDU\ JURXSFDOOHG µ/RV7LJUHV¶ 7KHJURXSZDVDPRQJVWWKH
most murderous of thH&XEDQFRQIOLFWRIWKH¶V DQGDUHDFFXVHGE\WKHFXUUHQW&XEDQ
government of more than 2,000 murders.     
21
 Tro (1917-1947) had fought in the Spanish Civil War on the loyalist side. He had opposed 
Batista until being forced into exile in 1941, when he served in the US Army, before returning 
to establish the UIR which supported the Auténtico administration.   
  
 
unions, both Auténtico presidents appointed action group members to 
government positions in return for their support: ³*UDX HYHQ DSSRLQWHG DVKHDG
of the criminal investigation department an MSR leader, Mario Salabarría a 
QRWRULRXV NLOOHU «7UyWKH8,5ERVVPDGH LW DVIDU DVKHDGRI WKHQDWLRQDO
SROLFH VFKRRO´  (Skierka, 2004:21). 
The Auténtico era is full of examples of politically motivated violence, but 
perhaps the single most sensational event of the pistolero era took place in 
September 1947. Opposing factions of uniformed police (one loyal to the MSR 
and the other to the UIR) fought in the streets of Marianao (a Havana suburb) 
for three hours (Ameringer, 2000:53). The clash erupted when Salabarría set 
out to arrest the UIR-affiliated police chief, Antonio Morín Dopico and Tró.  
The resulting chaos left six dead and eleven injured, including Tró, who was 
shot and killed alongside a pregnant woman after surrendering. The shoot-out 
took place in full view of the national press which documented the entire event 
for a shocked nation (The New York Times, September 17 1947:15). The 
Auténtico president did not intervene in the situation and only acted days later 
when public outrage left him no choice but to mobilize the army to settle the 
dispute (Ameringer, 2000:53).       
)UDQFLVFR -RVp0RUHQRDUJXHV WKDWZKLOVW D³IHZ UHVWUDLQLQJ
PHFKDQLVPV ´ 0RUHQR -45) had existed under Grau, these ceased to 
exist altogether under Prío. The violence became more frequent and more 
unpredictable during the second Auténtico government (Ibid). Discontent 
WRZDUGV WKH$XWpQWLFRV EHFDPHPRUHYRODWLOH :LWKLQ PRQWKV RI3UtR¶V
inauguration, a group calling itself Acción Auténtica Independiente began 
planting bombs at the homes of former Grau government members who had 
used their positions to amass fortunes (British Embassy, Dispatch No. 14, 
January 27 1949). The Auténtico era may have seen unprecedented civil 
liberties, honest elections and freedom of the press, but it was also amongst the 
most chaotically violent periods in Cuban history. The government had set a 
dangerous precedent in its complicity with the action groups, and had by 1948 
lost much of their ability to manage the action groups.   
Whilst Grau had not supported any anti-pistolero action, in July 1949 Prío 
GHFODUHG WKDW KHZRXOG ³ZLSH RXWWKHYLROHQFH ´ DQGFUHDWHGWKH*5$6*URXS
for the Repression of Subversive Activities) (Stokes, 1951:78). But this was 
little more than a ploy. In reality, GRAS just imprisoned a few low-level 
pistoleros, ZKLOVW WKHJRYHUQPHQW UHVXPHG ³H[FHOOHQW UHODWLRQV ´ ZLWK DFWLRQ
group leaders (Thomas, 2001:480). Hardly a week passed in the late 1940s 
without some public atrocity or gangland execution, carried out by one action 
group or another (Ameringer, 2000:81-84). Concerned at the levels of violence 
on the streets, Prío orchestrated a pacto de los grupos. The pact ramped up the 
distribution of botellas, in return for a cease to the violence. The president 
distributed as many as 2,000 salaried government positions to a variety of 
action group members (Thomas, 2001:483). The pact did little to stem the 
violence and was a complete failure. In 1951, Masferrer commented that 
³ZH¶UH DOO JDQJVWHUV WKLV LVQ¶W (XURSH2QO\ &KLEiV LV QRWDJDQJVWHU DQGKH¶V
  
 
PDG ´ 7KRPDV $VWKH VXQ VHWRQWKH$XWpQWLFR HUD&XEDKDG
descended into a gangster state, where machine-gun diplomacy prevailed.   
Pistoleros like µ(O7LJUH¶ 0DVIHUUHU DQG2UODQGR µEO&RORUDGR¶ León Lemus 
URGHDURXQG &XEDOLNH ³SLUDWH NLQJV ´ ,ELG7KHQRWRULRXV El Colorado 
admitted to journalist Néstor Piñango that his friendship with Prío went back 
as far as the first Batistato+HFODLPHG WKDW KHµWRRNFDUH¶RIYRWHU UHJLVWUDWLRQV 
for the PRC-$LQ 3LQDU GHO5LR DQGWKDW KHSURYLGHG µPXVFOH¶ IRU3UtR¶V
ULYDOU\ ZLWK µ0LJXHOLWR¶ 6XiUH])HUQiQGH] IRU WKH$XWpQWLFR QRPLQDWLRQ LQ
1948 (Ameringer, 2000:84). Piñango claimed to have been taken to the 
interview in a National Police patrol car, to a location guarded by uniformed 
soldiers. The Auténticos were complicit in sponsoring political violence which 
had weakened the legitimacy of the political system. By the dawn of the 1950s, 
³LW VHHPHG DVLI WKH FRXQWU\ ZDVLQ DVWDWHRI QHDU-insurrection, with incendiary 
UKHWRULF WKHQRUP DPRQJ WKH\RXQJ DQGDQJU\ F\QLFLVP DPRQJ WKH HOGHUV ´
(Moreno, 2007:34). The November 1951 escape of the notorious pistolero 
Policarpo Soler from the supposedly impregnable Castillo del Príncipe prison, 
and the February 1952 assassination of the ex-Minister of the Interior and 
Radio Cadena Habana proprietor, Alejo Cossío del Pino, were the final, high 
profile blows to the prestige of the Prío government (Embassy of the United 
States, February 15 1952),.  
 
The Ortodoxos: Vergüenza contra dinero 
 
The outrageous corruption, violence and incompetence of the Grau 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ FRPSHOOHG VRPH$XWpQWLFRV WRIROORZ µ(GG\¶&KLEiVZKHQ KH
broke from the ruling party to form the Ortodoxo Party. Chibás had been a 
leader in the 1927 DEU student directorate, a leading figure in the anti-
0DFKDGR VWUXJJOH DQGDKHURRIWKH µJHQHUDWLRQ RI¶¶+HZDVDOHIW-wing 
µGHPRFUDWLF SRSXOLVW¶ ZKR IRXJKW IRU los humildes, which had been a political 
strategy in Cuba since the days of José Martí (Farber, 1976:123).  
 
:KLOVW µ(GG\¶&KLEiV ZDVQRWSKRWRJHQLF OLNH %DWLVWD RU3UtR KHZDVKRQHVW
politically astute, and was one of the most charismatic and popular politicians 
RIWKH$XWpQWLFR HUD6WRNHVGHVFULEHG KLP DVDPDQ RI³IDQDWLFDO FRXUDJH ´
ZKR VKRXWHG ³SDVVLRQDWHO\ LQ FRQVWDQW GHQXQFLDWLRQ 6WRNHV&KLEiV
was committed to the original values of autenticismo, and was ³PRUH
$XWpQWLFR WKDQ WKHWKLHYHV DQGILIWK FROXPQLVWV ZKRKDGWDNHQRYHUWKHSDUW\ ´
(Ibid). Two years of Grau government had resulted in nothing but 
disappointment for Chibás, and he realised that he had to leave the party in 
order to rescue its original programme (Ibid). A significant group of leading 
Auténticos (Emilio µ0LOOR¶ 2FKRD-RVp3DUGR/ODGD /XLV &RQWH$JĦHro, 
Rafael García Bárcena) (Pérez Llody, 2007:57), aswell as elder statesmen 
(Fernando Ortiz, Herminio Portell Vilá and Jorge Mañach) (Stokes, 1952:71) 
joined Chibás in 1947. ,QDLQWHUYLHZ µ(GG\¶JDYH WKUHHSULPDU\ UHDVRQV
for breaking from the Auténticos: 
  
³(1) the realization that the Grau administration was corrupt; (2) the 
rehabilitation program-rural schools, cement floors in each bohio, sanitary 
  
 
latrines, good wells was stopped in its tracks and Grau did not seem to do 
anything but make promises; (3) belief that Grau intended to perpetuate 
himself in office or effect continuismo by hand-SLFNLQJ DVXFFHVVRU ´  
(Carteles, 1948: 28-29). 
 
William Stokes argues that there is compelling evidence to suggest that there 
had been personal animosity between Chibás and Grau, a common belief in 
Cuba at the time was that: 
 
³&KLEiV¶ GHYLDWLRQ IURP WLPH-tested support of the chief of the party came 
when Grau listened with mock seriousness and evident sympathy to Chibas' 
divulgation of presidential aspirations, then promptly ridiculed the idea into 
REOLYLRQ ZLWK WKH$XWpQWLFR RUJDQL]DWLRQ  ´ (Stokes, 1952:43). 
 
The Ortodoxos adopted the slogan vergüenza contra dinero (shame against 
money) (Ehrlich, 2007:3). Chibás promised that he would not dilute his 
revolutionary agenda by entering into political alliances with other groups. He 
denounced those that did as pactistas, who were only interested in pursuing 
politics as usual (Ameringer, 2000:62). The Ortodoxo platform was a product 
of autenticismo. They declared their cRPPLWPHQW WR³LQGHSHQGHQFLD
HFRQyPLFD OLEHUWDG SROtWLFD \MXVWLFLD VRFLDO´  3pUH]/ORG\ :KDW
differed from the Auténticos was their obsession with eliminating corruption in 
public office, and eradicating the pistolero violence on the streets. Chibás 
adopted the symbol of a broom with which he said he would sweep away the 
mistakes of the Auténtico era (Ameringer, 2000:45).  
 
2QHRIWKHSDUW\¶VPRVW SURPLQHQW \RXQJ VXSSRUWHUV ZDVD\HDU-old Fidel 
Castro. Castro had been a founding party member. +HDGPLUHG &KLEiV¶
fearless style, but did not agree with his non-violent approach (Ameringer, 
2000:44). Castro began to develop his own power base by founding the ARO 
(Acción Radical Ortodoxa), an Ortodoxo youth organization. It is known that 
he had links to the pistoleros, and had once been a member of the UIR 
(Skierka, 2004:24). Castro had been accused of at least three assassinations by 
KHKDGSDUWLFLSDWHG LQ DIDLOHG LQYDVLRQ RI7UXMLOOR¶V 'RPLQLFDQ
Republic, and had been present at the Bogotazo incident22 (Skierka, 2004:26-
27). &DVWURODWHU VWDWHGWKDW KHKDGEHHQ³DOZD\V XQGHU JXQV DQGEXOOHWV 
ZKDW ,VXIIHUHG DWWKHXQLYHUVLW\ KDGPRUHPHULW WKDQ WKH6LHUUD0DHVWUD ´
(Skierka, 2004:25). Stories like &DVWUR¶VZHUHQRWXQFRPPRQ LQ DSHULRG
characterised for its chaotic violence.   
  
7KH2UWRGR[R3DUW\KDG³SURGXFHG DSRZHUIXO UHYLYDO RI WKH&XEDQSRSXOLVW
SROLWLFDO WUDGLWLRQ ´ )DUEHU GHVSLWH KDYLQJ RQO\ EHHQLQ H[LVWHQFH
for barely a year, they fought a strong campaign in the 1948 presidential 
election. Ultimately, their lack of financial support and organisation and their 
                                                 
22
 Refers to the April 1948 riots in Bogotá, Columbia. At least 3,500 people were killed by the 
Columbian military whilst protesting (following the assassination of the populist presidential 
candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán Ayala5XPRXUVRI&DVWUR¶VLQYROYHPHQWDERXQGEXWLWLV
known that Castro was in the city as part of a student delegation at the time, and he may have 
been present (or involved in) in the rioting.  
  
 
refusal to enter into political alliances prevented the party from coming near to 
victory. Despite this, they secured an impressive 16.4 per cent of the 
presidential vote, and won four seats in the House of Representatives (Nohlen, 
2005:203).   
The Ortodoxo Party sustained their almost fanatical attacks on government 
corruption. Chibás accused Prío (whose father-in- law had been conveniently 
appointed Director of thH1DWLRQDO /RWWHU\ RI³EX\LQJ RII JRYHUQPHQW DQG
RSSRVLWLRQ VHQDWRUVZLWK IUHHORWWHU\ WLFNHWV ZKLFK WKH\ VROGDWDJRRGSURILW ´
and it was claimed that the Vice-President, Alonso Pujol, alone was earning 
$30,000 a month from the free lottery ticket fraud (British Embassy, Dispatch 
1R)HEUXDU\7KHSDUW\¶V REVHVVLRQ ZLWK WKHLVVXH RI FRUUXSWLRQ
began to gain traction not only amongst its own supporters but also amongst 
the electorate more generally (Ihlich, 2012:195). The Ortodoxo leaders 
popularity only increased when Prío imprisoned him for a short time in 1949, 
RQDFKDUJH RIµFRQWHPSW 7KRPDV   
A diaphragmatic hernia had struck Chibás down with illness for much of 1950, 
but he contested the mid-term senatorial elections nonetheless (Ameringer, 
2000:144). He accused the senate of being a den of iniquity and promised to 
act as a safeguard against the exploiters of the people (Bohemia, April 30 
$QHOHFWLRQ SRVWHUSRUWUD\HG DEDWWOH VFHQH LQZKLFK µ(GG\¶ ZRXOG
be the peoplH¶V µWUHQFK¶ DJDLQVW FRUUXSWLRQ Bohemia, May 19:81). Despite his 
poor health, the Ortodoxo leader won the Havana senatorial seat in 1950. The 
party won nine parliamentary seats, which was more than any other party 
outside of the winning government coalition23 (Nohlen, 2005:203). Ehrlich 
argues that the Auténticos won a majority in 1950, by throwing stolen public 
IXQGV DWVHQDWRULDO UDFHVDQGUHVRUWLQJ WR³VKDG\ PHWKRGV ´ (KUOLFK 
In a poll taken just after the mid-term elections, Chibás was voted the leading 
presidential candidate in Cuba, with 26.25 per cent of the vote (Batista came in 
VHFRQGWKH$XWpQWLFR µ0LJXHOLWR¶ 6XiUH]ZDVWKLUG Bohemia, June 25 
1950:84).  
Chibás maintained his momentum. A second poll taken almost year later 
showed that he was still the most preferred presidential candidate in the 
country; he had increased his popularity to 29.7 per cent (Batista was still 
VHFRQGZKLOVW 3UtR¶V$XWpQWLFR FDQGLGDWHV WUDLOHG LQ IRXUWK SODFHEHKLQG 3HSH
San Martín a Grauist candidate) (Ameringer, 2000:153). Chibás led in all six 
provinces, and, barring an Auténtico alliance with another party, looked like a 
possible future president.  
,QKLV HQWKXVLDVP WRLQFULPLQDWH WKH3UtRJRYHUQPHQW µ(GG\¶ KDGDFFXVHGWKH
Education Minister Aureliano Sánchez Arango of having plundered the 
treasury to fund real estate purchases in Guatamala, but he had a difficult time 
substantiating his allegations. After two months of failing to provide evidence, 
public opinion had begun to question the validity of the DOOHJDWLRQV DQGµ(GG\¶
faced the greatest crisis of his political career (Ameringer, 2000:154). Pressure 
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 7KHJRYHUQPHQWFRDOLWLRQFRQVLVWHGRIWKH$XWpQWLFR'HPRFUDW DQG5HSXEOLFDQSDUW\¶V7KH
coalition secured 42 of the 66 parliamentary seats in 1950.      
  
 
mounted as violent clashes claimed the lives of two of his supporters (Batista, 
1964:28). On August 5 1951 Chibás decided to settle the dispute once and for 
DOO +HGHFODUHG WKDW KHZDVKRSLQJ WRVDFULILFH KLV RZQOLIH WR³DURXVH WKH
&XEDQQDWLRQ DQGVWLU LWV FRQVFLHQFH ´ ,ELG:LWK WKDW KHVKRW KLPVHOI LQ WKH
DEGRPHQ µOLYH¶ RQDLU GXULQJ KLV UDGLREURDGFDVW7KH VKRW GLGQRWULQJ RXW
µOLYH¶ RQDLU DV intended. Chibás had overrun his allotted time slot and his 
listeners heard an advert for Café Pilón rather than the fatal shot 
(Skierka,2004:29). The Ortodoxo leader had risen to national prominence by 
shooting himself in the abdomen in 1939. It seems thDW KLV µVXLFLGH¶ KDG
actually been an attempt to garner sympathy or shock by recreating his earlier 
stunt. He even shot himself in exactly the same place as before, the bullet took 
WKH VDPHWUDMHFWRU\ EXWWKLV WLPH WKHHQLJPDWLF µ(GG\¶&KLEiVGLHG 0RUHno, 
2007:72).  
The death of Eddy Chibás initiated an explosion of grief which threatened to 
topple the Prío government (Ameringer, 2000:155). Bohemia (which was 
HGLWHGE\KLV &KLEDV¶ IULHQG DQG2UWRGR[RVXSSRUWHUV Miguel Ángel Quevedo) 
dedicated an entire LVVXH WRKLV SDVVLQJ ,WVHGLWRULDO FRPPHQWHG WKDW ³FRQ
&KLEiVPXHUH OD ILJXUD SROtWLFD PiV OLPSLD GHWRGDODKLVWRULD UHSXEOLFDQD ´
(Bohemia, August 19 1951:95). As many as 300,000 mourners escorted 
&KLEiV¶ ERG\WRWKH&ROyQ FHPHWHU\ LQZKDWZDVWKH ³JUHDtest demonstration 
LQ&XEDQKLVWRU\ ´ $PHULQJHU $FFRUGLQJ WR&DEUHUD,QIDQWH )LGHO
Castro wanted to march on the presidential palace to depose Prío that day. If 
Pardo Llada had not vetoed the plan, the Ortodoxos could have easily 
succeeded (Ibid).  
The death of the most honest and popular politician of the Auténtico era 
resulted in a power vacuum which threatened to destabilise the government 
and the entire political system. The perceived legitimacy of the democratic 
process never recovered. The death plunged the country into strikes, protests 
and general discontent. The Ortodoxo Party declared that Cuba was living 
³XQGHU DSLUDWH IODJ ´ $PHULQJHU   
The death of Chibás obviously shook Prío, whose actions in the following 
weeks were remarkable. He threatened to resign and turn the government over 
to the military authorities. The president commanded the police to stop 
students demonstrating against a bus fare increase by any means necessary. If 
this were not bizarre enough, on September 19, he delivered a speech which 
criticised everybody from business leaders to unions, the media to political 
SDUWLHV 7KHSUHVLGHQW ILQDOO\ EODPHG DOO RI&XED¶V SUREOHPV RQWKH363
(Ameringer, 200:157). Prío seemed to be doing everything possible to destroy 
the credibility of the presidency, and was reminiscent of Machado when he 
SURPLVHG WREULQJ WKHµZHLJKW RI WKHODZ¶ GRZQXSRQ WKRVH LQVXOWLQJ RU
showing a lack of respect for Cuban government institutions (Ibid). Within 
GD\V3UtR¶V DFWLRQ JURXS IULHQGV were beating cinema-goers for not showing 
enough respect for images of government officials (Ameringer, 2000:158). 
³&XEDQ¶V ZRQGHUHG LI WKH porra had been resurrected to deprive Cubans of 
³WKH VDFUHGULJKW WRZKLVWOH´ ,ELG*DQJV RIPDVNHGPHQ FDUU\LQJ Pachine 
guns raided the Communist newspaper Hoy. The Ortodoxos claimed that Prío 
was attempting to install a dictatorship (Ameringer, 2000:159). Whilst the 
  
 
president did quickly rescind the heavy-handed approach, the damage had been 
done. The legitimacy of the presidency and the political system had been 
damaged still further.   
7KH2UWRGR[R3DUW\KDGEHHQWKH ³REUDGH&KLEiV ´ Bohemia, August 26:35) 
and his replacement, Roberto Agramonte, did not possess the charisma of his 
predecessor (and cousin). Whilst Chibás was irreplaceable, the party could still 
count on the political astuteness of established leaders such as like Millo 
Ochoa as well as Agramonte, as well as charismatic rising stars like José Pardo 
Llada and Fidel Castro. A national poll in December 1951 showed that the 
Ortodoxos stood an excellent chance of winning the presidency in 1952 
(Bohemia, December 16 1951:127). A majority of 50.54 per cent said they 
would vote for an opposition presidential candidate, whilst 33.79 per cent said 
they would vote for a government candidate (the remainder declined to answer, 
or did not know) (Bohemia, December 16 1951:126). Of the opposition voters, 
29.29 per cent said they would vote for Agramonte (compared to 14.21 per 
cent who would vote for Batista).   
µ(GG\¶ Chibás had almost done too perfect a job in discrediting the Auténticos. 
His death left an immeasurable vacuum in Cuban politics which no other 
democratic leader could fill. To many Cubans he was the only leader 
charismatic, politically astute and popular enough to remedy the sickness of 
the Auténtico era. Not many Cubans felt that they could disagree with Batista 
in March 1952 when he claimed that Cuba was in the danger of descending 
into disorder and lawlessness. If Batista had got past the sentries of democracy, 
LWZDVEHFDXVHµ(GG\¶ &KLEiVKDGLQDGYHUWHQWO\ OHIW WKHGRRURSHQ 
Corruption, pistoleros, the crisis of organised labour and the rise of the 
Ortodoxo Party were all symptoms of the failings of the Auténticos. The weak 
Auténtico governments haG³SURYHG WREHDQLQDGHTXDWH VXEVWLWXWH IRU%DWLVWD¶V
DXWKRULWDULDQ %RQDSDUWLVW UXOH ´ )DUEHU Whilst the Auténticos had 
been strong enough to drive the batistiano candidate from the ballot box in 
1944, they were not strong or capable enough to imitate the liberal 
democracies (the model of which the political system had adopted) of North 
America or Europe (Farber, 1976:111).  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 4 
March 10 
Order from Chaos? 
 
%DWLVWD¶V XQH[SHFWHG VHL]XUH RI SRZHURQ0DUFKZDVPHWZLWK
remaUNDEOH DSDWK\ DQGFDOP E\WKHYDVWPDMRULW\ RI&XEDQSHRSOH ³ZKDW LV WKH
most extraordinary feature of the whole affair is the calm with which the 
SHRSOHKDVUHFHLYHG WKH FKDQJH RIUHJLPH ´ +DYDQD 3RVW0DUFK
Batista claimed that he had seized power to impose order and end the 
lawlessness and corruption of the Auténtico years (Batista, 1964:36). Whilst 
this may have been true, equally, it was extremely unlikely that Batista could 
have returned to power by democratic vote. He must have realized that a 
military coup was his only opportunity of returning to power in Cuba (British 
Embassy, Dispatch No. 35, March 19 1952). As already seen, by virtue of his 
XQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO VHL]XUH RI SRZHUDORQJVLGH KLV UHJLPH¶V EUXWDOLW\ DQGDEXVHV
of power in the mid-to-late 1950s (which resulted in the one-dimensional  
caricature), the literature assumes that Batista was deeply unpopular in Cuba at 
the time he took power. However, this was not necessarily the case. For a start, 
E\&XED¶VGLVFUHGLWHG SROLWLFDl system was akin to a terminally ill 
patient, and many Cubans were actually relieved to see the demise of the 
Auténtico government. Some sectors of Cuban society even vested great hopes 
LQ DUHWXUQ WRWKHRUGHUDQGSURVSHULW\ RI%DWLVWD¶V ILUVW WHQXUH LQ power. 
:KDWHYHU %DWLVWD¶V OHYHO RI VXSSRUW DPRQJVW WKH HOHFWRUDWH ZKDW LV FHUWDLQ LV
that his rebellion initially faced almost no resistance, no mass protests, and no 
serious organised opposition whatsoever. On the contrary, in the moment of 
March 1952, mRVW&XEDQVGHPRQVWUDWHG WROHUDQFH RUVXSSRUW IRU&XED¶V
caudillo.        
µ7KLV LVWKH0DQ¶ 
%DWLVWD KDG FXWVKRUW KLV µGLVFUHHW H[LOH¶ E\UHWXUQLQJ WR&XEDQSROLWLFV LQ 
He won a Las Villas senatorial race without even having to leave Daytona 
Beach, )ORULGD 9RWHUV LQ/DV9LOODV KDGHYLGHQWO\ ³IRUJRWWHQ KLV EUXWDO SROLFH
PHWKRGV UHPHPEHULQJ RQO\ WKDWPHDW DQGEXWWHUZHUHFKHDSHU LQ KLV WLPH ´
(English, 2008: 86). The ex-caudillo ZDVPHW E\³DQ HQWKXVLDVWLF ZHOFRPH
from thousands of his supporters who literally mauled him with affection upon 
KLV DUULYDO DW5DQFKR %R\HURV DLUSRUW ´ (PEDVV\ RI WKH8QLWHG 6WDWHV
November 22 1948). He then founded the PAU (Partido Acción Unitaria) as 
KLV HOHFWLRQ YHKLFOH LQ0DUFK³(O HPEOHPD WDPELpQ GHEtD VHUYLU GH 
³JDQFKR ´ SROtWLFR SRUORTXHLQFOXtD D0DUWt \0DFHR\GHEDMRXQ\DQTXH FRQ
HO OHPD ³3HQVDPLHQWR \$FFLyQ 7UDEDMR\3URJUHVR ´ /ySH]&LYHLUD 
62). 
7KHSDUW\¶V LGHRORJ\ ZDVYDJXH DQG WKHpaupistas (PAU supporters) were 
joined by some of the Partido Líberal and Demócrata leaders (López Civeira, 
  
 
1990, 62-63). PAU primarily existed as a personal election vehicle for Batista. 
He was so well-known that it was not even necessary to include his name on 
FDPSDLJQ OLWHUDWXUH ZKLFK VLPSO\ GHFODUHG µ(VWH HVHO KRPEUH¶ WKLV LV WKH
man) (English, 208:209). However, the 1950 mid-term elections resulted in 
HOHFWRUDO GLVDVWHU ³HO GHVDVWUHVHSURGXMRFRQODV HOHFFLRQHV SXHVVyOR ORJUDURQ
DOFDOGHV \UHSUHVHQWDQWHV ´ /ySH] &LYHLUD 7KLV DE\VPDO
performance resulted in Batista frantically searching for allies in order to avoid 
a similar fate in 1952.  
3UtR¶V9LFH-President Alonso Pujol (whose Partido Republicano had formed 
part of the winning coalition in 1948) , had opted to support Grau in his 
opposition to Prío during the Auténtico hostilities of 1950 (Embassy of the 
United States, Dispatch 195, November 14 1951). This alliance soon 
disintegrated, Pujol dissolved the Partido Republicano, and established the 
31&3DUWLGR 1DFLRQDO &XEDQR 3XMRO¶V QHZJUoup subsequently nominated 
the Mayor of Havana, Nicolás Castellano, as its party president. Batista seized 
WKLV RSSRUWXQLW\ DQGDOOLHG ZLWK WKH31&LQ)HEUXDU\ GHFODULQJ WKDW ³/RV
partidos de Acción Unitaria y Nacional Cubano, apreciando de igual manera 
los problemas que el país confronta, desde un plano de serena, reflexiva y 
HQpUJLFD RSRVLFLyQ DO*RELHUQR ´ Diario de la Marina, February 1 1951:6). 
Considering the fragmented state of autenticismo, the alliance seemed to have 
somewhat of a credible chance of competitively contesting the scheduled 1952 
election (Thomas, 2001:490). However, Castellanos reneged on the agreement 
in December 1951, when the Auténticos offered his group seven senatorships 
and the provincial governorship of Havana (Ibid). The breakdown of this 
DOOLDQFH DOO EXWGHVWUR\HG%DWLVWD¶V FKDQFH RIUHWXUQLQJ WRWKHSUHVLGHQWLDO
palace by the democratic route. In December, Bohemia ZURWH WKDW ³HO JHQHUDO
GHO µ&XDWURGH6HSWLHPEUH¶ FRQIURQWD KR\ OD SRVLFLyQ PiVGLItFLO GHO FXDGURGH
aspirDQWHV ´ %RKHPLD 'HFHPEHU &DUORV0iUTXH] 6WHUOLQJ 
SUHGLFWHG WKDW ³HO FDXGLOOR FRPLHQ]D DGHFOLQDU ´ ,ELG  
Despite his anti-communist rhetoric following the coup, the General had 
actually explored the idea of resuming his alliance with the PSP in the months 
prior to March 10. Talks failed only because the PSP had made it clear that 
they would actively support the Soviets in the event of direct conflict with the 
United States, whereas Batista had promised to side with the United States  
(the war in Korea made such a conflict a real possibility). A PAU-PSP alliance 
was therefore rendered impractical. The PSP, for their part, had attempted to 
forge an alliance with the Ortodoxos, but, having failed in this endeavour, they 
realised that they stood no chance of success and ultimately directed their 
supporters to vote for the Ortodoxo candidate Roberto Agramonte (Thomas, 
2001:490).    
Agramonte (who had been a sociology professor and ambassador to Mexico) 
was known to be politically astute but lacked any of KLV SUHGHFHVVRU¶V
charisma. However, his academic demeanour and steadfast commitment to the 
Chibás political programme endeared him to the urban middle classes 
(Thomas, 2001: 490). Hart Phillips argued that the Ortodoxos revolved around 
the cult of SHUVRQDOLW\ RIWKHLU IRUPHU OHDGHU DQGWKDW WKH ³WKH JKRVW RI&KLEiV
  
 
ran for President with Agramonte as a stand-LQ ´ +DUW3KLOOLSV  
PHUKDSV WKH2UWRGR[RV¶ JUHDWHVW FKDOOHQJH ZDVWKHLU FRPPLWPHQW WR&KLEiV¶V
vow not to enter into political pacts or deals, so Agramonte announced that 
³JDQDUHPRV HO SRGHUHQFRPRTXHUtD &KLEiV VLQPiV DOLDGR TXHHO
SXHEOR ´ %RKHPLD 'HFHPEHU   
In a national poll published in Bohemia in December 1951, Agramonte was the 
most favoured presidential candidate, with 29.29 per cent support (compared 
with 17.53 per cent supporting Hevia, and 14.21 per cent Batista) (Bohemia, 
December 16 1951:127). Of those respondents who said that they would 
support the Ortodoxos, the largest percentage (42.31 per cent) agreed that the 
Ortodoxos should not enter into any pacts or deals, compared to 29.93 per cent 
ZKREHOLHYHG WKH\ VKRXOG HQWHU LQWR µVRPH¶GHDOV EXW QRW SDFWVDQGSHU
cent who believed that they should enter into both pacts and deals. Of those 
who believed that the Ortodoxos should enter into pacts or deals, 61.44 per 
cent believed they should do so with Castellanos, compared with just 3.79 per 
cent believing that they should do so with Batista (Bohemia, December 16 
1951:146).   
The Ortodoxos gained momentum in early 1952 and their attacks on the 
Auténticos were ceaseless.  The young Ortodoxo congressional candidate, 
)LGHO &DVWURKDGVHHPLQJO\ UHSODFHG&KLEiV DVWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V µFKLHI
DFFXVHU¶ ³/DVSLVWRODV FRQTXHVHPDWD ODVSDJD3UtRODVPiTXinas en que se 
PDWD ODV SDJD3UtR\ORVKRPEUHV TXHPDWDQ ORV VRVWLHQH 3UtR ´ &DVWUR
Alerta, March 2 1952:13). In an article entitled µ<o Acuso¶, Castro accused 
Prío of acquiring four farms illegally between 1946 and 1949, and of acquiring 
one of these farms in return for squashing a case against a man for molesting a 
small child (Alerta, January 28 1952:13). In a subsequent exposé, he went 
XQGHUFRYHU WRSRVHDVDJDUGHQHU RQ3ULR¶V OX[XULRXV /D&KDWDHVWDWH WRSURYH
WKH H[WHQW RIWKHSUHVLGHQW¶V HPEH]]lement, he even took photographs (Alerta, 
)HEUXDU\ +HFODLPHG WKDW ³PHQVXDOHV GDQDODV SDQGLOODV
HQSDODFLR ´ Alerta, March 4 1952:1) and implored the Tribunal de Cuentas to 
³HO YiVWDJR GHFKRUURGHRURTXHDOLPHQWD DO FKRUURGHVDQJUH fratricida que 
FRUUHSRUODV FDOOHV GHODFDSLWDO´  (Ibid).   
The Auténticos had nominated Carlos Hevia as their 1952 presidential 
candidate. He had played an important role in the anti-Machado struggle, had 
VHUYHG LQ WKH µ-GD\JRYHUQPHQW¶ DQGKDG DYRLded scandal whilst holding 
high-profile posts, such as Secretary of State and Minister for Agriculture in 
the Auténtico governments. However, he primarily owed his nomination to his 
reputation for honesty, a rare attribute that the Auténticos desperately needed 
following eight years of scandal (Thomas, 2001:490). The Prío government, 
however, had left Hevia in a precarious position: the Bohemia poll of 1951 
FRQFOXGHG WKDW WKHPDMRULW\ RI&XEDQV WKRXJKW WKDW3UtRKDGGRQHDµEDG¶MRE
as president (Bohemia, December 16 1951:124), respondents said that the 
economy, bad administration and gangsterism were the three worst aspects of 
the Prío government (Ibid:127). Hevia would struggle to win back the 
HOHFWRUDWH¶V FRQILGHQFH LQ WKH$XWpQWLFRV LQ  
 
  
 
The Bloodless Coup 
Batista subsequently claimed that several officers had approached him in the 
months preceding the golpe, and had attempted to convince him to take 
FRPPDQG RIWKH DUPHG IRUFHV WRSUHYHQW ³WKH FRXQWU\ IURP SOXQJLQJ LQWR
FRPSOHWH FKDRV ´ %DWLVWD 64:31). He also (somewhat absurdly) claimed that 
Prío was a secret communist, who had left Cuba clandestinely (without the 
UHTXLUHG FRQVWLWXWLRQDO DSSURYDO WRYLVLW ³WKH UHGSUHVLGHQW -DFRERÈUEHQ]´ 
in Guatemala. Prío was apparently planning a golpe of his own, as a response 
to Ortodoxo threats to imprison him in La Cabaña if they were to win the 
election24 (Batista, 1964:29-6HYHUDO DXWKRUV GLVPLVV WKHVH FODLPV ³3UtR
despite his condonation of gangsterism and graft, retained certain democratic 
predilections which make it unlikely that he seriously wanted to interfere with 
WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQ ´ 7KRPDV   
7KH FRXS¶V WLPLQJ ZDVLPSHFFDEOH DQGWKHGDWHRI0DUFKZDVQRWDUELWUDU\
Three days earlier the majority of the cabinet had formally resigned in 
preparation for the electoral campaign (as constitutionally required). On March 
9, Carteles KDGMRNHG³&5,6,60,1,67(5,$/ £&XDOTXLHUD VDOH ´ Carteles, 
March 9 1952:26). The joke implied that there were no ministers left in office, 
as they had all left and were too busy campaigning. Prío was away on his La 
Chata estate in the suburbs of Havana, preparing a list of names to temporarily 
fill cabinet positions until after the election. With most of the ministries 
leaderless, the government was at its weakest (British Embassy, Dispatch No. 
35, March 19 1952).   
Nevertheless, the madrugón ZDVHQWLUHO\ XQH[SHFWHG ³XQD DWPyVIHUD GH
VRUSUHVDVHDSRGHUDEDGHWRGRV ´Carteles, March 16 1952:52). In the early 
hours of March 10, Batista entered Campamento Columbia, accompanied by 
just one captain and his .38 revolver (Havana Post, March 11 1952:1). With 
the complicity of his co-conspirators, he assumed command of its four infantry 
battalions and ordered the arrest of the Grauist military high command: Chief 
of Staff Ruperto Cabrera, Inspector-General of the Army Quirino Uría and 
Adjutant General Rogelio Soca Llanes (Thomas, 2001:495). The golpistas 
simultaneously seized key points across the capital (such as the La Cabaña 
fortress, the air force and navy headquarters, police and military commands, 
radio stations and CTC headquarters). This was a pattern repeated throughout 
the country $PHULQJHU  -XVW ³DQKRXU DQG VHYHQWHHQ PLQXWHV ´ DIWHU
entering Columbia, batistianos ³KDG FRQWURO RI HYHU\PLOLWDU\ SRVWLQ&XED ´
(Los Angeles Times, March 11 1952).   
Prío and his ministers had assembled at the presidential palace at 5am; the 
president appeared to be paralyzed with indecision and his cabinet was acting 
hysterically. Army commands in Matanzas and Santiago de Cuba had initially 
resisted the golpe and remained loyal to the government (Embassy of the 
United States, Dispatch No. 599, March 10 1952). Ameringer argues that Prío 
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base.    
  
 
could have resisted the coup if he had left the capital to take command of the 
provincial commands sooner (Ameringer, 2000:179).   
Soon after 6am, a small detachment of soldiers arrived at the palace, offering 
WRµUHLQIRUFH¶ WKHSUHVLGHQWLDO JXDUG 5HDOLVLQJ WKDW%DWLVWD KDGVHQWWKHP
3UtR¶V JXDUG GLVDUPHG WKHJURXS DQGD3UtRDLGH VKRW GHDGWKHGHWDFKPHQW¶V
officer, Lieutenant Negrete  (Thomas, 2001:496). An FEU delegation arrived 
at 6.30am to offer to support the constitutional process by resisting the coup 
(Ameringer, 2000:180-181). The students requested access to the emergency 
arms caches which existed for just this type of occasion. Prío agreed to send 
arms to the university, but, as the students left optimistically to await the 
delivery of the arms 3UtR OHIW WKHSDODFH ³ZLWKRXW KDYLQJ GRQHDQ\WKLQJ ´
(Thomas, 2001:497). The government in fact abandoned the palace at 8.15am 
when informed that tanks, dispatched from Campamento Columbia, were 
heading towards them. By 8.30am, batistianos assumed control of the 
presidential palace (Carteles, March 16 1952:33). Prío, along with his brother 
)UDQFLVFR DQGOHDGLQJ $XWpQWLFR µ7RQ\¶ 9DURQD KHDGHGWR0DWDQ]DV EXW
upon arriving three hours later, discovered that batistianos had seized the 
military command there (British Embassy, Dispatch No. 35, March 19 1952).  
7KHSUHVLGHQW OHDUQHG WKDW ³WKHSRSXODU PDVVHV ³ZHUH LQ WKH VWUHHWV DQGXSLQ
DUPV ´ $PHULQJHU  LQ&DPDJĦH\ DQG2ULHQWH SURYLQFHV DQG
2UWRGR[ROHDGHU µ0LOOR¶ 2FKRDRIIHUHG WRVHQGDSODQH WRIO\ 3UtRWR6DQWLDJR
de Cuba to organise resistance. The PSP newspaper Hoy reported ³SURIXQGD
FRPPRFLyQ \HQFHQGLGDV SURWHVWDV ´ Hoy, March 12 1952:1) in the interior of 
WKH FRXQWU\ DQG FODLPHG WKDW VSRQWDQHRXV SURWHVWV KDGHUXSWHG LQ &DPDJĦH\
and Oriente provinces, closing streets and causing chaos. Gladys Marel García-
Perez (1999) argues that popular outrage was immediate and spontaneous: 
³SHRSOH LQ/DV9LOODV 0DWDQ]DV +DYDQD DQG2ULHQWH WRRNWRWKHVWUHHWV DQG
SDUNVWRSURWHVW WKHFRXSDQGVWXGHQWV DQGZRUNHUV FDOOHG IRU DJHQHUDO VWULNH ´
García-3HUH] DUJXHV WKDW ³VWXGHQWV SURIHssionals, workers, and members of the 
2UWRGR[RDQGWKH$XWpQWLFR 3DUWLHV «UDOOLHG WRGHIHQG WKHEHOHDJXHUHG
JRYHUQPHQW´ *DUFLD-Perez, 1999:2). However these claims remain 
uncorroborated and are contradicted by other studies and the media coverage at 
the time. It seems that whilst there were some protests outside of the capital, 
they could not be described as major incidents and had been quelled within 
hours. Whatever the case, the president gave little or no encouragement to 
those military officers in a position to oppose Batista (Alexander, 2002:134); 
rather, he accepted defeat and returned to the capital to seek asylum in the 
Mexican embassy (Ameringer, 2000:181). Prío and his ministers were then 
given safe passage to Mexico a few days later (The Washington Post, March 
³%DWLVWD ZDVQRZ3UHVLGHQW ± E\WKHJUDFHRI KLV EDOOV ´ 0RUHQR
2007:97).  
The Flight of the Politicos 
Radio stations had been seized and ordered at gun point to play music only, 
while rumours abounded that Prío was being held prisoner or was missing, or 
that shots were coming from inside the presidential palace; Carteles described 
WKHGD\RIWKHJROSH DVRQHRI³SDVLYLGDG \VLOHQFLR ´ DVWKH³SXHEOR VHGHEDWtD
  
 
HQWUH YHUVLRQHV FRQIXVDV \FRQWUDGLFWRULDV ´ &DUWHOHV0DUFK52). The 
8QLWHG 6WDWHV¶$PEDVVDGRU :LOODUG %HDXODF REVHUYHGWKDW RWKHU WKDQ DVPDOO
student protest at the university, there were no disturbances whatsoever in 
Havana. He also observed that there was great jubilation amongst soldiers and 
sailors (Embassy of the United States, Dispatch No. 0292, March 10 1952). 
Indeed, the coup had been met with overwhelming apathy, tolerance or   
impotence by WKHYDVWPDMRULW\ RI WKH&XEDQSHRSOH ³%DWLVWD KDGWDNHQRYHU
the military, claimed to be in control of the country, and no one was trying to 
VWRSKLP 1RJRYHUQPHQW UHDFWLRQ QRUHVLVWDQFH QRILJKWLQJ QRWKLQJ ´
(Moreno, 2007:96).  
Opposition politicians (those that had not fled) immediately met the coup with 
public statements denouncing it, but, otherwise, there was no active resistance. 
Farber argues that the political leaders of the Auténtico era had become 
accustomed to peace, and by 1952 lacked the capacity to challenge Batista with 
anything other than words (Farber, 1976:150).  
In subsequent days and weeks, politicians who attempted to meet in large 
groups were harassed and detained; for example, when a group of Auténtico 
congressmen met in the house of the ex-minister Arturo Hernández Tallaheche, 
the national police arrested eleven of the group for illegally congregating 
(Diario de la Marina, March 13 1952:1). When congressmen tried to enter the 
Capitolio25, they were prevented in doing so by soldiers firing over their heads 
(Havana Post, March 18 1952:1). Grau, who had been detained during the 
morning of March 10 and then released without charge (he was supposedly 
detained by over-zealous young officers) GHQRXQFHG WKHFRXS ³XQD VLWXDFLyQ
GHIDFWR UHVXOWDUtD LQWROHUDEOH ´ Diario de la Marina, March 16 1952:1). Hevia 
too released a statement denouncing the golpe:   
³7RUUHQWHV GHVDQJUH\HO VDFULILFLR GHYDULDV JHQHUDFLRQHV FXOPLQDURQ HQHO
régimen jurídico que el pueblo de Cuba se dió con la concurrencia de todos los 
Cubanos, en la constitución de 1940 . . . y ahora poniendo por encima de los 
supremos intereses de la patria la ambición de poder, se lanza un reto al pueblo 
de Cuba, para someterlo por la fuerza a una servidumbre inicua . . . Condeno 
indignado este crimen de esa patria, y fiel a la tradición de mis mayores y a los 
más altos ideales del pueblo de Cuba ´ Carteles, March 16 1952:28). 
Despite the denunciations, there was no attempt to actively resist the coup. 
Moreno argues that the Auténticos in government had the least to lose, since 
WKH\ ZHUH³RQ WKHLU ZD\RXWDQGWKH\ NQHZ LWZKLFK FRXOG H[SODLQ WKHir 
UHOXFWDQFH WRWDNHDQRSHQDQGVWURQJ VWDQFH DJDLQVW %DWLVWD DQGKLV VROGLHUV ´
(Moreno, 2007:96). Prío and his ministers had already made their fortunes in 
office, and the majority appreciated that their ministerial careers were at an end   
anyway (coup or no coup). They therefore had little to gain from risking their 
lives opposing Batista. Either wayWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V IHHEOH UHVSRQVH HQVXUHG
the end of autenticismo³WKH ORVV RISUHVWLJH RIWKH$XWpQWLFRV KLW ERWWRPZLWK
the quick stampede of its leadeUV WRZDUGV0LDPL ,ELG7KH8QLWHG 6WDWHV¶
DPEDVVDGRU EHOLHYHG WKDW ³WKHJHQHUDO DWWLWXGH RIGLVLOOXVLRQPHQW ZLWK WKH
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 The Capital building was the seat of government in Cuba and home to Congress.    
  
 
$XWpQWLFRV PDNHV DUHWXUQ LQ VWUHQJWK RIWKDW SDUW\ VHHPXQOLNHO\ ´ Embassy of 
the United States, Dispatch No. 1619, April 1 1952). Auténtico activists 
therefore now found themselves leaderless, fragmented and furious with their 
OHDGHUV¶ DEDQGRQPHQW VRPHDWWHPSWHG WRSHUVXDGH2UWRGR[RVXSSRUWHUV WR
MRLQ WKHP LQEXLOGLQJ D³FLYLF IURQW ´ 7KRPDV   
Ironically, the most noble AuténtLFR UHVSRQVH FDPHIURP 3UtR¶V(GXFDWLRQ
Minister, Aureliano Sánchez Arango (the minister whom Chibás had accused 
RIVWHDOLQJ FKLOGUHQ¶V OXQFK PRQH\ WRSD\IRU UHDO HVWDWHSXUFKDVHV LQ
Guatemala). In the weeks following the coup, Sánchez Arango established the 
Triple A group (Asociación de Amigos de Aureliano), which became the first 
of the anti-Batista insurgency groups of the 1950s (Llerena, 1978:53); it was 
primarily comprised of Auténtico and Directorio Revolucionario supporters 
and eventually became responsible for planting bombs on a daily basis in 
Havana. Sánchez Arango became the symbol for what little resistance there 
was in the capital in the months following the coup (Llerena, 1978:54). 
Roberto Luque Escalona aptly sums up that KHZDV³EUDYH EXWZLthout 
SRSXODULW\ ´ $PHULQJHU   
The Ortodoxos were probably the greatest political casualties of the coup. The 
pro-Ortodoxo newspaper Alerta OHG WKHPHGLD¶V RSSRVLWLRQ WRWKH FRXS
Arguing that Batista had destroyed a constitutional process built up over many 
years, its editor Ramón Vasconcelos blasted the Prío government and the 
Cuban people for their docility and lack of conviction (Alerta, March 11 
1952:1). Moreno (who was an Ortodoxo youth leader at the time) argues that 
³LW PDGH VHQVHIRU WKH Ortodoxos to lead the resistance, since we had the most 
to lose if Batista got away with a military putsch less than three months before 
DQHOHFWLRQ ZHZHUH VXUHWRZLQ ´ 0RUHQR $JUDPRQWH SXEOLFO\
GHQRXQFHG WKH FRXSDUJXLQJ WKDW ³(VWH FXDUWHODzo, que quebranta el ritmo 
FRQVWLWXFLRQDO GHODQDFLyQ WLHQH OD UHSXOVD XQiQLPH GHOSXHEOR FXEDQR ´ 
µ0LOOR¶ 2FKRDVSRNHRI D³JROSH PLOLWDU LQFDOLILFDEOH ´ Carteles, March 16 
1952:33). Moreno recalls attending an emergency meeting (chaired by 
Ortodoxo youth leader Pepe Iglesias) on March 10: 
³3HSHGLGQ¶W KDYH PXFK WRVD\DQGFRQWUDU\ WRP\H[SHFWDWLRQ ZDV                    
FDOP DQGFROOHFWHG GLGQ¶W IRUHVHH DQ\ FRXQWHUDFWLRQ WRWKHPLOLWDU\                
WDNHRYHU RIWKHJRYHUQPHQW GLGQ¶W KDYH DFRXUVe of action to recommend, 
showed no inclination to lead in any direction, and went on to explain                   
in unerring logic that we had nothing to fight with Batista with, even that                
even if we could get our hands on some weapons, we ZRXOGQ¶W NQRZ              
how to operate them or what to do wLWK WKHP  ´ (Moreno, 2007:97). 
Fidel Castro later argued that the Ortodoxos could have resisted, arguing that 
&KLEiV¶V PHPRU\ KDGOHIW DQ³LPPHQVH LQIOXHQFH ´ RQ WKH&XEDQSHRSOH DQG
that the paUW\HQMR\HG JUHDW ³PRUDO DXWKRULW\ ´ LQ &XEDDWWKH WLPH )DUEHU
1976:152). Nevertheless, the party (already weakened by the death of their 
unifying leader) was fragmented and ultimately collapsed as a unified party in 
the weeks and months following the coup (Farber, 1976:151). Farber argues 
that the collapse reflected the feelings of the Cuban middle classes to which 
most of the Ortodoxo membership belonged. The middle classes lacked 
  
 
LGHRORJ\ DQG³VWURQJ RUJDQL]DWLRQDO DXWRQRP\ ´ )DUEHU DQGLW was 
this which resulted in them avoiding direct confrontation with the golpistas.   
The eradication of the grupos de acción was one undisputed benefit of the 
coup. These groups suddenly found themselves without political protection and 
melted away almost oYHUQLJKW /HDGHUV VXFK DV3ROLFDUSR 6ROHU DQG-HV~V µEl 
([WUDĔR¶*RQ]iOH] &DUWDVIOHG DQGHYHQWXDOO\ WXUQHG XSLQ WKH'RPLQLFDQ
5HSXEOLF ZKHUH WKH\KLUHG RXW WKHLU µH[SHUWLVH¶ WRWKH7UXMLOOR UHJLPH Embassy 
of the United States, Dispatch No. 1072, April 25 1952). In the months that 
followed, rank and file aFWLRQ JURXSPHPEHUV ³WRRNXSSRVLWLRQV DVGHIHQGHUV
RURSSRQHQWV RI%DWLVWD ´ 7KRPDV 2IDOO WKHDSSDUHQWO\ IHDUOHVV
action group leaders, only the MSR leader Masferrer supported the students at 
the university on March 10. Ameringer argues that his subsequent service to 
Batista could have meant he was there to infiltrate rather than to help the 
students (Ameringer, 2000:182).  
The Students: Brave but Unprepared 
As the day of the coup progressed, the students declared a strike and 
essentially remained the only voices of dissent in the capital (albeit from the 
safety of the University26 0RUHQR UHPHPEHUV WKDW ³WKH RQO\ YLVLEOH
opposition came from the University students who marched and demonstrated 
and shouted against the government through loudspeakers at the bottom of the 
VWHSVOHDGLQJ WR8QLYHUVLW\ +LOO RQ6DQ/i]DUR 6WUHHW ´ 0RUHQR 
&DUWHOHVZURWH WKDW ³/D HVFDOLQDWD XQLYHUVLWDULD GXUDQWH ODPDxDQD GHO GH
marzo. Grupos de estudiantes se reunieron en el recinto universitario para 
exSUHVDU VXSURWHVWD FRQWUD HO JROSHPLOLWDU ´ Carteles, March 16 1952:51).  
7KHSURWHVWLQJ VWXGHQWV EHFDPH%DWLVWD¶V JUHDWHVW FRQFHUQ LQ WKH LQLWLDO ZHHNV
and months following the coup; he tried to appease them by promising to build 
a $10 million Ciudad Universitara, complete with brand-new facilities and 
even boarding houses, but the students rebuffed these efforts and adopted the 
mantra La Universidad ni se vende ni se rinde. The FEU organised successive 
demonstrations in the months following the coup, frequently clashing with 
SROLFH /OHUHQD 7KH\ GHPDQGHG ³WKH UHVWRUDWLRQ RIWKH
constitution, the reestablishment of civil government, and the holding of free 
HOHFWLRQV ´ 6XFKOLFNL 'D\V DIWHU WKHFRXS)LGHO&DVWURGHOLYHUHG
an emotLRQDO VSHHFK DWWKH WRPERI&KLEiV LQ+DYDQD¶V &ROyQ FHPHWHU\
(Diario de la Marina, March 18 1952:7). The students soon adopted Chibás as 
WKHLU PDUW\U KLV SULQFLSOHV HQHUJLVLQJ VWXGHQWV DVFKDQWV RI ³&KLEiV &KLEiV
&KLEiV ´ UDQJRXWWKURXJKRXW WKHXQLYHUsity (Thomas, 1971:508). In April, the 
FEU staged a mock funeral and symbolically buried the Cuban constitution:  
³/RV HVWXGLDQWHV GHOD)(8KDQPDQWHQLGR VXDFWLWXG GHSURWHVWDFRQWUD HO
régimen del presidente Batista, primero colocando cartelones en la colina y 
DKRUD ³YHODQGR ´ OD FRQVWLWXFLyQ \OOHYDQGR HO IpUHWUR VLPEyOLFR KDVWD HO5LQFyQ
0DUWLDQR HQODWDUGHGHO GRPLQJR  ´Carteles, April 13 1952:34) 
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 Government or military authorities were prohibited from entering the grounds of the 
university by the constitution of 1940. Batista would have risked outrage (or bloodshed) if he 
had violated this revered clause of the constitution.  
  
 
Some students began to follow the enigmatic Ortodoxo and university teacher 
Rafael García Bárcena. In the months following the coup, he had established 
the MNR (Movimiento Nacional Revolucionaria) as an anti-Batista militant 
JURXS 3pUH]/ORG\ *DUFtD %iUFHQDZDVD³EULOOLDQW LQWHOOHFWXDO ± 
SKLORVRSKHU SRHWMRXUQDOLVW DQGSURIHVVRU ´ /OHUHQD, 1978:45); on March 10 
he had been a teacher at the Escuela Superior de Guerra (a training school for 
army officers), but lost his position as a result of his opposition to Batista. He 
argued that the golpe KDGLQLWLDWHG ³DQHZ UHYROXWLRQDU\ F\FOH LQ &XED ´
(Llerena, 1978:46). The MNR fashioned itself after the ABC and DEU groups 
of the anti-Machadato struggle (Pérez Llody, 2007:76). MNR activist Mario 
/OHUHQD DUJXHG WKDW WKHJURXSZDV³PRUH DIOXLG VWDWHRIPLQG WKDQ DUHDO
UHYROXWLRQDU\ PRYHPHQW ´ /OHUHQD, 1978:49), and that it achieved little beyond 
theorising in its short existence. The MNR crescendo occurred in April 1953, 
when it marched on Campamento Columbia, armed with elderly guns and 
knives. García Bárcena DSSDUHQWO\ KDG µIULHQGV¶ DPRQJVW WKHRIILcers, and had 
conspired with them so that they would rise up with him to precipitate a 
revolution. The attempt failed, however, and García Bárcena was imprisoned 
IRU WZR\HDUVEHLQJ ³WRUWXUHG VRYLOHO\ WKDW KLV VSLULW DQGDQ\SROLWLFDO WKDW KH
might have KDGZHUHILQLVKHG ´ 7KRPDV   
Fidel Castro of course launched a similar attack four months later. His now 
famous attack on the Moncada barracks in Oriente province had been intended 
to seize a military garrison (where some one thousand heavily armed soldiers 
were stationed) using the element of surprise. Like García Bárcena, he hoped 
was that its success would ignite rebellion throughout the country (Thomas, 
1971:543). The attack, however, was marred by mishaps and confusion and, 
after one hRXU RIILJKWLQJ KDGIDLOHG PLVHUDEO\ 2I&DVWUR¶V original one 
hundred and sixty fighters (some dropped out just prior to the assault): around 
eighty were captured on the day of (or the day after) the attack, a further sixty 
eight were killed either in the fighting or tortured and murdered while 
imprisoned (Thomas, 1971:545). Whilst the attack itself was a disaster, the 
HYHQW DQG&DVWUR¶Vµ+LVWRU\ ZLOO DEVROYH PH ´ VSHHFK DWKLV VXEVHTXHQW WULDO
provided some of the impetus for the resulting anti-Batista struggle of the mid-
to-late 1950s.           
Communist and CTC Responses 
The PSP reaction to the coup was full of contradictions. Batista clearly 
distanced himself from his former allies upon seizing power: the new Minister 
of Work, Jesús Portocarrero, warned of the dangers of communism, days after 
WDNLQJ SRZHU ³(O JRELHUQR VHSURSRQHSUHVHUYDU DO SXHEORGHO SHOLJUR UHDO \
SRVLWLYR TXHVLJQLILFD HOFRPXQLVPR ´ Diario de la Marina, March 12:1). 
Equally, Hoy denounced the break of constitutional process in the strongest 
terms. However, it has been suggested that some members welcomed the 
breakdown of the democratic system, and there were even rumours that PSP 
and PAU members worked together in the aftermath of the coup. Party leader 
Juan Marinello vaguely assured a historian, in the weeks after the coup, that 
WKH363³ZRXOG SUREDEO\ QRW UHVXPH LWV ROG DOOLDQFH ZLWK %DWLVWD ´ 7KRPDV
1971:506). Marinello and Blas Roca continued to live openly in Havana 
throughout the second Batistato, without experiencing the same level of 
  
 
persecution which haunted other oppositionists from the mid-1950s 
(Goldenberg, 1965:165). Some communists who had held government civil 
service posts remained in their jobs after March 10, and some were even newly 
appointed (Thomas, 1971:506). Goldenberg claims that, following the coup 
"five of their senior officials (communists) had joined the Batista government" 
(Goldenberg, 1965:165.). The party was able to publish at least four journals 
(whilst other oppositionists were unable to do the same); some leaders were 
detained, whilst others were permitted to travel to and from the Soviet Union 
IUHHO\ DQGZKHQ %DWLVWD HVWDEOLVKHG DQµDQWL-FRPPXQLVW¶ SROLFH XQLW LQ WKH
summer of 1953, it only had a small staff and few resources (Thomas, 
1971:506). The lack of determination to µcrack down¶ on communism could 
KDYH VWHPPHG IURP WKH IDFW WKDWZKLOVW DUPHGJURXSV VXFK DVWKH µ7ULSOH $¶RU
MNR (or indeed CastUR¶Vµ-XO\ PRYHPHQW¶) were committed to armed 
action against the Batistato, the PSP remained committed to peaceful 
opposition (and remained so until the very final months of the 1956-1958 
insurrection). The PSP had become accustomed to the emergence of "ultra-
revolutionary movements arising on their left and was understandingly 
suspicious of all of them" (Jackson, 1969:11); they believed that those who 
SXUVXHG DUPHG VWUXJJOH ZHUHµSXWFKLVW
 DQGDGYHQWXUHUV DQGWKat strikes could 
defeat Batista. However, %DWLVWD¶V LQIOXHQFH RYHU0XMDO DQG WKH&7&(and 
therefore his influence over most of the trade unions in Cuba) blunted the 
effectiveness of this strategy (Farber, 1976:163).  
Hoy was permitted to continue to operate (even if it clearly opposed the golpe). 
7KHQHZVSDSHU XQHTXLYRFDOO\ GHFODUHG LWV RSSRVLWLRQ ³HO SXHEOR HVWiFRQWUD HO
JROSH PLOLWDU ´ +Ry, March 29 1952:1). The Communist organ argued that the 
FRXS¶V REMHFWLYH KDGEHHQ WR³SRQHU HOSRGHUHQPDQRV GH%DWLVWD SDUDTXH
reagrupe las fuerzas gobiernistas, disperse a las masas electorales ortodoxas y 
prepare las condiciones para una victoria eleFWRUDO´  Hoy, March 15 1952:1). 
Despite this opposition, the newspapers criticism of Batista was clearly muted, 
it more energetically attacked the record of the Prío government, the United 
States and Mujal, rather than Batista. Hoy accused Prío of having left the 
palace on March 10 with eleven million pesos in suitcases (Hoy, March 20 
1952:1). The newspaper was equally critical towards the United States. On 
March 21, it published a cartoon which depicted the Cuban constitution being 
WUDPSOHG RQE\µ8QFOH 6DP¶ DQGDFU\SWLF PLOLWDU\ ERRWHoy, March 21 
 LQ DQRWKHU HGLWLRQ DFDUWRRQGHSLFWHG µ8QFOH 6DP¶ VWUDQJOLQJ D
communist worker to death (Hoy, March 25 1952:2). Mujal was also criticised 
frequently, and portrayed as an opportunist and a gangster (Hoy, March 14 
1952:1); a cartoon depicted a smiling guitar-strumming Mujal, alongside a 
gangster at a jovial party, the caption read: ³< W~¢FyPRHVWiVHQFDQWDGR GHOD
YLGD" ´ Hoy, March 12 1952:2). According to the British ambassador, 
communist labour leaders were indeed ³RSHUDWLQJ XQGHU WKHJXLVH RI
paupistas ´DJDLQVW 0XMDO %ULWLVK (PEDVV\ 'LVSDWFK 1R$SULO 
Publicly, Batista opposed the (supposed) growing communist influence in 
&XED GD\V DIWHU WKHFRXSKHDQQRXQFHG WKDW ³&XEDZLOO OLQH up with the free 
ZRUOG LQ WKHLPSHQGLQJ FRQIOLFW EHWZHHQ FRPPXQLVW DQGGHPRFUDF\ ´ 7KH
Washington Post, March 18th 1952); however, privately it seems that he was 
not really sure what to do with the PSP all, he seems to have considered them a 
much lesser threat than other opposition group.    
  
 
As for the CTC, the golpistas seized the Cuban telephone exchange and 
Palacio de los Trabajadores (CTC headquarters) on the morning of March 10, 
thus preventing any effective CTC resistance (United States Embassy, 
Despatch No. 1481, March 11 1952). The Auténtico- led CTC executive 
initially opposed the coup and attempted to organise a national strike, but were 
slow in doing so; some (but not all) finally met in front of the Batista-occupied 
:RUNHUV¶3DODFHPLG-morning on March 10, but the golpistas seizure of 
communications rendered it practically impossible to relay national strike 
orders. Some unions, such as the Electrical Workers Federation, did not 
receive the order to strike, while others, such as the Telephone Workers 
Federation, received the order but decided not to obey it (Alexander, 
2002:135). The result was a confused and inconsistent CTC reaction:  
³7KHUH ZDVLW LV WUXH DSDUDO\VDWLRQ RIXUEDQ WUDQVSRUW LQ+DYDQD 7KHUHZHUH
also strikes in two petroleum refineries, various railroad delegations and one or 
another labor center. There was partial abstention in the Ariguanabo Textile 
Firm and some other enterprises but the rest of the workers in other economic 
activities either did not hear about or ignored the FDOOV RI WKH&7& ´ 
(Alexander, 2002:135). 
Alexander argues that, since the Auténticos had seized control of the CTC in 
WKH\ KDGVXFFHHGHGLQ RULHQWDWLQJ LW DURXQG ³HFRQRPLF UDWKHU WKDQ
SROLWLFDO REMHFWLYHV ´ $OH[DQGHU :RUNHrs perceived the 
confederation to be an organisation through which they could demand pay 
increases, but not an organisation from which they should follow political 
directives. Political events not directly affecting their particular union 
seemingly mattered little to the average workers, and most would not risk their 
jobs for some abstract political cause that they did not understand or about 
which they did not care. The strike of March 10 was a failure, and by 11pm 
Mujal and Batista had reached an agreement (Alexander, 2002:141): Batista 
promised to respect CTC gains won under the Auténticos, and agreed not to 
interfere with the running of the union and not to purge any of its leadership. In 
return, the Palacio de los Trabajadores was returned to the CTC by March 14, 
and Mujal (the hitherto ardent Auténtico) switched allegiances, declaring his 
support for Batista; Mujal remarkably DQQRXQFHG WKDW ³WKH ZRUNHUVZHUH
VROLGO\ EHKLQG *HQHUDO %DWLVWD LQ KLV VWUXJJOH IRU DEHWWHU&XED ´$OH[DQGHU
argues that (despite the fact they had been Auténtico political appointees) the 
CTC executive was primarily motivated by financial rather than political 
factors: they had received $300,000 annually from the Auténtico governments 
and were primarily interested in a continuation of this agreement with Batista, 
no matter the political ramifications (Alexander, 2002:141).   
µ+HUH,DPEDFNDJDLQ¶ 
,QMXGJLQJ %DWLVWD¶V SRSXODULW\ DWWKHWLPH RIWKH FRXSWKHOLWHUDWXUH UHOLHV RQ
%RKHPLD¶Vnational survey published in December 1951, which placed the ex-
caudillo in third place in the election behind the Auténtico and Ortodoxo 
candidates (Bohemia, December 16 1951:127; Alexander, 2002; Dominguez, 
1978; Farber, 1976; López Civeira, 1990; Ameringer 2000; Thomas 2001). 
However, it has surSULVLQJO\ QHJOHFWHG WZRODWHU VWXGLHV SXEOLVKHG E\&XED¶V
  
 
other major weekly, Carteles. Just a month before the coup, the study placed 
Batista in second place, with 23.40 per cent support, compared to Agramonte 
with 29.76 per cent support, and Hevia with 15.78 per cent (Carteles, February 
7KH OLWHUDWXUH¶V UHOLDQFH RQWKHHDUOLHU Bohemia study is flawed. 
Firstly, it relies on one individual source and ignores the later (and therefore 
perhaps more relevant) surveys. Secondly, because the Bohemia survey was 
FRQGXFWHG DWH[DFWO\ WKHWLPH WKDW%DWLVWD¶V DOOLDQFH ZLWK &DVWHOODQRV
disintegrated, this development could only have negatively impacted on the 
HOHFWRUDWH¶V SHUFHSWLRQ RI%DWLVWD¶V FKDQFHVRI VXFFHVV DWWKDW H[DFWPRPHQW  
The Carteles (February 1952) surveys concluded that Batista was the most 
recognisable candidate, with 75.90 per cent of respondents recognising him 
(compared to 70.31 per cent for Agramonte, and 65.91 per cent for Hevia). A 
majority of 46.75 per cent believed that Batista would do a better job of 
improving or developing health care, education, the economy and 
industrialisation (compared to just 10.97 per cent for Agramonte and 10.43 per 
cent for Hevia) (Carteles, February 10 1952:30). Whilst this seemed 
encouraging for the General, only 3.86 per cent of respondents thought that he 
was honest (compared to 48.32 per cent for Agramonte and 23.14 per cent for 
Hevia), suggesting that, whilst the Cuban people believed that Batista was the 
PRVW µFRPSHWHQW¶ FDQGLGDWH WKH\ DOVR WKRught that he was (by far) the most 
dishonest (Carteles, February 10 1952:32).    
A second Carteles survey looked specifically at the central and eastern 
provinces of Las Villas, Camagüey and Oriente. It suggested that, whilst 25.76 
per cent of respondents preferred Agramonte, Batista was, within a margin of 
error, on 23.14 per cent, while Hevia was third, with 18.59 per cent (Carteles, 
February 3 1952:30). Whilst this study did not suggest that Batista was the 
most popular candidate nor that he stood any chance of winning the election, it 
did suggest that he did have some support: more support than all the other 
candidates amongst rural Cubans, females, as well as the overwhelming 
support of black and mixed race Cubans (38.71 per cent of black Cubans in the 
eastern provinces said they would vote for Batista, compared to just 23.64 for 
Agramonte) (Carteles, February 3 1952:32), and greater support amongst the 
electorate than %RKHPLD¶V earlier surveys had suggested, and even greater than 
the Auténtico candidate. Whilst these surveys suggested popularity amongst 
specific sectors, they also suggested that he was most unpopular amongst the 
(predominantly white) urban middle classes. Perhaps most pertinently, the 
surveys demonstrated his reputation for dishonesty, in an election in which the 
attribute of honestidad mattered most.   
Indeed, some historians have seen such support, especially amongst richer or 
PRUH HOLWH VHFWRUV ,QKHUPHPRLUV +DUW3KLOOLSV DUJXHG WKDW ³PDQ\
businessmen and merchants were pleased by the coup, feeling he would bring 
law and order to the country, stability that meant prosperity and a sounder 
HFRQRP\ ´ +DUW3KLOOLSV 3pUH]-Stable (1999) concurs that the 
clases económicas (commercial and industrial classes) generally welcomed the 
coup and looked to Batista to restore public order. Morley argues that the coup 
was particularly welcomed by Cuban and United States entrepreneurs, who 
believed that the coup would bring stability and an end to on-going labour 
  
 
disputes (Morley, 1982:147). Aguila argues that many Cubans supported the 
FRXSLQFOXGLQJ ³SURPLQHQW QDWLRQDO ILJXUHV EXVLQHVV RUJDQL]DWLRQV FRUSRUDWH
interests, working-class leaders, and the leadership of the Partido Socialista 
Popular either directly endorsed the coup and rejoiced at the prospect of 
UHWXUQLQJ RUGHUDQG VWDELOLW\ ´ RUDVZLWK WKH363³WDFLWO\ DSSURYHGWKH
EUHDNGRZQRIWKHGHPRFUDWLF UHJLPH ´ $JXLOD  
Members of the executive board of the Association of Landowners of Cuba 
paid its respects to the new government to avoid disruption to the zafra. The 
prestigious Economic Society of the Republic equally urged the acceptance of 
the new regime. Representatives of the Asociación de Hacendados de Cuba , 
Banqueros de La Habana, Asociación de Colonos and Asociacíon de Veteranos 
visited Batista to offer their support (Carteles, March 23:73), while the 
Asociación Nacional de Industriales de Cuba and its President José R. Pérez 
made it clear that they did not want anything to affect production and offered 
the government their full cooperation (Diario de la Marina, March 19:1). 
:LWKLQ ILYH GD\VRIWKH FRXSWKH³+DYDQD ([FKDQJH LQGXVWULDOLVWV FRORQRV
banking firms forming the Association of Banks of Cuba, and the Havana 
Clearing House had pledged their support of tKHJRYHUQPHQW ´ 3pUH]
1976:132). Hence, it is clear that Batista was not without influential support. 
However, Batista consolidated his position elsewhere by visiting 119 of Cuba's 
126 mayors within weeks of taking power (Carteles, March 23:49), and also 
issued a number of populist measures. At his first cabinet meeting on March 
31, he announced the reinstatement of a number of school teachers who had 
been removed by the Auténticos, and also that all teachers would receive an 
enormous 150 per cent pay rise (British Embassy, Dispatch No. 43, April 2 
1952); he also announced cash payments for married women with children,   
and a house-building programme to bring affordable housing to workers and 
peasants alike within one year (British Embassy, Dispatch No. 43, April 2 
1952). The Partido Demócrata supported Batista within weeks, while the 
police rank and file welcomed Batista after new police chief, Rafael Salas 
Cañizares, promised them new equipment and patrol cars, the recruitment of 
2,000 new police officers and a 30 per cent pay increase (Havana Post, April 1 
1952:1).  
Batista was also welcomed by powerful conservative interests. The Catholic 
Church wasted no time in welcoming and officially blessing the coup; Cardinal 
Manuel Arteaga and the vast majority of his Bishops immediately 
congratulated the General, although two or three bishops were privately 
opposed, and one Franciscan priest, Father Julián de Bastarrica, publicly 
denounced it. The majority of the Church embraced the golpistas, and the 
Virgen de la Caridad³&XED¶V QDWLRQDO UHOLJLRXV V\PERO ZDVFDUULHGE\
military plane on a national pilgrimage . . . and through her presence the 
FKXUFK RIILFLDOO\ FRQIHUUHG LWV EOHVVLQJ RQWKH FRXS ´ .LUN   
Alejandro de la Fuente`s (2000) study provides in-depth analysis of the 
response of the Afro-Cuban population. Fuente discusses the support that the 
Federación de Sociedades de la raza de color immediately bestowed upon the 
QHZ UHJLPH )XHQWH GHVFULEHVKRZ WKHIHGHUDWLRQ¶V 3UHVLGHQW 3ULVFLOLDQR
  
 
Piedra) asked all Afro-&XEDQ VRFLDO FOXEV WR³GLVSOD\ WKHLU IUDQN DQGVWURQJ
VXSSRUW IRU WKHQHZ OHDGHUVKLS RIWKHQDWLRQ ´ )XHQWH )XHQWH
argues that expectations were high amongst afro-Cubans who overwhelmingly 
supported Batista. His study discusses the significance of the appointment of 
several Afro-Cuban leaders (such as: Generoso Campos Marquetti, Aquilino 
Lombard, Gustavo Urrutia, Gastón Baquero and Luis Oliva Pérez) to the 
consultative council which replaced congress; as well as the importance of the 
two Afro-&XEDQ DSSRLQWHHV WR%DWLVWD¶V ILUVW FDELQHW 0LJXHO $QJHO &pVSHGHV
as minister for justice and Justo Salas as minister without portfolio. Fuente 
quotes a Cuban staff member at the United States embassy who confirmed that 
³%DWLVWD LVJHQHUDOO\ assumed to have considerable sympathy for the negro and 
his problems (he is, of course, widely thought to have some small proportion 
RI1HJUREORRGKLPVHOI ´ ,ELG  
&XED¶VOHDGLQJ FRQVHUYDWLYH QHZVSDSHU Diario de la MarinaZDV%DWLVWD¶V
most vocal supporter in the media, announcing that the coup had been met with 
absolute peace and normality, and leading daily tributes to Batista and the new 
Jefe de Ejército General Tabernilla. In an interview with the newpaper, 
7DEHUQLOOD VDLG WKDW ³WRGRHOPXQGR acude al trabajo. La vida nacional no se ha 
LQWHUUXPSLGR ´ Diario de la Marina, March 13:1), and, in the subsequent days 
and weeks, Diario de la Marina enthusiastically reported the speeches and 
announcements of the new government, publishing full colour photographs of 
the new leaders and excitingly reporting their latest declarations. They were 
SDUWLFXODUO\ REVHVVHGZLWK %DWLVWD¶V ZLIH 0DUWD)HUQiQGH] 0LUDQGD GH%DWLVWD 
articles appeared daily concerning her various charitable donations to places 
such as the Escuela Parroquil de Morón, Hospital Infantil de San Juan de Dios 
RU0DGUHV2EODWDV GH&DPDJĦH\ Diario de la Marina, March 30, 1952:1). 
2QHDUWLFOH GHWDLOHG DGD\ LQ WKH OLIH RI0DUWDµDWKRPH¶ RQWKH IDPLO\ HVWDWHDV
she received her high-society friends (Diario de la Marina, March 13 1952:1), 
but the British embassy also compared her to Evita Perón for her dedication to 
public works and charitable projects (British Embassy, Dispatch No. 64, April 
30 1952). Marta would most famously be responsible for the construction of 
the iconic twenty metre high Cristo de la Habana.  
The Havana Post, popular amongst industrialists, entrepreneurs and foreigners, 
enthusiastically supported the coup. Since the annual Havana Carnival had 
been scheduled two weeks after the coup and was permitted to go ahead as 
planned, the Havana Post claimed that the peaceful nature of the carnival was 
indicative of the lack of opposition to the coup in the capital:   
³,W FRXOGZHOO EHWKDW WRWKHVXFFHVV RIWKHZHHN-end carnival celebrations of 
attached a message of political significance. If there were people here in this 
capital ready to cause trouble, this would have been an ideal opportunity for 
them to go into action. What could be more helpful to them that to be able to 
wear disguises and voluminous garb under the latter of which could be 
concealed all kinds of weapons including machineguns and bombs? Nothing 
occurred. From the fact that nothing occurred with such excellent, made to 
order opportunities for potential trouble ±makers can reasonably be deducted 
that trouble-makers at the present time are in short supply in Havana. The spirit 
RIMRYLDOLW\ ZDVXQUHVWUDLQHG ´ +DYDQD 3RVW0DUFK 
  
 
The centre-right newspaper El Mundo argued that Prío had collaborated with 
criminals and that Batista should be given the benefit of the doubt. Its editorial 
argued that all of the facts were not yet clear, and that Cubans should avoid 
bloodshed and work for the restoration of constitutional process peacefully (El 
Mundo, March 12 1952:1). The newspaper Mañana defended Batista, arguing 
that the country had disintegrated into chaos, democracy had ceased to exist 
anyway, and that Batista was the only person capable of restoring stability 
(Mañana, March 12 1952:2).  
The British ambassador Adrian Homan observed that the country had met the 
coup quietly, even if they were not contented. Holman praised the golpistas for 
behaving well, and for not unnecessarily abusing civil liberties or politically 
persecuting opponents to any great extent. The British generally supported the 
FRXSDUJXLQJ WKDW ³QRWKLQJ FRXOG EHZRUVHWKDQ WKHGHJUDGLQJ GHSWKV UHDFKHG
E\WKH ODVW 3UtR UHJLPH ´ British Embassy, Dispatch No. 43, April 2 1952); 
they KDGEHHQKLJKO\ FULWLFDO RI3UtRDUJXLQJ WKDW KLV ³ZHDNQHVV DQG 
unreliability of character, hardly fitted him for shouldering the heavy 
responsibilities of office in a land such as this, where economics, labour 
problems and communism SOD\ VXFK DQLPSRUWDQW UROH ´ Dnd agreed with 
%DWLVWD WKDW ³GUDVWLF DFWLRQ ´ KDG WREH taken to avoid the country deteriorating 
VWLOO IXUWKHU DQGFRQFOXGLQJ WKDW WKH³SHRSOH VKRXOG EHJUDWHIXO WR%DWLVWD IRU
WKHSUHVHQW LQWHUYHQWLRQ ´ British Embassy, Dispatch No. 35, March 19 1952). 
Holman argued that, whilst Batista himself was full of good intentions and had 
superb attributes, his inner circle were of a substandard quality and that his 
FDELQHW ZDV³RYHUORDGHG ZLWK GHDGZRRG ´ KHcomplained that the 
Consultative Council which had replaced Congress was full of his incompetent 
cronies and political allies, and was too big to actually achieve anything 
(British Embassy, Dispatch No. 64, April 10 1952).    
However, the differences between the british and US reactions were intriguing. 
The British ambassador took a pragmatic approach, applauding %DWLVWD¶V
commitment to controlling organised labour and eradicating gangsterism, 
corruption and communism; whilst he recognised that Cubans had started to 
perceive themselves as beacons of progress and democracy in the region and 
WKDW WKH FRXSKDG³VWUXFN a rude blow at their amour-SURSUH ´ %ULWLVK (PEDVV\
Dispatch No. 35, March 19 1952), he was generally less concerned with the 
demise of democracy and much more concerned with the stability and pro-
business policies Batista was expected to support.   
However, the United States ambassador Willard Beaulac was much more 
concerned by the break in constitution process. He argued that, whilst many in 
Washington disliked the Auténticos and would have been pleased to see 
%DWLVWD UHWXUQ YLD WKHEDOORW ER[³PDQ\ ZHre unable to stomach his success as 
DUHVXOW RIXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO SURFHGXUH ´ British Embassy, Dispatch No. 35, 
March 19 1952). The British claimed that, in the days following the coup, the 
8QLWHG 6WDWHVKDGPDGH ³IUDQWLF HIIRUWV WRPDNHDQKRQHVW ZRPDQ RI Miss 
&XEDDIWHU KHU XQIRUWXQDWH GHYLDWLRQ IURP WKHGHPRFUDWLF SDWKRI YLUWXH´ (Ibid). 
They speculated that the United States might pressure Batista to appoint a 
provisional president (in the fashion of his puppet presidents of the 1930s) 
until fresh elections could be held. Batista confided in his close friend, the 
  
 
American lawyer Lawrence Berenson (who became the President of the Cuban 
Chamber of Commerce in the United States), his nervousness at the United 
States SXEOLF¶V UHDFWLRQ WRKLV FRXSWRWKLV HQG, he sought to employ another 
American, his friend (and journalist) Edmund Chester, as his public relations 
representative (Embassy of the United States, Dispatch 1604, march 27 1952). 
Batista also called upon other high-profile friends in the United States to 
restore his reputation, including the US Army Colonel, Elliot Roosevelt (son of 
the former United States president Franklin D. Roosevelt); Roosevelt visited 
Batista in the days following the coup and publicly supported the caudillo, 
GHFODULQJ WKDW ³,feel very friendly towards General Batista whom I have 
known for many years and who was a great friend of my father. I believe and 
hope that General Batista will carry out a constructive work of government 
ZKLFK ZLOO SRVLWLYHO\ EHQHILW &XED ´ Havana Post, March 15 1952:1).  
López Civeira frames the coup in the context of the cold war and suggests that 
agencies of the United States government implicitly engineered the coup:  
³%HIRUH WKHFRXS(OOLRW 5RRVHYHOW FDPH WR&XEDRIILFLDOO\ RQEXVLQHVV KHPHW
privately with Batista and on the very day of the coup communicated 
telephonically with Washington that the plans had been fulfilled, immediately 
after Batista was installed in the presidential palace he visited with a group of 
North Americans. There was also a direct U.S. presence during events, a U.S.  
Officer was in Campamento Columbia  during the entirety of the coup, as well 
DVWZR861DY\2IILFHUV ´ /ySH]-Civeira, 1990:67 - translated by Author) 
Whilst it true that the Elliot Roosevelt had indeed visited Batista before and 
after the coup, and was known to have enjoyed excellent relations with the 
*HQHUDO VWHPPLQJ IURP %DWLVWD¶V ILUVW WHQXUH LQSRZHUWKHUH LV QRWDQ\
evidence to suggest that Roosevelt represented the United States in any official 
or unofficial capacity, rather, it is clear that Roosevelt was simply a 
businessman as he claimed to be. There is equally no evidence to suggest that 
United States military personnel based at Campamento Columbia in March 
1952 participated or influenced the coup in any way. United States military 
personnel presence had been routinely present for many years and was related 
to the United States presence at Guantanamo Bay. Research behind this study 
suggests that the claims made by López-Civeira are unsubstantiated.       
Batista had requested recognition from the United States on the day of the 
coup (Embassy of the United States, Dispatch 0287, March 10 1952), but was 
informed by the United States Secretary Of State, Dean Acheson, that relations 
ZHUH³WpFQLFDPHQWH HQVXVSHQVR ´ Diario de la Marina, March 13 1952:1). 
Washington was furious with the unconstitutional manner in which Batista had 
come to power. British Embassy dispatches show that the United Kingdom 
was waiting for the United States to recognise the Batista regime first, and was 
surprised and nervous that this recognition was taking so long. The Dominican 
Republic dictator Trujillo had been the first to recognise the regime on March 
11 (Alerta, March 12 1952:1), and Spain had done so on March 17 (Diario de 
la Marina, March 18 1952:1). After a long wait for the United States, the 
British ambassador had finally been instructed to meet the new minister of 
State, Miguel Angel de la Campa y Caraveda, on March 26, to recognise the 
  
 
new government. Holman reported that LWZDVDEULHI PHHWLQJ ³ZLWK WKLV NLQGO\
and rather colourless and moth eaten old gentleman, who had been on the shelf 
VLQFH  ´WKH&DQDGLDQ DPEDVVDGRU concurred WKDW WKH ³RQO\ PLVVLQJ ZDV
WKHPRWKEDOO´  British Embassy, Dispatch 43, April 2 1952). The British had 
ultimately feared that waiting any longer could endanger the Cuban-Anglo 
commercial agreement which had been signed in 1951, as well as other British 
interests (such as United Railways and the Leyland Bus contracts). The United 
States finally recognised the regime on March 27, by which time 21 other 
countries had already agreed recognition (Diario de la Marina, March 28 
1952:1). This delay demonstrated the disapproval of the coup in Washington. 
The Havana Post ODWHUZURWH WKDW ³DJUHDW SDUWRf the Cuban population awaited 
the recognition of the Batista regime by the government of the United States as 
WKRXJK LW LPSOLHG DJUHDWHU FRQVROLGDWLRQ RIWKHGHIDFWR VLWXDWLRQ ZHFRQIURQW ´
(Havana Post, April 29 1952:1). A cartoon appeared in Carteles which 
depicted Batista in a sick bed (he had contracted chicken pox in the week 
IROORZLQJ WKH FRXSDVDGRFWRUGUHVVHGDV8QFOH 6DP DVNHG³¢&yPR VH
VLHQWH *HQHUDO" ´ DQG%DWLVWD UHSOLHG ³(VWR\ PHMRU GHVSXpVGHO
UHFRQRFLPLHQWR ´ Carteles, April 6 1952:26). Recognition by the United States 
had bestowed on the coup the required stamp of international approval.  
Batista and the Military 
Whilst the General had commanded support from various sectors of the 
country, it was his support in the military which was, and always had been, 
central to his success. Batista was a soldier, a military man who had risen 
through the ranks to become Jefe del Ejército and President. The Havana Post 
SHUWLQHQWO\ FRPPHQWHG WKDW ³WKHUH LV QRTXHVWLRQ DERXW LW%DWLVWD LV WRWKH
CuEDQ$UP\ DVWKHKHDUW LV WRWKHKXPDQ ERG\ ´ Havana Post, March 12 
1952:1).  Diario de la Marina published an insightful cartoon which depicted a 
voter proudly declaring that his candidate had the support of 43 barrios, and, 
in response, a soldier declared that his candidate only had the support of one 
barrio: Campamento Columbia (Diario de la Marina, March 23:7).  
,QRUGHUWRDSSUHFLDWH WKH VLJQLILFDQFH RI%DWLVWD¶V ULVH LQ LW LV XVHIXO WR
review the preceding historical context. 7KH8QLWHG 6WDWHV¶ authorities had 
dissolved the Ejército Liberador (Cuban army of independence) during its first 
occupation of Cuba (1892 until 1902), and had left behind a poorly-armed and 
poorly-trained Guardia Rural. The Guard, as its name suggest, was primarily 
assigned to policing the countryside, but was unable to respond effectively to 
serious disorder. Subsequent rebellion in 1905 had left Cuba in a state of 
LQVXUUHFWLRQ DQG VDZWKH UHWXUQ RI8QLWHG 6WDWHV¶ RFFXSDWLRQ DVDUHVXOW RI WKH
Platt Amendment which permitted United States to intervene militarily in 
Cuban affairs). The inability of Cubans to control the rebellion themselves had 
been largely a result of having no permanent standing army (Thomas, 
1971:282). The second occupation (1906 until 1909) therefore resulted in the 
establishment of an Ejército Permanente (Permanent Army). United States 
occupation Governor, Charles Magoon, announced the establishment of the 
$UP\ LQ $SULO ³*HQHUDO $OHMDQGUR 5RGULJXH] VKDOO EHLQ command, and   
artillery, including mountain rapid fire guns, constitutes the basis of the new 
DUP\ ´ The New York Times: April 5, 1908). By orchestrating the 
  
 
establishment of a permanent army, the United States authorities primarily 
aimed to ensure stability and therefore safeguard their own economic interests 
RQWKH LVODQG +RZHYHU LQ LWV ILUVW \HDUV WKHDUP\ EHFDPH³PRUH UHVSRQVLYH WR
WKHQHHGVRI$PHULFDQ SROLF\ REMHFWLYHV ´ WKDQ WRSURWHFWLQJ &XEDQ
VRYHUHLJQW\ 3pUH]DUJXHV WKDW WKLV ³GLSORPDWLF LPSHUDWLYH ´ UHVXOWHG LQ DSDWWHUQ
of contiQXLVPR ZKLFK FDPHGHILQH WKH DUP\¶V UROH LQ WKH5HSXEOLF IRU
JHQHUDWLRQV 3HUH] +HDUJXHV WKDW WKHDUP\¶V ODFNRIKLVWRULFDO
tradition and lack of Cuban input in its creation and development left it apart 
IURP QDWLRQDO LQWHUHVWV ³WKH DUPHG LQVWitution, lacking historicity, grew 
LQFUHDVLQJO\ HVWUDQJHG IURP QDWLRQDO WUDGLWLRQV ´ 3HUH] [YL  
When Batista joined the 11,000-strong army in 1921 as a private, he had joined 
an extremely elitist institution. Enlisted men were treated appallingly by their 
officers, and countless rules existed to ingrain a sense of inferiority amongst 
the enlisted soldiers: they were required to leave a public place if an officer 
appeared, they would travel in third class whilst officers travelled in first class 
and they would live and dine in appalling conditions while officers enjoyed 
opulence. Some enlisted men were even required to work as domestic servants 
to, and perform household chores for, their officers (Argote Freye, 2006:25). 
The army was also outrageously corrupt: it was not unusual for the Cuban 
treasury to fund more army positions than actually existed, with the extra funds 
being pocketed by high ranking officers. Officers received financial rewards 
for assisting one politician or another. Consecutive presidents used the military 
as a political tool, serving party political interests rather than national 
QHFHVVLW\ 7KH DUP\ URXWLQHO\ LQIOXHQFHG HOHFWLRQ UHVXOWV ³WKHPLOLWDU\
frequently played a role in national elections, favouring one candidate over 
anoWKHU E\PHDQV RILQWLPLGDWLRQ RURXWULJKW IUDXG ´ $UJRWH )UH\UH 
(YHQ DUP\ GLVFLSOLQH GHSHQGHGRQSROLWLFDO SHUVXDVLRQ ³SXQLVKPHQW IRU
VHULRXV EUHDFKRIGLVFLSOLQH ZDVRIWHQ YLWLDWHG E\SROLWLFDO LQWHUYHQWLRQ ´ 3pUH]
2009:31). It was not until the revolución de los sargentos in September 1933, 
that the dominance of the military by the Cuban elites was broken; but, rather 
WKDQ UHVROYLQJ WKHVHSUREOHPV %DWLVWD¶V ZRUNLQJ-class sergeants simply 
replaced the middle-class officers in becoming the milLWDU\¶V QHZEHQHIDFWRUV
The revolt of 1933 created a powerful group of officers who became known as 
the septembristas; perhaps the most prominent of the group were Francisco 
Tabernilla and José Pedraza.  These officers owed their positions to Batista and 
benefited most from his rule until 1944, but many survived throughout the 
Auténtico era until 1952.     
Grau did purge some of the septembristas on coming to power in 1944, but he 
PRUHJHQHUDOO\ ZRUNHGWRGLPLQLVK WKHPLOLWDU\¶V UROH LQ SROLWLFV DQGUHOLHd 
more on the support of the grupos de accíon than the Cuban army. The army 
lost power and influence during the Auténtico era, and by 1952 the old guard 
(many of them septembristas) felt pushed aside by the government, as the 
PLOLWDU\¶V UROH LQ WKHFHQWUH  of Cuban political life diminished; many feared 
that a third autenticismo victory would permanently exclude them from the 
benefits of power. Meanwhile, a significant group of young officers (known as 
puros), who had been the first generation of the professional training 
academies IHOW ³WKRURXJKO\ GLVJXVWHG ZLWK WKH FRUUXSWLRQ DQGJDQJVWHULVP ´ RI
the government (Ameringer, 2000:179). Auténtico corruption and complicity 
  
 
in pistolerismo inspired little confidence or respect in all ranks in the military. 
Pérez DUJXHV WKDW WKH ³DVVDVVLQDWLRQV DQGJDQVWHULVLPR H[SRVHGWKH LQDELOLW\
of civilian leadership to underwrite order and stability, discrediting the   
government and senior (Auténtico) army commanders in the eyes of the young 
SURIHVVLRQDO VROGLHUV ´ 3pUH] 1976:126). Furthermore, the Auténticos had 
DSSRLQWHG XQSRSXODU KLJK FRPPDQGV *UDX¶V GHVSLVHG Jefe del Ejército, 
Genovevo Pérez Damara, was the perfect example of the pro-Auténtico 
officers who were unpopular, incompetent and commanded little loyalty 
amongst the rank and file (Embassy of the United States, Dispatch A-437, 
March 2 1945).  
García-Pérez identifies three distinct bases of Batista support within the armed 
forces: puros, tanquistas and serving or retired septembristas. The puros were 
young professional officers who were appalled by the politicking, deal-making 
and corruption of the Auténticos. Tanquistas were comprised primarily of 
³FRUUXSW KDUG-OLQH ´ *DUFtD-Perez, 1998:4) captains and lieutenants, who were 
frustrated by the lack of promotion opportunities under the civilian 
administrations. The third, septembrista, group consisted of officers purged by 
the Auténticos since 1944 (most notably  Tabernilla, Carlos Cantillo and 
Ramón E. Cruz y Vidal), or still serving officers (such as Rafael Salas 
Cañizares and Dámaso Sogo) who feared being displaced permanently by a 
third autenticismo electoral victory. García-Pérez concludes that the primary  
GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQDQG³was that instead of organizing sergeants 
and enlisted men, on this occasion he (Batista) organized captains and 
lLHXWHQDQWV ´ *DUFtD-Perez, 1998:5).  
0XFKRI%DWLVWD¶V VXSSRUWZDVQHSRWLVWLF DQGGHULYHG IURP DIHZSRZHUIXO
military families. The Tabernilla family was the most notable of these. Family 
patriarch Francisco Tabernilla (who became Jefe del Ejército after March 10) 
was a enormously respected and influential professional soldier, who had 
supported Batista since 1933; his three sons (Francisco, Carlos and Marcelo) 
had all been high-ranking officers who had retired with Batista in 1944 and 
who returned to support him in 1952 (two ultimately became brigadier 
generals and one a lieutenant colonel). Similar dynasties included the 
Cañizares, García and Cantillo families; allies or members of these (almost 
feudal) familial dynasties were responsible for seizing and consolidating many 
of the military commands throughout the country on March 10, and Batista 
could not have succeeded without the support of these networks of support 
(Pérez, 1976:146-147).   
The golpe had the effect of renewing the preeminence of the military, returning 
it to the centre of Cuban political life (and to the prestige and financial benefits 
that came with this). Pérez-Stable argues that the young officers (who had been 
the original conspirators) had turned to Batista for leadership, as a result of his 
experience, influence and the general support that he commanded amongst the 
ranks (Pérez-Stable 1999:52). The United States Embassy concurs that the 
young puro officers had been the original conspirators and had even set the 
date of March 10, to which Batista agreed (Embassy of the United States, 
Dispatch 1604, march 27 1952); but the coup could not have succeeded 
ZLWKRXW %DWLVWD¶V OHDGHUVKLS DQGSRSXODULW\ DPRQJVW WKHVROGLHUV 1RRWKHU
  
 
leader could have persuaded the soldiers at Campamento Columbia to revolt as 
Batista had could:  
³,W LV VLPSO\ DFDVHZKHUH DQHORTXHQW VSHDNHUGRPLQDWHV WKHHPRWLRQV RIKLV
listeners like a great master draws inspiring music from a Stradivarius. That 
same instrument, in unskilled hands, perhaps would produce nothing but a 
series of discordant notes . . . what Batista is best at doing is standing before a 
crowd of men as he did yesterday at Columbia while telling them that he is just 
a common, humble soldier, convincing them that he was sent to lead them in 
WKH IXOILOOPHQW RIWKHLU GHVWLQ\  ´ (Havana Post, March 12 1952:1) 
The golpe had surprised everybody on March 10, but no group had the means 
RIUHVLVWLQJ %DWLVWD¶V OR\DO VROGLHUV 7KH DYHUDJH &XEDQZDVQRWLQYHVWHG
enough in the democratic system to consider fighting (and possibly dying) for 
LW0DQ\SHRSOH¶V H[SHULHQFH RIWKH µFRQVWLWXWLRQDO SURFHVV¶ KDGEHHQ
overwhelmingly negative and they attached little loyalty to the system. To 
many, Batista was a known quantity and most settled for Batista with relief; 
7KRPDV DUJXHV WKDW ³WKH SURVWLWXWHV RI9LUWXH 6WUHHWNQHZ WKDW WKH VXEVWLWXWLRQ
RI%DWLVWD IRU3UtR LQ WKH1DWLRQDO 3DODFHZRXOG PDNH OLWWOH GLIIHUHQFH WRWKHP ´
(Thomas, 1971:503). The CTC leadership were apparently prepared to work 
with anybody as long as they received government money; Mujal was 
probably relieved that the Ortodoxos would not be given a chance to win the 
election (which likely would have resulted in an end to the government 
subsidy). Much of the electorate was sickened by the corruption and political 
violence of the Auténtico era, and the death of Chibás had left an 
unmistakeable vacuum in public life. Many Cubans must have felt that nobody 
(other than perhaps Batista) could genuinely eradicate pistolerismo and restore 
stability to the country. The rest of the autenticismo generation had been 
discredited and did not have the capacity or desire to resist the golpe. Most 
lacked the stomach to participate in armed resistance; they had already grown 
rich and accustomed to the comfort of corruption. The students, despite their 
JRRGLQWHQWLRQV ZHUHXQDUPHG DQGXQSUHSDUHG WRGREDWWOH DJDLQVW %DWLVWD¶V
tanks and machine guns in 1952. There was really little opposition to the 
golpistas until the full emergence of hungry young leaders such as Frank País, 
José Echeverría and Fidel Castro in later years; but, in the moment of March 
1952, most Cubans must have received the second Batistato with indifference, 
cautious optimism or a sigh of relief.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the Introduction it was established that we have inherited a one-dimensional 
caricature of Batista as the archetypal dictator of the tiranía. Popular culture 
and the narrative of the Cuban Revolution have successfully sold us a distorted 
and oversimplified perception of pre-revolutionary Cuba. The research behind 
this thesis gives a different picture; it suggests that the loss of legitimacy of the 
political system under the Auténticos directly resulted in the conditions which 
permitted the coup. Evidence suggests that there was much tolerance of Batista 
(who was not overwhelmingly popular or unpopular), primarily because he 
was not an Auténtico.  
This thesis has stressed the clear distinction between Batista of the first 
Batistato, and the Batista of March 10 and during the second Batistato. This 
thesis suggests that Batista had many faces, and was not the same man in 1952 
that he had been in the 1930s. In December 1951 the Ortodoxo congressman 
Luis Orlando Rodriguez almost prophesied when he warned that:   
³$KRUD %DWLVWD QRHVHOVDUJHQWR IODFR GHVJUHxDGR HLQVROHQWH GHOGH
septiembre 1933, a quien resultaba natural la camisilla deportiva con que se 
disfraza de civil: es el multimillonario a costa del Presupuesto, el poseedor de 
fincas, casas GHDSDUWDPHQWRV VRFLHGDGHV DQyQLPDV \RWURVQHJRFLRV ´
(Bohemia, December 23:25) 
7KLV VWXG\ VXJJHVWV WKDW LWZDVPRUH WKDQ %DWLVWD¶V UHSXWDWLRQ DVD 
revolutionary (derived from his participation in the revolución de los 
sargentos) that accounts for the support that the armed forces gave him in 
1952. His support revolved around much more practical considerations; 
septembrista officers owed their careers to Batista (many had been lowly 
sergeants or corporals who had risen to become colonels and generals), and 
believed that Batista could re-establish the pre-eminence of the military, which 
would have been lost forever if the Ortodoxo Party had won the presidency in 
1952. Younger puro officers (who had been the original conspirators in 1952) 
were drawn to BatistD¶V SUHVWLJH DQGUHDOLVHG WKDW KLV VXSSRUWZRXOG JUHDWO\
increase their chances of success. We can therefore assume that there were 
more practical implications than just nostalgia that were responsible for the 
PLOLWDU\¶V VXSSRUW LQ  
This thesis suggests that whilst Batista attempted to become a populist leader 
in the 1930s (and to some extent succeeded). He was limited as a populist to 
WKH H[WHQW WKDW RWKHU/DWLQ $PHULFDQ OHDGHUV ZHUHQRW&XED¶VRYHUZKHOPLQJ
reliance on the zafra and the Reciprocity Treaties with the United States made 
industrialisation (and therefore economic independence) impossible. 
Furthermore, his rapid transition to social reformer in 1937, and verbatim 
DGRSWLRQ RIPXFK RI*UDX¶V µGD\JRYHUQPHQW¶ DJHQGD FRXSOHG ZLWK KLV
  
 
opportunistic alliance with the Communist Party, suggests that, whilst he was a 
VXFFHVVIXO SRSXOLVW WRVRPHH[WHQW KHZDVVXUHO\ QRW&XED¶V DQVZHU WR/i]DUR
Cárdenas or Juan Perón.  
Batista did undoubtedly leave office in 1944 reasonably popular and with some 
prestige. He had undoubtedly orchestrated a transition to a truly representative 
and honest democracy for the first time in Cuban history, overseeing some of 
the most transparent elections ever. But we should remember that, despite the 
financial backing of Batista and his friends amongst the clases económicas, the 
batistiano candidate in 1944, Carlos Saladrigas Zayas, lost the election. It 
seems plausible therefore that Batista owed any support he may have had to 
individual achievements and his hombre fuerte persona, rather than any 
visionary political platform. The ex-caudillo did not leave office either as a 
wildly popular or a deeply unpopular figure, but Grau was the man of the 
moment in 1944.   
This study has suggested that the Auténticos had wasted the hopes of many 
&XEDQVZLWK LQHIILFLHQW DQGFRUUXSW JRYHUQDQFH *UDXKDGRIIHUHG µDSRWRI
JROG DQG DQHDV\FKDLU¶ WRKLV SROLWLFDO DOOLHV DQGJRYHUQPHQW PLQLVWHUV +LV
successor did not do much better; the newspaper editorial of Alerta aptly 
summed up thH3UtRSUHVLGHQF\ ³(O QHSRWLVLPR HOIDYRULWLVPR \ODV FDPDULOODV
LQIOX\HQWHV JUDYLWDQ GHFLVDPHQWH HQODGpELO YROXQWDG GHO3UHVLGHQWH ´ Alerta. 
October 11 1950:1). Whilst the research for this thesis found no compelling 
evidence to suggest that the dawn of 1952 found a nation in the grip of 
³FKDRWLF FRQGLWLRQV ZKLFK HQGDQJHUHG OLYHV DQGSURSHUW\ ´ %DWLVWD  LW
does suggest that there was some degree of disorder and that much of the basis 
of support or tolerance for the coup originated from the excesses of the 
Auténtico era.  
)URPH[LOH 3UtRFRPPHQWHG WKDW WKH FRXSZDV ³1HLWKHU ULJKW QRUOHIW QRU
centrist. It is nothing more than a military coup in which one caudillo takes 
SRZHUIRU KLPVHOI DQGGLYLGHG XSWKHFRPPDQGV DPRQJ KLV VXSSRUWHUV ´
(Havana Post, March 14:1). This thesis has demonstrated that, whilst this may 
have been true, it did not necessarily mean that most Cubans opposed the 
action. Research has demonstrated that support for the golpistas came from 
(admittedly) predictable sectors of Cuban society, but also attracted the 
surprising support of the CTC and some confused PSP members. This study 
has also dispelled the assumption that the United States government supported 
%DWLVWD¶V UHWXUQ LQ DQGLQ IDFWZHUHIXULRXV DWWKHEUHDNLQ constitutional 
process. Ameringer and Thomas argue that Cuban people would have fought 
tooth and nail against the coup if they had suspected that the constitutional 
process had been permanently discarded, there seems no evidence to suggest 
that any group had the capacity to resist, or the desire (with the possible 
exception of a very small number of FEU students).  
This thesis has thrown up many questions in need of further investigation. The 
historiography does not account for the mechanism of batistiano support. 
Whilst Louis Pérez touches on his closest collaborators (such as José Pedraza 
and Francisco Tabernilla), no study really accounts for these pivotal historical 
figures (who were at one time or another the second most powerful figures in 
  
 
Cuba). The RUJDQLVDWLRQ RI%DWLVWD¶V SROLWLFDO SDUW\ 3$8 LVHTXDOO\ VKURXGHG
in obscurity. There is, therefore, a definite need for further investigation of this 
topic.  
Whereas we would have expected the military, capitalists, conservatives and so 
on to support Batista (for the reasons investigated throughout this thesis), what 
the research behind this study has demonstrated is the remarkable degree of 
apathy and tolerance of him in 1952.  In the days following the coup, 
7DEHUQLOOD FODLPHG WKDW ³1RWRQO\ LV&XEDFalm, but also contented. The man 
in the street is cheerful and does not hide his satisfaction over the security 
which is offered him by the provisional government, based on the prestige 
HQMR\HG E\*HQHUDO %DWLVWD ´ Havana Post, March 18 1952:1). This thesis can 
conclude that whilst the coup was indeed met with calm, Batista was not 
popular enough in 1952 to inspire µFKHHUIXOQHVV¶ DPRQJVW WKHPDMRULW\ RI WKH
population.  
Fulgencio Batista had begun his career as a revolutionary sergeant and 
subsequently underwent many incarnations before ending his career in 
disgrace, slipping away in the early hours of January 1 1959, with a plane full 
of cronies and suitcases full of gold. But in the moment of March 10 1952 
(after almost eight years of Auténtico government), many Cubans must have 
remembered the old Cuban proverb: con un cambio de actividad se renuevan 
ODV HQHUJtDV µDFKDQJH LV DVJRRGDVDUHVW¶,QFRQYHQLHQW DWUXWK LWPD\ EH
ZKHQ %DWLVWD GHFODUHG WKDW KHZDVµEDFNDJDLQ¶ RQ0DUFKPXFK RI
Cuba breathed a sigh of relief and some even vested hopes for change in 
&XED¶Vhombre fuerte.         
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